State retained immunity in New York

1996Relevant and analogous precedents illustratively point out that the "State waived that immunity which it had enjoyed solely by reason of its sovereign character," but that "the State retained its immunity for those governmental actions requiring expert judgment or the exercise of discretion" ( Arteaga v State of New York , 72 N.Y.2d 212, 215-216 ; see , Tarter v State of New York , 68 N.Y.2d 511, 518-519 ).

1996Relevant and analogous precedents illustratively point out that the "State waived that immunity which it had enjoyed solely by reason of its sovereign character,” but that "the State retained its immunity for those governmental actions requiring expert judgment or the exercise of discretion” (Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 215-216 ; see, Tarter v State of New York, 68 NY2d 511, 518-519 ).

2024Absolute immunity may be lost, however, if the State acted in contravention of a governing rule or regulation which caused the incarcerated individual to suffer actual prejudice or a deprivation of due process rights ( see Miller v State of New York , 156 AD3d 1067 [3d Dept 2017] [The State retained its immunity and the cause of action for wrongful confinement was dismissed where claimant failed to establish any prejudice resulting from the alleged one-day delay in commencing his disciplinary hearing and the alleged failure to comply with the pertinent regulation, or that, but for the delay, t

2011The State cites Jattan v Queens Coll. of City Univ. of N.Y. ( 64 AD3d 540 [2009]) for the proposition that notwithstanding Court of Claims Act § 8, the State retained immunity from suit based on a cause of action created by local enactment.

2003They *206 withdrew this appeal following our decision in Alston v State of New York ( 97 NY2d 159 [2001] [holding that under the terms of the waiver of sovereign immunity in Court of Claims Act § 8, the State retained its immunity as to claims not complying with the time limitations in Court of Claims Act § 10 (4), upon which the waiver was conditioned]). 3 .

1996Significantly, in Sharapata v Town of Islip ( 56 N.Y.2d 332 ), this Court emphasized that it " is hard to believe that any attempt to include punitive damages [in Court of Claims Act § 8] would not have induced lively legislative debate , contemporary State history preceding the formulation of section 8 gives no indication that the matter ever evoked any legislative interest" ( id. , at 337 [emphasis added]).

1991At the same time, the State retained its immunity in several areas (see, Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212 [State employee actions constituting discretionary conduct of a quasi-judicial nature under the authority of and in full compliance with statutes and regulations]; Stukuls v State of New York, 42 NY2d 272 [defamation by high ranking governmental executives in the course of their duties]; Weiss v Fote, 7 NY2d 579, 587 ["exercise of expert judgment in the course of government planning for the public safety”]).

1988While assuming liability under the rules applicable to corporations and individuals for the actions of its officers and employees in the everyday operations of government (see, e.g., Wingerter v State of New York, 79 AD2d 817 , affd 58 NY2d 848 ; McCrink v City of New York, 296 NY 99 ; Bernardine v City of New York, supra), the State retained its immunity for those governmental actions requiring expert judgment or the exercise of discretion (see, Friedman v State of New York, 67 NY2d 271 ; Weiss v Fote, supra).

1988While assuming liability under the rules applicable to corporations and individuals for the actions of its officers and employees in the everyday operations of government ( see, e.g. , Wingerter v State of New York , 79 AD2d 817 , affd 58 N.Y.2d 848 ; McCrink v City of New York , 296 N.Y. 99 ; Bernardine v City of New York , supra ), the State retained its immunity for those governmental actions requiring expert judgment or the exercise of discretion ( see , Friedman v State of New York , 67 N.Y.2d 271 ; Weiss v Fote , supra ).

1988While assuming liability under the rules applicable to corporations and individuals for the actions of its officers and employees in the everyday operations of government (see, e.g., Wingerter v State of New York, 79 AD2d 817 , affd 58 NY2d 848 ; McCrink v City of New York, 296 NY 99 ; Bernardine v City of New York, supra), the State retained its immunity for those governmental actions requiring expert judgment or the exercise of discretion (see, Friedman v State of New York, 67 NY2d 271 ; Weiss v Fote, supra).

1988While assuming liability under the rules applicable to corporations and individuals for the actions of its officers and employees in the everyday operations of government ( see, e.g. , Wingerter v State of New York , 79 AD2d 817 , affd 58 N.Y.2d 848 ; McCrink v City of New York , 296 N.Y. 99 ; Bernardine v City of New York , supra ), the State retained its immunity for those governmental actions requiring expert judgment or the exercise of discretion ( see , Friedman v State of New York , 67 N.Y.2d 271 ; Weiss v Fote , supra ).

1988While assuming liability under the rules applicable to corporations and individuals for the actions of its officers and employees in the everyday operations of government (see, e.g., Wingerter v State of New York, 79 AD2d 817 , affd 58 NY2d 848 ; McCrink v City of New York, 296 NY 99 ; Bernardine v City of New York, supra), the State retained its immunity for those governmental actions requiring expert judgment or the exercise of discretion (see, Friedman v State of New York, 67 NY2d 271 ; Weiss v Fote, supra).

1988While assuming liability under the rules applicable to corporations and individuals for the actions of its officers and employees in the everyday operations of government ( see, e.g. , Wingerter v State of New York , 79 AD2d 817 , affd 58 N.Y.2d 848 ; McCrink v City of New York , 296 N.Y. 99 ; Bernardine v City of New York , supra ), the State retained its immunity for those governmental actions requiring expert judgment or the exercise of discretion ( see , Friedman v State of New York , 67 N.Y.2d 271 ; Weiss v Fote , supra ).

1988While assuming liability under the rules applicable to corporations and individuals for the actions of its officers and employees in the everyday operations of government (see, e.g., Wingerter v State of New York, 79 AD2d 817 , affd 58 NY2d 848 ; McCrink v City of New York, 296 NY 99 ; Bernardine v City of New York, supra), the State retained its immunity for those governmental actions requiring expert judgment or the exercise of discretion (see, Friedman v State of New York, 67 NY2d 271 ; Weiss v Fote, supra).

1988While assuming liability under the rules applicable to corporations and individuals for the actions of its officers and employees in the everyday operations of government ( see, e.g. , Wingerter v State of New York , 79 AD2d 817 , affd 58 N.Y.2d 848 ; McCrink v City of New York , 296 N.Y. 99 ; Bernardine v City of New York , supra ), the State retained its immunity for those governmental actions requiring expert judgment or the exercise of discretion ( see , Friedman v State of New York , 67 N.Y.2d 271 ; Weiss v Fote , supra ).

1988This immunity, we have held, is absolute when the action involves the conscious exercise of discretion of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature (see, Tarter v State of New York, 68 NY2d 511 , supra; Tango v Tulevech, 61 NY2d 34 , supra).

1988This immunity, we have held, is absolute when the action involves the conscious exercise of discretion of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature (see , Tarter v State of New York , 68 N.Y.2d 511 , supra ; Tango v Tulevech , 61 N.Y.2d 34 , supra) .