first sentence rule in New York

2014Assuming, arguendo, that a grand jury may be given a “continue deliberating” type instruction when their vote does not authorize any affirmative grand jury action be taken, such instruction certainly cannot be “unbalanced and coercive.” (Aponte, 2 NY3d at 305 .) Here, the first sentence of the instruction given is decidedly unbalanced and coercive.

1959(Tooker v. Arnoux, 76 N. Y. 397, 401 ; see, also, 3 Carmody, New York Practice, § 934, p. 1810.) It is true that in the Tooker case the Court of Appeals was construing that portion of section 162 of the Code of Procedure which, with minor amendment not significant here, later became the first sentence of section 534 of the Code of Civil Procedure and is now the first sentence of rule 94 of our Buies of Civil Practice.

1953The first sentence of rule 81 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly states “ (1) These rules (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure — insertion mine) do not apply to proceedings in admiralty.” This quoted sentence specifically excludes the provisions of subdivision (a) of rule 20 of the Federal Rules that “ All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of la

1953These views are confirmed by the decisions of the Appellate Division of this department in Tausik v. Tausik ( 280 App. Div. 887 ), and Field v. Field ( 281 App. Div. 657 ), decided after the effective date of the rule, in which the Appellate Division in this department held that general examinations before trial in matrimonial actions will not be permitted as a matter of policy in the absence of special circumstances.

1953These views are confirmed by the decisions of the Appellate Division of this department in Tausik v. Tausik ( 280 App. Div. 887 ), and Field v. Field ( 281 App. Div. 657 ), decided after the effective date of the rule, in which the Appellate Division in this department held that general examinations before trial in matrimonial actions will not be permitted as a matter of policy in the absence of special circumstances.

1911(Jones Const. Cont. 302; Jackson v. Topping, 1 Wend. 388, 396 .) Let us transpose the order of the words of the first sentence of the clause in question, so that it reads, “The party of the second part hereby agrees to pay during the above term for the license hereby granted on all pipes electro galvanized by it during the said term a fee or royalty of 50c per 1000 feet for an output of five million or less feet per year a/nd for all pipes of an output of over five million feet per year at the rate of 30c per 1000 feet.” It now appears quite clearly that the entire price is not made to depend