phrasing test in New York

2004The court’s phrasing of its instruction cannot be said to have gone “to the essential validity of the proceedings conducted below” so that the “entire trial [was] irreparably tainted” (People v Patterson, 39 NY2d 288, 296 [1976], affd 432 US 197 [1977]; cf. People v Andujar, 228 AD2d 194 [1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 862 [1996]; People v Rios, 215 AD2d 509 [1995], lv denied 86 NY2d 801 [1995]).

2004The court’s phrasing of its instruction cannot be said to have gone “to the essential validity of the proceedings conducted below” so that the “entire trial [was] irreparably tainted” (People v Patterson, 39 NY2d 288, 296 [1976], affd 432 US 197 [1977]; cf. People v Andujar, 228 AD2d 194 [1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 862 [1996]; People v Rios, 215 AD2d 509 [1995], lv denied 86 NY2d 801 [1995]).

2004The court’s phrasing of its instruction cannot be said to have gone “to the essential validity of the proceedings conducted below” so that the “entire trial [was] irreparably tainted” (People v Patterson, 39 NY2d 288, 296 [1976], affd 432 US 197 [1977]; cf. People v Andujar, 228 AD2d 194 [1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 862 [1996]; People v Rios, 215 AD2d 509 [1995], lv denied 86 NY2d 801 [1995]).

1994Accordingly, there was no need to administer an "expurgatory oath” to the juror, since no actual bias had been demonstrated (cf., People v Torpey, 63 NY2d 361 supra; People v Brown, 111 AD2d 248 ).

1994Accordingly, there was no need to administer an "expurgatory oath” to the juror, since no actual bias had been demonstrated (cf., People v Torpey, 63 NY2d 361 supra; People v Brown, 111 AD2d 248 ).

1983(US Code Cong & Admin News, 1976, vol 5, p 6616; Rhee v Dahan, 116 Misc 2d 548, 550 [App Term, 1st Dept]; Cocron v Cocron, 84 Misc 2d 335, 338-340 .) Here, that immunity cannot be established by the Mission.

1976They tend to convey a delusion of certitude when what is most certain is the com plexity of strands in the web of freedoms which the judge must disentangle.” (Freund, Understanding the Supreme Court, pp 27-28.) The phrasing of the test, "clear and present danger”, has since been modified so that, at this time, the court, if that test controls, must determine whether "the gravity of the ’evil’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.” (Dennis v United States, 183 F2d 201, 212, supra; Nebraska Press Assn. v Stuart, 427 US 539, 5

1972(See Merino v. Munoz, 99 App. Div. 201 .) That plaintiffs might have sought and obtained equitable relief on the same facts by way of a declaration of rights (Clark v. Mosher, 107 N. Y. 118 ; cf. Simler v. Conner, 372 U. S. 221 ), by way of requiring the assignment of documents (Mahnk v. Blanchard, 233 App. Div. 555 ) and foreclosure of liens (Pease v. Egan, 131 N. Y. 262 ), or other in personam relief, does not destroy its right to seek for and recover a money judgment which is a traditional common-law remedy. ‘ ‘ "Where relief can be as completely had either in law or equity, an action at la

1972(See Merino v. Munoz, 99 App. Div. 201 .) That plaintiffs might have sought and obtained equitable relief on the same facts by way of a declaration of rights (Clark v. Mosher, 107 N. Y. 118 ; cf. Simler v. Conner, 372 U. S. 221 ), by way of requiring the assignment of documents (Mahnk v. Blanchard, 233 App. Div. 555 ) and foreclosure of liens (Pease v. Egan, 131 N. Y. 262 ), or other in personam relief, does not destroy its right to seek for and recover a money judgment which is a traditional common-law remedy. ‘ ‘ "Where relief can be as completely had either in law or equity, an action at la

1972(See Merino v. Munoz, 99 App. Div. 201 .) That plaintiffs might have sought and obtained equitable relief on the same facts by way of a declaration of rights (Clark v. Mosher, 107 N. Y. 118 ; cf. Simler v. Conner, 372 U. S. 221 ), by way of requiring the assignment of documents (Mahnk v. Blanchard, 233 App. Div. 555 ) and foreclosure of liens (Pease v. Egan, 131 N. Y. 262 ), or other in personam relief, does not destroy its right to seek for and recover a money judgment which is a traditional common-law remedy. ‘ ‘ "Where relief can be as completely had either in law or equity, an action at la

1972(See Merino v. Munoz, 99 App. Div. 201 .) That plaintiffs might have sought and obtained equitable relief on the same facts by way of a declaration of rights (Clark v. Mosher, 107 N. Y. 118 ; cf. Simler v. Conner, 372 U. S. 221 ), by way of requiring the assignment of documents (Mahnk v. Blanchard, 233 App. Div. 555 ) and foreclosure of liens (Pease v. Egan, 131 N. Y. 262 ), or other in personam relief, does not destroy its right to seek for and recover a money judgment which is a traditional common-law remedy. ‘ ‘ "Where relief can be as completely had either in law or equity, an action at la

1972Confirming the extension of equitable principles to actions of law, the court said (p. 131) this extension was “ subject to the restriction that the mode of trial and the relief which can be given in a legal action are adapted to the exigencies of the particular case, and that the transaction is capable of adjustment by that procedure, without prejudice to the interests of third persons. ’ ’ The court repeated this phrasing of the test in Weston v. Brown ( 158 N. Y. 360 ) and it has become the settled law of this State.

1972(See Merino v. Munoz, 99 App. Div. 201 .) That plaintiffs might have sought and obtained equitable relief on the same facts by way of a declaration of rights (Clark v. Mosher, 107 N. Y. 118 ; cf. Simler v. Conner, 372 U. S. 221 ), by way of requiring the assignment of documents (Mahnk v. Blanchard, 233 App. Div. 555 ) and foreclosure of liens (Pease v. Egan, 131 N. Y. 262 ), or other in personam relief, does not destroy its right to seek for and recover a money judgment which is a traditional common-law remedy. ‘ ‘ "Where relief can be as completely had either in law or equity, an action at la

1972(See Merino v. Munoz, 99 App. Div. 201 .) That plaintiffs might have sought and obtained equitable relief on the same facts by way of a declaration of rights (Clark v. Mosher, 107 N. Y. 118 ; cf. Simler v. Conner, 372 U. S. 221 ), by way of requiring the assignment of documents (Mahnk v. Blanchard, 233 App. Div. 555 ) and foreclosure of liens (Pease v. Egan, 131 N. Y. 262 ), or other in personam relief, does not destroy its right to seek for and recover a money judgment which is a traditional common-law remedy. ‘ ‘ "Where relief can be as completely had either in law or equity, an action at la