Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
6 New York opinions name it 2 courts 1976–1983 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hobsongreen2 sentences1981The first, the Donovan-Arthur rule, holds that once an attorney enters the proceeding, no waiver of rights may be extracted from a defendant without the attorney being present (e.g., People v Hobson, 39 NY2d 479 ). 1981The first, the Donovan-Arthur rule, holds that once an attorney enters the proceeding, no waiver of rights may be extracted from a defendant without the attorney being present (e.g., People v Hobson, 39 NY2d 479 ). | 1 | 3 |
People v. Vellagreen1 sentence1980The Taylor exception rearticulated in People v Hobson ( 39 NY2d 479 , supra) was later refined and limited in a series of cases (see People v Ermo, 47 NY2d 863 ; People v Carl, 46 NY2d 806 ; People v Ramos, 40 NY2d 610 ; see, also, People v Vella, 21 NY2d 249; but cf. People v Coleman, 43 NY2d 222 ; People v Clark, 41 NY2d 612 ). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cunninghamgreen2 sentences1980This was followed by a long, and, at times, confusing effort to clarify the scope of the Donovan-Arthur rule with regard to matters unrelated to an action in which a defendant already had legal representation (see People v Rogers, 48 NY2d 167, 171 , supra; People v Cunningham, supra, p 209). 1980This was followed by a long, and, at times, confusing effort to clarify the scope of the Donovan-Arthur rule with regard to matters unrelated to an action in which a defendant already had legal representation (see People v Rogers, 48 NY2d 167, 171 , supra; People v Cunningham, supra, p 209). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Colemangreen2 sentences1980The Taylor exception rearticulated in People v Hobson ( 39 NY2d 479 , supra) was later refined and limited in a series of cases (see People v Ermo, 47 NY2d 863 ; People v Carl, 46 NY2d 806 ; People v Ramos, 40 NY2d 610 ; see, also, People v Vella, 21 NY2d 249; but cf. People v Coleman, 43 NY2d 222 ; People v Clark, 41 NY2d 612 ). 1979We have, until today, always held that a defendant may waive counsel without having an attorney present although he is represented by counsel on an entirely unrelated pending charge (see, e.g., People v Stanley, 15 NY2d 30 ; People v Simons, 22 NY2d 533 ; People v Hetherington, 27 NY2d 242 ; People v Taylor, 27 NY2d 327 ; People v Clark, 41 NY2d 612 ; People v Coleman, 43 NY2d 222 ). | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Arthur
green
2 sentences1983Not applicable either is the Donovan-Arthur rule (People v Donovan, 13 NY2d 148 ; People v Arthur, 22 NY2d 325 ), which precludes questioning in counsel’s absence once counsel in fact has entered the picture (see People v Angus, 56 NY2d 549 , affg 81 AD2d 971 ). 1983Not applicable either is the Donovan-Arthur rule (People v Donovan, 13 NY2d 148 ; People v Arthur, 22 NY2d 325 ), which precludes questioning in counsel’s absence once counsel in fact has entered the picture (see People v Angus, 56 NY2d 549 , affg 81 AD2d 971 ). | 4 | 1976–1983 |
People v. Donovan
green
2 sentences1983Not applicable either is the Donovan-Arthur rule (People v Donovan, 13 NY2d 148 ; People v Arthur, 22 NY2d 325 ), which precludes questioning in counsel’s absence once counsel in fact has entered the picture (see People v Angus, 56 NY2d 549 , affg 81 AD2d 971 ). 1983Not applicable either is the Donovan-Arthur rule (People v Donovan, 13 NY2d 148 ; People v Arthur, 22 NY2d 325 ), which precludes questioning in counsel’s absence once counsel in fact has entered the picture (see People v Angus, 56 NY2d 549 , affg 81 AD2d 971 ). | 2 | 1979–1983 |
People v. Hetherington
green
2 sentences1980An exception was carved out in People v Taylor ( 27 NY2d 327, 332 ) to the effect that the Donovan-Arthur rule did not obtain unless and until the police or prosecutor learned that an attorney had been secured "to assist the accused in defending against the specific charges for which he is held” (emphasis in original) (see, also, People v Hetherington, 27 NY2d 242 ). 1980An exception was carved out in People v Taylor ( 27 NY2d 327, 332 ) to the effect that the Donovan-Arthur rule did not obtain unless and until the police or prosecutor learned that an attorney had been secured "to assist the accused in defending against the specific charges for which he is held” (emphasis in original) (see, also, People v Hetherington, 27 NY2d 242 ). | 2 | 1979–1980 |
People v. Taylor
green
2 sentences1980An exception was carved out in People v Taylor ( 27 NY2d 327, 332 ) to the effect that the Donovan-Arthur rule did not obtain unless and until the police or prosecutor learned that an attorney had been secured "to assist the accused in defending against the specific charges for which he is held” (emphasis in original) (see, also, People v Hetherington, 27 NY2d 242 ). 1980An exception was carved out in People v Taylor ( 27 NY2d 327, 332 ) to the effect that the Donovan-Arthur rule did not obtain unless and until the police or prosecutor learned that an attorney had been secured "to assist the accused in defending against the specific charges for which he is held” (emphasis in original) (see, also, People v Hetherington, 27 NY2d 242 ). | 2 | 1979–1980 |
People v. Ramos
green
2 sentences1980The Taylor exception rearticulated in People v Hobson ( 39 NY2d 479 , supra) was later refined and limited in a series of cases (see People v Ermo, 47 NY2d 863 ; People v Carl, 46 NY2d 806 ; People v Ramos, 40 NY2d 610 ; see, also, People v Vella, 21 NY2d 249; but cf. People v Coleman, 43 NY2d 222 ; People v Clark, 41 NY2d 612 ). 1978Any ambiguity in the manner in which Rill undertook to expand his representation of defendant cannot be permitted to constitute a waiver of his right to counsel in the absence of the attorney (People v Ramos, supra, p 618 ). | 2 | 1978–1980 |
People v. Angus
green
2 sentences1983Not applicable either is the Donovan-Arthur rule (People v Donovan, 13 NY2d 148 ; People v Arthur, 22 NY2d 325 ), which precludes questioning in counsel’s absence once counsel in fact has entered the picture (see People v Angus, 56 NY2d 549 , affg 81 AD2d 971 ). 1983Not applicable either is the Donovan-Arthur rule (People v Donovan, 13 NY2d 148 ; People v Arthur, 22 NY2d 325 ), which precludes questioning in counsel’s absence once counsel in fact has entered the picture (see People v Angus, 56 NY2d 549 , affg 81 AD2d 971 ). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
People v. Angus
green
2 sentences1983Not applicable either is the Donovan-Arthur rule (People v Donovan, 13 NY2d 148 ; People v Arthur, 22 NY2d 325 ), which precludes questioning in counsel’s absence once counsel in fact has entered the picture (see People v Angus, 56 NY2d 549 , affg 81 AD2d 971 ). 1983Not applicable either is the Donovan-Arthur rule (People v Donovan, 13 NY2d 148 ; People v Arthur, 22 NY2d 325 ), which precludes questioning in counsel’s absence once counsel in fact has entered the picture (see People v Angus, 56 NY2d 549 , affg 81 AD2d 971 ). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
People v. Settles
green
2 sentences1981Under the second rule, which may be referred to as the Settles-Samuels doctrine, the nonwaivability principle attaches upon actual commencement of the criminal proceeding (e.g., People v Samuels, 49 NY2d 218 , supra; People v Settles, 46 NY2d 154 ). 1981Under the second rule, which may be referred to as the Settles-Samuels doctrine, the nonwaivability principle attaches upon actual commencement of the criminal proceeding (e.g., People v Samuels, 49 NY2d 218 , supra; People v Settles, 46 NY2d 154 ). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
People v. Samuels
green
2 sentences1981Under the second rule, which may be referred to as the Settles-Samuels doctrine, the nonwaivability principle attaches upon actual commencement of the criminal proceeding (e.g., People v Samuels, 49 NY2d 218 , supra; People v Settles, 46 NY2d 154 ). 1981Under the second rule, which may be referred to as the Settles-Samuels doctrine, the nonwaivability principle attaches upon actual commencement of the criminal proceeding (e.g., People v Samuels, 49 NY2d 218 , supra; People v Settles, 46 NY2d 154 ). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
People v. Carl
green
1 sentence1980The Taylor exception rearticulated in People v Hobson ( 39 NY2d 479 , supra) was later refined and limited in a series of cases (see People v Ermo, 47 NY2d 863 ; People v Carl, 46 NY2d 806 ; People v Ramos, 40 NY2d 610 ; see, also, People v Vella, 21 NY2d 249; but cf. People v Coleman, 43 NY2d 222 ; People v Clark, 41 NY2d 612 ). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
People v. Ermo
green
1 sentence1980The Taylor exception rearticulated in People v Hobson ( 39 NY2d 479 , supra) was later refined and limited in a series of cases (see People v Ermo, 47 NY2d 863 ; People v Carl, 46 NY2d 806 ; People v Ramos, 40 NY2d 610 ; see, also, People v Vella, 21 NY2d 249; but cf. People v Coleman, 43 NY2d 222 ; People v Clark, 41 NY2d 612 ). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
People v. Rogers
green
2 sentences1980This was followed by a long, and, at times, confusing effort to clarify the scope of the Donovan-Arthur rule with regard to matters unrelated to an action in which a defendant already had legal representation (see People v Rogers, 48 NY2d 167, 171 , supra; People v Cunningham, supra, p 209). 1980This was followed by a long, and, at times, confusing effort to clarify the scope of the Donovan-Arthur rule with regard to matters unrelated to an action in which a defendant already had legal representation (see People v Rogers, 48 NY2d 167, 171 , supra; People v Cunningham, supra, p 209). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
People v. Simons
green
2 sentences1979We have, until today, always held that a defendant may waive counsel without having an attorney present although he is represented by counsel on an entirely unrelated pending charge (see, e.g., People v Stanley, 15 NY2d 30 ; People v Simons, 22 NY2d 533 ; People v Hetherington, 27 NY2d 242 ; People v Taylor, 27 NY2d 327 ; People v Clark, 41 NY2d 612 ; People v Coleman, 43 NY2d 222 ). 1979We have, until today, always held that a defendant may waive counsel without having an attorney present although he is represented by counsel on an entirely unrelated pending charge (see, e.g., People v Stanley, 15 NY2d 30 ; People v Simons, 22 NY2d 533 ; People v Hetherington, 27 NY2d 242 ; People v Taylor, 27 NY2d 327 ; People v Clark, 41 NY2d 612 ; People v Coleman, 43 NY2d 222 ). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
People v. Stanley
green
2 sentences1979We have, until today, always held that a defendant may waive counsel without having an attorney present although he is represented by counsel on an entirely unrelated pending charge (see, e.g., People v Stanley, 15 NY2d 30 ; People v Simons, 22 NY2d 533 ; People v Hetherington, 27 NY2d 242 ; People v Taylor, 27 NY2d 327 ; People v Clark, 41 NY2d 612 ; People v Coleman, 43 NY2d 222 ). 1979We have, until today, always held that a defendant may waive counsel without having an attorney present although he is represented by counsel on an entirely unrelated pending charge (see, e.g., People v Stanley, 15 NY2d 30 ; People v Simons, 22 NY2d 533 ; People v Hetherington, 27 NY2d 242 ; People v Taylor, 27 NY2d 327 ; People v Clark, 41 NY2d 612 ; People v Coleman, 43 NY2d 222 ). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Chapman v. California
red
2 sentences1976(People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237 ; Chapman v California, 386 US 18, 24 .) Where crucial self incriminating evidence was erroneously placed before a trial jury or where a defendant’s guilty plea resulted from an erroneous denial of his suppression motion, such error would not, ordinarily, be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 1976(People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237 ; Chapman v California, 386 US 18, 24 .) Where crucial self incriminating evidence was erroneously placed before a trial jury or where a defendant’s guilty plea resulted from an erroneous denial of his suppression motion, such error would not, ordinarily, be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
People v. Crimmins
green
2 sentences1976(People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237 ; Chapman v California, 386 US 18, 24 .) Where crucial self incriminating evidence was erroneously placed before a trial jury or where a defendant’s guilty plea resulted from an erroneous denial of his suppression motion, such error would not, ordinarily, be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 1976(People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237 ; Chapman v California, 386 US 18, 24 .) Where crucial self incriminating evidence was erroneously placed before a trial jury or where a defendant’s guilty plea resulted from an erroneous denial of his suppression motion, such error would not, ordinarily, be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 1976–1976 |