Arkansas rule in Arkansas

2003See Criddle v. State, 338 Ark. 744 , 1 S.W.3d 436 (1999); Jackson v. State, 241 Ark. 850 , 410 S.W.2d 766 (1967).

2003See Criddle v. State, 338 Ark. 744 , 1 S.W.3d 436 (1999); Jackson v. State, 241 Ark. 850 , 410 S.W.2d 766 (1967).

2000Noting that Rule 3.4 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure is the Arkansas standard for the application of the rule announced in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), he contends that the so-called pat-down search was more intrusive than necessary to insure the officers’ safety.

2000Noting that Rule 3.4 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure is the Arkansas standard for the application of the rule announced in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), he contends that the so-called pat-down search was more intrusive than necessary to insure the officers’ safety.

2020However, we explained that “the same cannot be said for predispute jury-waiver clauses because no Arkansas statute or Arkansas rule of civil procedure expressly provides for predispute waivers of the right to a jury trial.” Id. at 13–14, 532 S.W.3d at 578 . 13 Relying on Tilley, the employees contend that because the FAA is not an Arkansas statute or Arkansas rule, the FAA is not “a manner prescribed by law” in which one may waive the right to a jury trial.

2020However, we explained that “the same cannot be said for predispute jury-waiver clauses because no Arkansas statute or Arkansas rule of civil procedure expressly provides for predispute waivers of the right to a jury trial.” Id. at 13–14, 532 S.W.3d at 578 . 13 Relying on Tilley, the employees contend that because the FAA is not an Arkansas statute or Arkansas rule, the FAA is not “a manner prescribed by law” in which one may waive the right to a jury trial.

2016On appeal, Muhammad raises three arguments: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for robbery; (2) in conjunction with that argument, Arkansas’s standard of review in criminal cases is unconstitutional and inconsistent with Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); and (3) Arkansas’s habitual-offender sentencing statutes are unconstitutional.

2016On appeal, Muhammad raises three arguments: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for robbery; (2) in conjunction with that argument, Arkansas’s standard of review in criminal cases is unconstitutional and inconsistent with Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); and (3) Arkansas’s habitual-offender sentencing statutes are unconstitutional.

2016Before the circuit court’s hearing on the Rule 37 petition, Roberts filed a prehearing brief requesting specific findings of fact and conclusions of law on the following six points: (1) whether his incompetency to waive under Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 , 86 S.Ct. 1505 , 16 L.Ed.2d 583 (1966) (per curiam) (establishing a two-prong inquiry when a death-sentenced defendant seeks to waive post-conviction remedies); (2) whether his waiver was illness-driven and thus involuntary; (3) whether he was incompetent based on this court’s standard articulated in Franz v. State, 296 Ark. 181 , 754 S.W.2d

2016Before the circuit court’s hearing on the Rule 37 petition, Roberts filed a prehearing brief requesting specific findings of fact and conclusions of law on the following six points: (1) whether his incompetency to waive under Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 , 86 S.Ct. 1505 , 16 L.Ed.2d 583 (1966) (per curiam) (establishing a two-prong inquiry when a death-sentenced defendant seeks to waive post-conviction remedies); (2) whether his waiver was illness-driven and thus involuntary; (3) whether he was incompetent based on this court’s standard articulated in Franz v. State, 296 Ark. 181 , 754 S.W.2d

2016Before the circuit court’s hearing on the Rule 37 petition, Roberts filed a prehearing brief requesting specific findings of fact and conclusions of law on the following six points: (1) whether his incompetency to waive under Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 , 86 S.Ct. 1505 , 16 L.Ed.2d 583 (1966) (per curiam) (establishing a two-prong inquiry when a death-sentenced defendant seeks to waive post-conviction remedies); (2) whether his waiver was illness-driven and thus involuntary; (3) whether he was incompetent based on this court’s standard articulated in Franz v. State, 296 Ark. 181 , 754 S.W.2d

2016Before the circuit court’s hearing on the Rule 37 petition, Roberts filed a prehearing brief requesting specific findings of fact and conclusions of law on the following six points: (1) whether his incompetency to waive under Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 , 86 S.Ct. 1505 , 16 L.Ed.2d 583 (1966) (per curiam) (establishing a two-prong inquiry when a death-sentenced defendant seeks to waive post-conviction remedies); (2) whether his waiver was illness-driven and thus involuntary; (3) whether he was incompetent based on this court’s standard articulated in Franz v. State, 296 Ark. 181 , 754 S.W.2d

2016Before the circuit court’s hearing on the Rule 37 petition, Roberts filed a prehearing brief requesting specific findings of fact and conclusions of law on the following six points: (1) whether his incompetency to waive under Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966) (per curiam) (establishing a two-prong inquiry when a death-sentenced defendant seeks to waive postconviction remedies); (2) whether his waiver was illness-driven and thus involuntary; (3) whether he was incompetent based on this court’s standard articulated in Franz v. State, 296 Ark. 181 , 754 S.W.2d 839 (1988) (adopting the Arkansas

2016Before the circuit court’s hearing on the Rule 37 petition, Roberts filed a prehearing brief requesting specific findings of fact and conclusions of law on the following six points: (1) whether his incompetency to waive under Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966) (per curiam) (establishing a two-prong inquiry when a death-sentenced defendant seeks to waive postconviction remedies); (2) whether his waiver was illness-driven and thus involuntary; (3) whether he was incompetent based on this court’s standard articulated in Franz v. State, 296 Ark. 181 , 754 S.W.2d 839 (1988) (adopting the Arkansas

1998Like Singleton, Rector filed a petition for declaratory judgment in circuit court, stating he was ineligible for execution because (1) a state cannot execute persons whose mental illness prevents comprehension of the reasons for the penalty, and (2) the Arkansas standard limiting executions of persons with mental deficiencies is more stringent than that required under the Supreme Court's decision in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 , 106 S.Ct. 2595 , 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986), and Arkansas's law should prevent Rector's execution if his current mental impairment prevented him from assisting his cou

1998Like Singleton, Rector filed a petition for declaratory judgment in circuit court, stating he was ineligible for execution because (1) a state cannot execute persons whose mental illness prevents comprehension of the reasons for the penalty, and (2) the Arkansas standard limiting executions of persons with mental deficiencies is more stringent than that required under the Supreme Court's decision in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 , 106 S.Ct. 2595 , 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986), and Arkansas's law should prevent Rector's execution if his current mental impairment prevented him from assisting his cou

2019Davis v. State, 2018 Ark. 290 , 558 S.W.3d 366 .

2014However, in jurisdictions adhering to the Arkansas rule, it has frequently been held that mere general, broad, and seemingly 4 Cite as 2014 Ark.

2014However, in jurisdictions adhering to the Arkansas rule, it has frequently been held that mere general, broad, and seemingly 4 Cite as 2014 Ark.

2010Before analyzing the merits of this argument, we note Miller's contention that the standard for determining mental retardation under Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 , 122 *277 S.Ct. 2242, is broader than the Arkansas standard, with Atkins recognizing intelligence quotients of between 70 and 75 as mentally retarded.

2010Before analyzing the merits of this argument, we note Miller's contention that the standard for determining mental retardation under Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 , 122 *277 S.Ct. 2242, is broader than the Arkansas standard, with Atkins recognizing intelligence quotients of between 70 and 75 as mentally retarded.

2007Jerala Grayson continues her argument in her brief before this court on the certified question that the conscious-indifference standard announced by this court in Shepherd v. Washington County, 331 Ark. 480 , 962 S.W.2d 779 (1998), is the Arkansas standard for claims under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act and should have been given in this case.

2007Jerala Grayson continues her argument in her brief before this court on the certified question that the conscious-indifference standard announced by this court in Shepherd v. Washington County, 331 Ark. 480 , 962 S.W.2d 779 (1998), is the Arkansas standard for claims under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act and should have been given in this case.

2005See In re: Client Security Fund, 254 Ark. 1975 , 493 S.W.2d 422 (1973) (per curiam).

2000Ramsey v. Ramsey, 259 Ark. 16 , 531 S.W.2d 28 (1975); McClain v. McClain, 36 Ark.

2000Ramsey v. Ramsey, 259 Ark. 16 , 531 S.W.2d 28 (1975); McLain v. McLain, 36 Ark.App. 197 , 820 S.W.2d 295 (1991); Lyle v. Lyle, 15 Ark.App. 202 , 691 S.W.2d 188 (1985).

2000Ramsey v. Ramsey, 259 Ark. 16 , 531 S.W.2d 28 (1975); McLain v. McLain, 36 Ark.App. 197 , 820 S.W.2d 295 (1991); Lyle v. Lyle, 15 Ark.App. 202 , 691 S.W.2d 188 (1985).

2000Ramsey v. Ramsey, 259 Ark. 16 , 531 S.W.2d 28 (1975); McLain v. McLain, 36 Ark.App. 197 , 820 S.W.2d 295 (1991); Lyle v. Lyle, 15 Ark.App. 202 , 691 S.W.2d 188 (1985).

2000Ramsey v. Ramsey, 259 Ark. 16 , 531 S.W.2d 28 (1975); McClain v. McClain, 36 Ark.

2000Ramsey v. Ramsey, 259 Ark. 16 , 531 S.W.2d 28 (1975); McClain v. McClain, 36 Ark.

2000Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 , 107 S.Ct. 2739 , 97 L.Ed.2d 90 (1987) (interpreting Fed.R.Evid. 606(b), which is virtually identical to the Arkansas rule).

2000Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 , 107 S.Ct. 2739 , 97 L.Ed.2d 90 (1987) (interpreting Fed.R.Evid. 606(b), which is virtually identical to the Arkansas rule).

1999In responding to this inquiry, I specifically refer you to the following cases: Porter v. Arkansas Western Gas, 252 Ark. 958 , 482 S.W.2d 598 (1972); United States of America v. Keenan, 753 F.2d 681 (8 th Cir. 1985).

1999In responding to this inquiry, I specifically refer you to the following cases: Porter v. Arkansas Western Gas, 252 Ark. 958 , 482 S.W.2d 598 (1972); United States of America v. Keenan, 753 F.2d 681 (8 th Cir. 1985).

1999In responding to this inquiry, I specifically refer you to the following cases: Porter v. Arkansas Western Gas, 252 Ark. 958 , 482 S.W.2d 598 (1972); United States of America v. Keenan, 753 F.2d 681 (8 th Cir. 1985).

1998We respectfully decline this opportunity to change our interpretation of section 16-56-105 and hold that Goldsby, 309 Ark. 380 , 831 S.W.2d 142 , continues to be the Arkansas rule, and accordingly, do not depart from the occurrence rule.

1998We respectfully decline this opportunity to change our interpretation of section 16-56-105 and hold that Goldsby, 309 Ark. 380 , 831 S.W.2d 142 , continues to be the Arkansas rule, and accordingly, do not depart from the occurrence rule.

1998Id. at 105, 823 S.W.2d 829 .

1998Id. at 105, 823 S.W.2d 829 .

1998This court further clarified in Goldsby that Stroud, 297 Ark. 472 , 763 S.W.2d 76 , does not stand for the proposition that Arkansas has adopted the damage rule.

1998This court further clarified in Goldsby that Stroud, 297 Ark. 472 , 763 S.W.2d 76 , does not stand for the proposition that Arkansas has adopted the damage rule.

1997Millsap v. Lane, 286 Ark. 439 , 706 S.W.2d 378 (1986) (citing Trustees v. Greenough, 15 Otto 527 , 105 U.S. 527 , 26 L.Ed. 1157 (1882)).

1997Millsap v. Lane, 286 Ark. 439 , 706 S.W.2d 378 (1986) (citing Trustees v. Greenough, 15 Otto 527 , 105 U.S. 527 , 26 L.Ed. 1157 (1882)).