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6 New York opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rollins v. New York City Board of Educationgreen2 sentences2023Accordingly, plaintiff now is unable to assert that Lenox Hill owed her a duty of care in opposition to Lenox Hill's motion for summary judgment ( Rollins v New York City Bd. of Educ ., 68 AD3d 540, 541 [1st Dept 2009] [as the plaintiff did not plead a special relationship in the notice of claim or complaint, she could not rely on it to oppose defendant's summary judgment motion]). 2023Accordingly, plaintiff now is unable to assert that Lenox Hill owed her a duty of care in opposition to Lenox Hill's motion for summary judgment ( Rollins v New York City Bd. of Educ ., 68 AD3d 540, 541 [1st Dept 2009] [as the plaintiff did not plead a special relationship in the notice of claim or complaint, she could not rely on it to oppose defendant's summary judgment motion]). | 2 | 2 |
Shectman v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2012Here, the Lenox Hill defendants made a prima facie showing that there was no departure from accepted practice, and that in any event, their actions or inactions did not proximately cause the plaintiffs injuries (see Shectman v Wilson, 68 AD3d 848, 849-850 [2009]). 2012Here, the Lenox Hill defendants made a prima facie showing that there was no departure from accepted practice, and that in any event, their actions or inactions did not proximately cause the plaintiffs injuries (see Shectman v Wilson, 68 AD3d 848, 849-850 [2009]). | 2 | 2 |
Deutsch v. Chaglassiangreen2 sentences2012Finally, the Lenox Hill defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging lack of informed consent insofar as asserted against them (see Public Health Law § 2805-d [2]; Deutsch v Chaglassian, 71 AD3d 718, 719-720 [2010]; Sample v Levada, 8 AD3d 465, 467 [2004]). 2012Finally, the Lenox Hill defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging lack of informed consent insofar as asserted against them (see Public Health Law § 2805-d [2]; Deutsch v Chaglassian, 71 AD3d 718, 719-720 [2010]; Sample v Levada, 8 AD3d 465, 467 [2004]). | 2 | 2 |
Recovery of Judgment, LLC v. Warrengreen2 sentences2012Initially, contrary to the Lenox Hill defendants’ contention, under the circumstances of this case, we may consider the affirmation of the plaintiff’s expert, which was notarized in Pennsylvania, even though it lacked a certificate of conformity (see CPLR 2309 [c]; Matter of Recovery of Judgment, LLC v Warren, 91 AD3d 656, 657 [2012]; Betz v Daniel Conti, Inc., 69 AD3d 545 [2010]; Smith v Allstate Ins. 2012Initially, contrary to the Lenox Hill defendants’ contention, under the circumstances of this case, we may consider the affirmation of the plaintiff’s expert, which was notarized in Pennsylvania, even though it lacked a certificate of conformity (see CPLR 2309 [c]; Matter of Recovery of Judgment, LLC v Warren, 91 AD3d 656, 657 [2012]; Betz v Daniel Conti, Inc., 69 AD3d 545 [2010]; Smith v Allstate Ins. | 2 | 2 |
Forrest v. Tierneygreen2 sentences2012Moreover, even assuming that the Lenox Hill defendants did depart from accepted practice, the plaintiffs expert’s assertion that this departure proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries is purely speculative, and thus insufficient to defeat summary judgment (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 325 [1986]; Forrest v Tierney, 91 AD3d 707, 709 [2012]; Ramsay v Good Samaritan Hosp., 24 AD3d at 647 ). 2012Moreover, even assuming that the Lenox Hill defendants did depart from accepted practice, the plaintiffs expert’s assertion that this departure proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries is purely speculative, and thus insufficient to defeat summary judgment (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 325 [1986]; Forrest v Tierney, 91 AD3d 707, 709 [2012]; Ramsay v Good Samaritan Hosp., 24 AD3d at 647 ). | 2 | 2 |
Sample v. Levadagreen2 sentences2012Finally, the Lenox Hill defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging lack of informed consent insofar as asserted against them (see Public Health Law § 2805-d [2]; Deutsch v Chaglassian, 71 AD3d 718, 719-720 [2010]; Sample v Levada, 8 AD3d 465, 467 [2004]). 2012Finally, the Lenox Hill defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging lack of informed consent insofar as asserted against them (see Public Health Law § 2805-d [2]; Deutsch v Chaglassian, 71 AD3d 718, 719-720 [2010]; Sample v Levada, 8 AD3d 465, 467 [2004]). | 2 | 2 |
Alvarez v. Prospect Hospitalgreen2 sentences2012Moreover, even assuming that the Lenox Hill defendants did depart from accepted practice, the plaintiffs expert’s assertion that this departure proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries is purely speculative, and thus insufficient to defeat summary judgment (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 325 [1986]; Forrest v Tierney, 91 AD3d 707, 709 [2012]; Ramsay v Good Samaritan Hosp., 24 AD3d at 647 ). 2012Moreover, even assuming that the Lenox Hill defendants did depart from accepted practice, the plaintiffs expert’s assertion that this departure proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries is purely speculative, and thus insufficient to defeat summary judgment (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 325 [1986]; Forrest v Tierney, 91 AD3d 707, 709 [2012]; Ramsay v Good Samaritan Hosp., 24 AD3d at 647 ). | 2 | 2 |
Sheila C. v. Povichgreen1 sentence2024A cause of action premised upon negligent hiring must be supported by proof that the defendants either “knew, or should have known,” of their employees’ “propensity for the sort of conduct which caused the injury” (Sheila C. v Povich, 11 AD3d 120, 129-130 [1st Dept 2004]; see Kuhfeldt v. New York Presbyt./Weill Cornell Med. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Betz v. Daniel Conti, Inc.
green
2 sentences2012Initially, contrary to the Lenox Hill defendants’ contention, under the circumstances of this case, we may consider the affirmation of the plaintiff’s expert, which was notarized in Pennsylvania, even though it lacked a certificate of conformity (see CPLR 2309 [c]; Matter of Recovery of Judgment, LLC v Warren, 91 AD3d 656, 657 [2012]; Betz v Daniel Conti, Inc., 69 AD3d 545 [2010]; Smith v Allstate Ins. 2012Initially, contrary to the Lenox Hill defendants’ contention, under the circumstances of this case, we may consider the affirmation of the plaintiff’s expert, which was notarized in Pennsylvania, even though it lacked a certificate of conformity (see CPLR 2309 [c]; Matter of Recovery of Judgment, LLC v Warren, 91 AD3d 656, 657 [2012]; Betz v Daniel Conti, Inc., 69 AD3d 545 [2010]; Smith v Allstate Ins. | 2 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Jenkins
green
2 sentences2012Moreover, even assuming that the Lenox Hill defendants did depart from accepted practice, the plaintiffs expert’s assertion that this departure proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries is purely speculative, and thus insufficient to defeat summary judgment (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 325 [1986]; Forrest v Tierney, 91 AD3d 707, 709 [2012]; Ramsay v Good Samaritan Hosp., 24 AD3d at 647 ). 2012Moreover, even assuming that the Lenox Hill defendants did depart from accepted practice, the plaintiffs expert’s assertion that this departure proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries is purely speculative, and thus insufficient to defeat summary judgment (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 325 [1986]; Forrest v Tierney, 91 AD3d 707, 709 [2012]; Ramsay v Good Samaritan Hosp., 24 AD3d at 647 ). | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Smith v. Allstate Insurance
green
2 sentences2012Co., 38 AD3d 522 , 523 [2007]; see also CPLR 2001). 2012Co., 38 AD3d 522 , 523 [2007]; see also CPLR 2001). | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Levinger v. General Motors Corp.
green
1 sentence1997As a threshold matter, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to hear Lenox Hill’s motion for reargument and clarification, which was brought prior to the entry of an order and judgment on the court’s initial decision (Levinger v General Motors Corp., 122 AD2d 419, 420 ), and which addressed questions of law raised for the first time by the court’s initial decision and unforeseen by the parties at the time of submission of their initial papers (see, People v Jones, 128 AD2d 405, 407-408 , affd 70 NY2d 547 ; Ferrizz v Jahelka, 125 AD2d 537, 538 ). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Ferrizz v. Jahelka
green
1 sentence1997As a threshold matter, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to hear Lenox Hill’s motion for reargument and clarification, which was brought prior to the entry of an order and judgment on the court’s initial decision (Levinger v General Motors Corp., 122 AD2d 419, 420 ), and which addressed questions of law raised for the first time by the court’s initial decision and unforeseen by the parties at the time of submission of their initial papers (see, People v Jones, 128 AD2d 405, 407-408 , affd 70 NY2d 547 ; Ferrizz v Jahelka, 125 AD2d 537, 538 ). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
In re Safran
green
1 sentence1997As a threshold matter, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to hear Lenox Hill’s motion for reargument and clarification, which was brought prior to the entry of an order and judgment on the court’s initial decision (Levinger v General Motors Corp., 122 AD2d 419, 420 ), and which addressed questions of law raised for the first time by the court’s initial decision and unforeseen by the parties at the time of submission of their initial papers (see, People v Jones, 128 AD2d 405, 407-408 , affd 70 NY2d 547 ; Ferrizz v Jahelka, 125 AD2d 537, 538 ). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
People v. Jones
green
1 sentence1997As a threshold matter, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to hear Lenox Hill’s motion for reargument and clarification, which was brought prior to the entry of an order and judgment on the court’s initial decision (Levinger v General Motors Corp., 122 AD2d 419, 420 ), and which addressed questions of law raised for the first time by the court’s initial decision and unforeseen by the parties at the time of submission of their initial papers (see, People v Jones, 128 AD2d 405, 407-408 , affd 70 NY2d 547 ; Ferrizz v Jahelka, 125 AD2d 537, 538 ). | 1 | 1997–1997 |