Melbourne analysis in Florida

2026Throughout this process, the burden of persuasion never leaves the opponent of the strike to prove purposeful racial discrimination.” Id. (footnote omitted); see also Welch v. State, 992 So. 2d 206 , 211–12 (Fla. 2008) (applying Melbourne standard and test to claims of gender discrimination in the context of a peremptory challenge). 4 The Florida Supreme Court has explained that “peremptory challenges are presumed to be exercised in a nondiscriminatory manner and . . . the appropriate standard of appellate review for determining the threshold question of whether there is a likelihood of [prote

2023Relevant to this appeal is step three of a Melbourne analysis which provides in part: “The court’s focus in step 3 is not on the reasonableness of the explanation [for the preemptory strike] but rather its genuineness.” Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759, 764 (Fla. 1996) (emphasis added). 2 We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit clear error by concluding the proffered reason was not genuine.

2020As we have explained with respect to that step, “[t]here are no specific words which the court must state to satisfy step three of the Melbourne analysis.” Murray v. State, 3 So. 3d 1108, 1119 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Simmons v. State, 940 So. 2d 580, 582 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)).

2020As we have explained with respect to that step, “[t]here are no specific words which the court must state to satisfy step three of the Melbourne analysis.” Murray v. State, 3 So. 3d 1108, 1119 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Simmons v. State, 940 So. 2d 580, 582 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)).

2001See Heggan v. State, 745 So.2d 1066, 1068 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (holding that where transcript of voir dire clearly indicates that judge accepted state’s valid proffered neutral reason to support exercise of peremptory challenge, “compliance with Melbourne analysis does not require the incantation of magical words.”).

2001Although I agree that the Melbourne analysis does not require the "incantation of magical words," Heggan v. State, 745 So.2d 1066, 1068 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), appellate courts cannot breathe new meaning into words and terms that have been very clearly *539 defined, nor can we ignore the totality of the jury selection record and focus on a single statement for the sake of salvaging what appears to have been a fair and just result. [5] I respectfully dissent.

2020“Rather, the most important consideration is that the trial judge actually ‘believes that given all the circumstances surrounding the strike, the explanation is not a pretext.’ ” Id. at 1120 (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 40 (Fla. 2000)). - 11 - Guzman v. State, 238 So. 3d 146, 155 (Fla. 2018).

2020“Rather, the most important consideration is that the trial judge actually ‘believes that given all the circumstances surrounding the strike, the explanation is not a pretext.’ ” Id. at 1120 (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 40 (Fla. 2000)). - 11 - Guzman v. State, 238 So. 3d 146, 155 (Fla. 2018).

2020On appeal to the Fourth District, Johnson claimed that the trial court did not properly conduct step 3 of the Melbourne inquiry because the record did not show -3- that “the trial court . . . reviewe[d], analyze[d], or conducte[d] any ‘judicial assessment’ of the reasons given by the State for striking [the prospective juror at issue].” Johnson, 268 So. 3d at 733 (quoting Hayes v. State, 94 So. 3d 452, 462 (Fla. 2012)).

2020On appeal to the Fourth District, Johnson claimed that the trial court did not properly conduct step 3 of the Melbourne inquiry because the record did not show -3- that “the trial court . . . reviewe[d], analyze[d], or conducte[d] any ‘judicial assessment’ of the reasons given by the State for striking [the prospective juror at issue].” Johnson, 268 So. 3d at 733 (quoting Hayes v. State, 94 So. 3d 452, 462 (Fla. 2012)).

2012Cf. Tetreault v. State, 24 So.3d 1242, 1244 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (“[T]he court below bypassed the third step in the Melbourne analysis and focused solely on the fact that the State’s reasons behind its peremptory strikes were gender-neutral. [The court] did not make a finding, implicit or otherwise, that the gender-neutral reasons were genuine.”).

2012Cf. Tetreault v. State, 24 So.3d 1242, 1244 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (“[T]he court below bypassed the third step in the Melbourne analysis and focused solely on the fact that the State’s reasons behind its peremptory strikes were gender-neutral. [The court] did not make a finding, implicit or otherwise, that the gender-neutral reasons were genuine.”).

2010Davis, 691 So.2d at 1183 ; see also Bowden v. State, 787 So.2d 185, 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (holding that the trial court's indication that it did not believe strike was racially motivated established that "the trial court reached step three of the Melbourne analysis and determined the strike was genuine"); Watson v. State, 841 So.2d 659, 660 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (trial court engaged in genuineness analysis required under Melbourne where it stated "[a]ll right.

2010Davis, 691 So.2d at 1183 ; see also Bowden v. State, 787 So.2d 185, 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (holding that the trial court's indication that it did not believe strike was racially motivated established that "the trial court reached step three of the Melbourne analysis and determined the strike was genuine"); Watson v. State, 841 So.2d 659, 660 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (trial court engaged in genuineness analysis required under Melbourne where it stated "[a]ll right.

2010Step 3 of the Melbourne analysis does not require the trial court to state that it found the State's proffered reason for the strike to be "genuine." Indeed, there "is no requirement that the trial court specifically use the word `genuine.'" See Hoskins, 965 So.2d at 12 (holding trial court applied correct standard in step 3 analysis even though trial court used terms "neutral and reasonable" as these terms are synonymous with word "genuine"); see also Johnson v. State, 706 So.2d 401, 404 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).

2010Step 3 of the Melbourne analysis does not require the trial court to state that it found the State's proffered reason for the strike to be "genuine." Indeed, there "is no requirement that the trial court specifically use the word `genuine.'" See Hoskins, 965 So.2d at 12 (holding trial court applied correct standard in step 3 analysis even though trial court used terms "neutral and reasonable" as these terms are synonymous with word "genuine"); see also Johnson v. State, 706 So.2d 401, 404 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).

2020As we have explained with respect to that step, “[t]here are no specific words which the court must state to satisfy step three of the Melbourne analysis.” Murray v. State, 3 So. 3d 1108, 1119 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Simmons v. State, 940 So. 2d 580, 582 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)).

2020As we have explained with respect to that step, “[t]here are no specific words which the court must state to satisfy step three of the Melbourne analysis.” Murray v. State, 3 So. 3d 1108, 1119 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Simmons v. State, 940 So. 2d 580, 582 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)).

2018The Second District certified a three-part question of great public importance: During a Melbourne hearing, when a trial court finds that the proponent’s reason for a peremptory challenge is facially neutral, is it the burden of the opponent (1) to claim the reason is a pretext, (2) to place into the record the circumstances supporting its position, and (3) to object if the trial court’s ruling does not contain adequate findings on the issue of genuineness? 5 Id. at 411 .

2018The Second District opined that the trial court was not required to perform a full genuineness analysis on the record every time a party initiates a Melbourne challenge, and if the opponent of the strike wants the trial court to determine the genuineness of the reason proffered for the strike, the opponent “must expressly make a claim of pretext and at least attempt to proffer the circumstances that support its claim.” Id. at 401 .

2026Throughout this process, the burden of persuasion never leaves the opponent of the strike to prove purposeful racial discrimination.” Id. (footnote omitted); see also Welch v. State, 992 So. 2d 206 , 211–12 (Fla. 2008) (applying Melbourne standard and test to claims of gender discrimination in the context of a peremptory challenge). 4 The Florida Supreme Court has explained that “peremptory challenges are presumed to be exercised in a nondiscriminatory manner and . . . the appropriate standard of appellate review for determining the threshold question of whether there is a likelihood of [prote

2012The state gave two reasons for the strike: (1) the juror “would relate to the defendant” because they were of a similar young age; and (2) the juror’s wife worked for a childcare nurturing facility, and that “based on philosophies within the family ... he may not be able to follow the law.” 998 So.2d at 603 .

2023See Dabbs v. State, 330 So. 3d 50 , 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (“Because the trial court conducted a proper genuineness inquiry, we must give appropriate deference to its determination.”); Hialeah Hosp., Inc. v. Hayes-Boursiquot, 316 So. 3d 754 , 758 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (affirming and finding the trial court properly exercised its discretion in sustaining a Melbourne challenge as “there is sufficient record evidence to support the trial court’s credibility assessments such that they may not be disturbed under the clearly- erroneous standard.”); King v. Byrd, 716 So. 2d 831, 834 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)

2023See Dabbs v. State, 330 So. 3d 50 , 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (“Because the trial court conducted a proper genuineness inquiry, we must give appropriate deference to its determination.”); Hialeah Hosp., Inc. v. Hayes-Boursiquot, 316 So. 3d 754 , 758 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (affirming and finding the trial court properly exercised its discretion in sustaining a Melbourne challenge as “there is sufficient record evidence to support the trial court’s credibility assessments such that they may not be disturbed under the clearly- erroneous standard.”); King v. Byrd, 716 So. 2d 831, 834 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)

2006In support of his position, the defendant relies on Dorsey v. State, 868 So.2d 1192 (Fla.2003), where the Florida Supreme Court applied the Melbourne analysis to a peremptory challenge based on a prospective juror's nonverbal behavior, such as lack of interest, inattentiveness, lack of eye contact, or bare looks and gestures.

2006In support of his position, the defendant relies on Dorsey v. State, 868 So.2d 1192 (Fla.2003), where the Florida Supreme Court applied the Melbourne analysis to a peremptory challenge based on a prospective juror's nonverbal behavior, such as lack of interest, inattentiveness, lack of eye contact, or bare looks and gestures.

2012Id. at 464-65; see also Russell v. State, 879 So.2d 1261 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (holding that the per se reversible error occurred in the trial court’s failure to accept a facially race-neutral reason for a strike and failing to then inquire as to the genuineness of the reason); Anderson v. State, 750 So.2d 741, 744 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (reversing and holding that the trial court erred in finding that the defense’s reason for a peremptory strike was not facially race or gender-neutral and failing to carryout step three of the Melbourne analysis).

2012Id. at 464-65; see also Russell v. State, 879 So.2d 1261 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (holding that the per se reversible error occurred in the trial court’s failure to accept a facially race-neutral reason for a strike and failing to then inquire as to the genuineness of the reason); Anderson v. State, 750 So.2d 741, 744 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (reversing and holding that the trial court erred in finding that the defense’s reason for a peremptory strike was not facially race or gender-neutral and failing to carryout step three of the Melbourne analysis).

2012See, e.g., Siegel v. State, 68 So.3d 281, 287 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (reversing for new trial where the record was devoid of any indication that the trial court actually engaged in requisite genuineness analysis of the defendant's reason for peremptory strikes since there was no proof of consideration of any circumstances relevant to this inquiry); Te-treault, 24 So.3d at 1243-44 (reversing where the trial court did not make express rulings explaining why it found the State's reasons for striking prospective jurors were genuine, indicating that the court bypassed the third step in the Melbourne a

2012See, e.g., Siegel v. State, 68 So.3d 281, 287 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (reversing for new trial where the record was devoid of any indication that the trial court actually engaged in requisite genuineness analysis of the defendant's reason for peremptory strikes since there was no proof of consideration of any circumstances relevant to this inquiry); Te-treault, 24 So.3d at 1243-44 (reversing where the trial court did not make express rulings explaining why it found the State's reasons for striking prospective jurors were genuine, indicating that the court bypassed the third step in the Melbourne a

2008Under federal law, that -step “contemplates something more than simply establishing the minority status of the defendant and the exclusion of a single venire member who happens to be of the sáme race.” United States v. Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d 458, 470 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 1321 , 167 L.Ed.2d 130 (2007).

2008Under federal law, that -step “contemplates something more than simply establishing the minority status of the defendant and the exclusion of a single venire member who happens to be of the sáme race.” United States v. Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d 458, 470 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 1321 , 167 L.Ed.2d 130 (2007).

2008See Plaza v. State, 699 So.2d 289, 294 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (Sorondo, J., specially concurring) ("The practical use of [the Neil/Melbourne objection], however, is rapidly degenerating into a strategic way for attorneys to pollute the trial record with baseless objections, alleging racial, ethnic and gender discrimination, which are completely unsubstantiated by the record.").

2008See Plaza v. State, 699 So.2d 289, 294 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (Sorondo, J., specially concurring) (“The practical use of [the Neil/Melbourne objection], however, is rapidly degenerating into a strategic way for attorneys to pollute the trial record with baseless objections, alleging racial, ethnic and gender discrimination, which are completely' unsubstantiated by the record.”).

2001We are cognizant of the cases holding that "`[t]here is nothing in Melbourne which requires trial judges to articulate *157 their thought process on the issue of pretext.'" Young v. State, 744 So.2d 1077, 1083 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (quoting Johnson v. State, 706 So.2d 401, 404 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)); see also Heggan v. State, 745 So.2d 1066, 1068 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) ("Compliance with the Melbourne analysis does not require the incantation of magical words.").

2001We are cognizant of the cases holding that "`[t]here is nothing in Melbourne which requires trial judges to articulate *157 their thought process on the issue of pretext.'" Young v. State, 744 So.2d 1077, 1083 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (quoting Johnson v. State, 706 So.2d 401, 404 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)); see also Heggan v. State, 745 So.2d 1066, 1068 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) ("Compliance with the Melbourne analysis does not require the incantation of magical words.").

2018“Preservation of an objection to the use of a peremptory strike requires more than one objection: an objection to initiate a Melbourne inquiry and another objection before the jury is sworn in.” Denis v. State, 137 So. 3d 583, 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).

2018“Preservation of an objection to the use of a peremptory strike requires more than one objection: an objection to initiate a Melbourne inquiry and another objection before the jury is sworn in.” Denis v. State, 137 So. 3d 583, 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).

2010Davis, 691 So.2d at 1183 ; see also Bowden v. State, 787 So.2d 185, 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (holding that the trial court's indication that it did not believe strike was racially motivated established that "the trial court reached step three of the Melbourne analysis and determined the strike was genuine"); Watson v. State, 841 So.2d 659, 660 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (trial court engaged in genuineness analysis required under Melbourne where it stated "[a]ll right.

2010Davis, 691 So.2d at 1183 ; see also Bowden v. State, 787 So.2d 185, 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (holding that the trial court's indication that it did not believe strike was racially motivated established that "the trial court reached step three of the Melbourne analysis and determined the strike was genuine"); Watson v. State, 841 So.2d 659, 660 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (trial court engaged in genuineness analysis required under Melbourne where it stated "[a]ll right.

2026Throughout this process, the burden of persuasion never leaves the opponent of the strike to prove purposeful racial discrimination.” Id. (footnote omitted); see also Welch v. State, 992 So. 2d 206 , 211–12 (Fla. 2008) (applying Melbourne standard and test to claims of gender discrimination in the context of a peremptory challenge). 4 The Florida Supreme Court has explained that “peremptory challenges are presumed to be exercised in a nondiscriminatory manner and . . . the appropriate standard of appellate review for determining the threshold question of whether there is a likelihood of [prote

2023“Where a peremptory strike is alleged to have been exercised in a racially discriminatory manner, we review a trial court’s ruling ‘to determine whether it was clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion.’” West v. State, 168 So. 3d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (quoting Cook v. State, 104 So. 3d 1187, 1189 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)).

2023“Where a peremptory strike is alleged to have been exercised in a racially discriminatory manner, we review a trial court’s ruling ‘to determine whether it was clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion.’” West v. State, 168 So. 3d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (quoting Cook v. State, 104 So. 3d 1187, 1189 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)).

2023“Where a peremptory strike is alleged to have been exercised in a racially discriminatory manner, we review a trial court’s ruling ‘to determine whether it was clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion.’” West v. State, 168 So. 3d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (quoting Cook v. State, 104 So. 3d 1187, 1189 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)).

2023“Where a peremptory strike is alleged to have been exercised in a racially discriminatory manner, we review a trial court’s ruling ‘to determine whether it was clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion.’” West v. State, 168 So. 3d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (quoting Cook v. State, 104 So. 3d 1187, 1189 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)).

2021Julmice v. State, 14 So. 3d 1199, 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). 4 African-American potential jurors. 6 Appellant takes issue on appeal with only the third peremptory challenge in which the trial court upheld Appellee’s third Melbourne challenge.

2020“Rather, the most important consideration is that the trial judge actually ‘believes that given all the circumstances surrounding the strike, the explanation is not a pretext.’ ” Id. at 1120 (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 40 (Fla. 2000)). - 11 - Guzman v. State, 238 So. 3d 146, 155 (Fla. 2018).

2020“Rather, the most important consideration is that the trial judge actually ‘believes that given all the circumstances surrounding the strike, the explanation is not a pretext.’ ” Id. at 1120 (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 40 (Fla. 2000)). - 11 - Guzman v. State, 238 So. 3d 146, 155 (Fla. 2018).

2020See Hayes v. State, 93 So. 3d 427, 429 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (“[A]lthough a trial court is not required to follow a specific script or incant particular words in conducting the Melbourne analysis, we have to assume that the trial court in this case said what it meant and meant what it said in ruling that the reason for the strike was not gender-neutral.” (citation omitted)).

2020See Hayes v. State, 93 So. 3d 427, 429 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (“[A]lthough a trial court is not required to follow a specific script or incant particular words in conducting the Melbourne analysis, we have to assume that the trial court in this case said what it meant and meant what it said in ruling that the reason for the strike was not gender-neutral.” (citation omitted)).