evaluating claim in Ohio

2006In State v. Keenan (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 402 , 406 , the Supreme Court of Ohio set forth the standard for evaluating a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, as follows: * * * The prosecutor carries into court the prestige of "the representative * * * of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest * * * is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. * * * Consequently, improper suggestions, insinuations and, especially, assertions of personal knowledge are apt to carry much weight against the accused

2006In State v. Keenan (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 402 , 406 , the Supreme Court of Ohio set forth the standard for evaluating a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, as follows: * * * The prosecutor carries into court the prestige of "the representative * * * of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest * * * is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. * * * Consequently, improper suggestions, insinuations and, especially, assertions of personal knowledge are apt to carry much weight against the accused

2006In State v. Keenan (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 402 , 406 , the Supreme Court of Ohio set forth the standard for evaluating a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, as follows: * * * The prosecutor carries into court the prestige of "the representative * * * of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest * * * is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. * * * Consequently, improper suggestions, insinuations and, especially, assertions of personal knowledge are apt to carry much weight against the accused

2003In State v. Keenan (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 402 , 406 , the Supreme Court of Ohio set forth the standard for evaluating a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, as follows: {¶ 38} "* * * The prosecutor carries into court the prestige of `the representative * * * of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest * * * is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. * * * Consequently, improper suggestions, insinuations and, especially, assertions of personal knowledge are apt to carry much weight against the

2016Serv., 73 Ohio St.3d 694, 697 , 1995-Ohio-206 , 653 N.E.2d 1207 . {¶15} In Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328 , 2012-Ohio-2179 , 972 N.E.2d 517 , the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the standard for evaluating a challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction also applies to civil cases.

2016Serv., 73 Ohio St.3d 694, 697 , 1995-Ohio-206 , 653 N.E.2d 1207 . {¶15} In Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328 , 2012-Ohio-2179 , 972 N.E.2d 517 , the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the standard for evaluating a challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction also applies to civil cases.

2016Serv., 73 Ohio St.3d 694, 697 , 1995-Ohio-206 , 653 N.E.2d 1207 . {¶15} In Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328 , 2012-Ohio-2179 , 972 N.E.2d 517 , the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the standard for evaluating a challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction also applies to civil cases.

2016Serv., 73 Ohio St.3d 694, 697 , 1995-Ohio-206 , 653 N.E.2d 1207 . {¶15} In Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328 , 2012-Ohio-2179 , 972 N.E.2d 517 , the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the standard for evaluating a challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction also applies to civil cases.

2006State v. Mauer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239 , 269 .

2002In State v. Zimmerman (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 43 , 45 , the court stated that, even if the prosecution makes an improper comment on a defendant's failure to testify, the "conviction must be affirmed if it is concluded, based on the whole record, that the prosecutor's improper comments were harmless beyond any reasonable doubt." To determine whether the comment was harmless, a court must determine whether "[a]bsent the prosecutor's allusion to the failure of the accused to testify, is it clear, beyond any reasonable doubt, that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty?" Id.

2002In State v. Zimmerman (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 43 , 45 , the court stated that, even if the prosecution makes an improper comment on a defendant's failure to testify, the "conviction must be affirmed if it is concluded, based on the whole record, that the prosecutor's improper comments were harmless beyond any reasonable doubt." To determine whether the comment was harmless, a court must determine whether "[a]bsent the prosecutor's allusion to the failure of the accused to testify, is it clear, beyond any reasonable doubt, that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty?" Id.

1998Counsel's performance will not be deemed ineffective unless and until counsel's performance is proved to have fallen below an objective standard of reasonable representation and, in addition, prejudice arises from counsel's performance. ( State v. Lytle [1976], 48 Ohio St.2d 391 ; * * * Strickland v. Washington [1984], 466 U.S. 668 , followed.) "3.

1998The standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was enunciated by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136 , paragraphs two and three of the syllabus, certiorari denied (1990), 497 U.S. 1011 , as follows: "2.

1998Counsel's performance will not be deemed ineffective unless and until counsel's performance is proved to have fallen below an objective standard of reasonable representation and, in addition, prejudice arises from counsel's performance. ( State v. Lytle [1976], 48 Ohio St.2d 391 ; * * * Strickland v. Washington [1984], 466 U.S. 668 , followed.) "3.

1998The standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was enunciated by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136 , paragraphs two and three of the syllabus, certiorari denied (1990), 497 U.S. 1011 , as follows: "2.