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6 New York opinions name it 3 courts 2000–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Soussi v. Gobingreen1 sentence2015They demonstrated that they were exempt from liability pursuant to Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-210 (b) for their alleged failure to maintain the sidewalk abutting their property by establishing that the subject property was a single-family residence, that it was owner occupied, and that it was used solely for residential purposes (see Administrative Code of City of NY § 7-210 [b]; Saunders v Tarsia, 124 AD3d 620 [2015]; Lai-Hor Ng Yiu v Crevatas, 103 AD3d 691 [2013]; Velez v City of New York, 97 AD3d 813, 814 [2012]; Soussi v Gobin, 87 AD3d 580, 581 [2011]). | 1 | 1 |
Velez v. City of New Yorkgreen1 sentence2015They demonstrated that they were exempt from liability pursuant to Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-210 (b) for their alleged failure to maintain the sidewalk abutting their property by establishing that the subject property was a single-family residence, that it was owner occupied, and that it was used solely for residential purposes (see Administrative Code of City of NY § 7-210 [b]; Saunders v Tarsia, 124 AD3d 620 [2015]; Lai-Hor Ng Yiu v Crevatas, 103 AD3d 691 [2013]; Velez v City of New York, 97 AD3d 813, 814 [2012]; Soussi v Gobin, 87 AD3d 580, 581 [2011]). | 1 | 1 |
Alvarez v. Prospect Hospitalgreen1 sentence2015In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). | 1 | 1 |
Rahman v. Parkgreen1 sentence2009Although the court did not give the parties notice of its intention to convert that branch of the motion, such notice was not required because the cause of action, inasmuch as it rested entirely upon the construction and interpretation of an unambiguous contractual provision (cf. Rahman v Park, 63 AD3d 812, 813-814 [2009]), “exclusively involve[d] issues of law which were fully appreciated and argued by the parties” (Moutafis v Osborne, 18 AD3d 723, 724 [2005]). | 1 | 1 |
Moutafis v. Osbornegreen1 sentence2009Although the court did not give the parties notice of its intention to convert that branch of the motion, such notice was not required because the cause of action, inasmuch as it rested entirely upon the construction and interpretation of an unambiguous contractual provision (cf. Rahman v Park, 63 AD3d 812, 813-814 [2009]), “exclusively involve[d] issues of law which were fully appreciated and argued by the parties” (Moutafis v Osborne, 18 AD3d 723, 724 [2005]). | 1 | 1 |
Gonzalez v. United Parcel Servicegreen1 sentence2004Contrary to defendants’ contentions that the remaining sections state only general propositions of law, this court notes that section 23-1.5 of the Industrial Code (12 NYCRR), cited by plaintiff in his complaint, and specifically subdivision (c) (1) of that provision which applies to the facts here in issue, is “sufficiently specific to constitute [a] predicate [ ] for the imposition of liability pursuant to Labor Law § 241 (6).” (Gonzalez v United Parcel Serv., 249 AD2d 210, 211 [1st Dept 1998].) Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims under sections 200 and 241 (6) of t | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fisher v. City of New York
green
1 sentence2024Further, the defendants sufficiently demonstrated that the branch of Lin's motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action to recover on the promissory note insofar as asserted by her was premature, as facts essential to justify opposition to that branch of the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the plaintiffs and the landlord ( see CPLR 3212[f]; A. L. v Able Healthcare Servs., Inc. , 189 AD3d 813 , 813; Fisher [*3]v City of New York , 128 AD3d 763 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Lai-Hor Ng Yiu v. Crevatas
green
1 sentence2015They demonstrated that they were exempt from liability pursuant to Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-210 (b) for their alleged failure to maintain the sidewalk abutting their property by establishing that the subject property was a single-family residence, that it was owner occupied, and that it was used solely for residential purposes (see Administrative Code of City of NY § 7-210 [b]; Saunders v Tarsia, 124 AD3d 620 [2015]; Lai-Hor Ng Yiu v Crevatas, 103 AD3d 691 [2013]; Velez v City of New York, 97 AD3d 813, 814 [2012]; Soussi v Gobin, 87 AD3d 580, 581 [2011]). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Saunders v. Tarsia
neutral
1 sentence2015They demonstrated that they were exempt from liability pursuant to Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-210 (b) for their alleged failure to maintain the sidewalk abutting their property by establishing that the subject property was a single-family residence, that it was owner occupied, and that it was used solely for residential purposes (see Administrative Code of City of NY § 7-210 [b]; Saunders v Tarsia, 124 AD3d 620 [2015]; Lai-Hor Ng Yiu v Crevatas, 103 AD3d 691 [2013]; Velez v City of New York, 97 AD3d 813, 814 [2012]; Soussi v Gobin, 87 AD3d 580, 581 [2011]). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Cun-En Lin v. Holy Family Monuments
neutral
1 sentence2004Since a gantry crane is a structure for section 240 (1) purposes and the absence of a safe perch {** 3 Misc 3d at 620 }for plaintiff to have worked while reinforcing the crane was the proximate cause of his injury, plaintiff Lin's motion for partial summary judgment on the section 240 (1) claim is granted. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
People v. Burgess
green
1 sentence2000The victims’ testimony about continued threats and physical abuse provided sufficient evidence for the jury to have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the forcible conduct initially displayed in Manhattan was not remote, but rather was part of the uninterrupted use of force used in the perpetration of the sex crimes throughout the victims’ captivity (see, People v Burgess, 107 AD2d 703 , lv denied 64 NY2d 1132 ). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.