aggressor standard (Oregon) · Go Syfert
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aggressor standard in Oregon

6 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1944–2026 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Phillipsgreen
orctapp · 2021 · cited in 4 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 2021–2026
2 sentences

2025See Phillips, 313 Or App at 7 (concluding that the trial court did not err because “there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the giving of the initial aggressor instruction”).

2025See Phillips, 313 Or App at 7 (concluding that the trial court did not err because “there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the giving of the initial aggressor instruction”).

34
State v. Buckgreen
orctapp · 2025 · cited in 1 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
2 sentences

2026See State v. Buck, 338 Or App 314 , 329-31 566 P3d 682 , rev den, 374 Or 143 (2025) (where prosecutor’s rebuttal argument was improper because it misstated the law as to how the jury could view hearsay evidence, the defendant did not establish plain error because the argument was brief and curable if the defendant had objected); Smith, 334 Or App at 95 (concluding that a prosecutor’s “single misstate- ment” was a “straightforward and potentially easy-to-dispel misstatement” and had the defendant objected, “the trial court could have provided an instruction to the jury to dis- regard the prosec

2026See State v. Buck, 338 Or App 314 , 329-31 566 P3d 682 , rev den, 374 Or 143 (2025) (where prosecutor’s rebuttal argument was improper because it misstated the law as to how the jury could view hearsay evidence, the defendant did not establish plain error because the argument was brief and curable if the defendant had objected); Smith, 334 Or App at 95 (concluding that a prosecutor’s “single misstate- ment” was a “straightforward and potentially easy-to-dispel misstatement” and had the defendant objected, “the trial court could have provided an instruction to the jury to dis- regard the prosec

11
State v. Smithgreen
orctapp · 2024 · cited in 1 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026See State v. Buck, 338 Or App 314 , 329-31 566 P3d 682 , rev den, 374 Or 143 (2025) (where prosecutor’s rebuttal argument was improper because it misstated the law as to how the jury could view hearsay evidence, the defendant did not establish plain error because the argument was brief and curable if the defendant had objected); Smith, 334 Or App at 95 (concluding that a prosecutor’s “single misstate- ment” was a “straightforward and potentially easy-to-dispel misstatement” and had the defendant objected, “the trial court could have provided an instruction to the jury to dis- regard the prosec

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (2)

CaseCitedYears
Penn v. Henderson green
or · 1944
2 sentences

1980Before addressing that contention, however, we note that "in an ordinary case, the one who is deemed the aggressor * * * is the one who first employs hostile force against the other * * *." Penn v. Henderson, 174 Or 1, 16 , 146 P2d 760 (1944).

1980Before addressing that contention, however, we note that "in an ordinary case, the one who is deemed the aggressor * * * is the one who first employs hostile force against the other * * *." Penn v. Henderson, 174 Or 1, 16 , 146 P2d 760 (1944).

11980–1980
Brookside-Pratt Mining Co. v. Booth green
ala · 1924
1 sentence

1944In an ordinary case, the one who is deemed the aggressor under this rule is the one who first employs hostile force against the other and such a one may not, while his aggression continues, claim the right of self-defense, but a lawful owner or occupant of a place of business such as a restaurant may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to remove a person who was originally on the premises by permission, but who refuses within a reasonable time to leave after being requested by the owner so to do. 1 Restatement of Torts, § 77; Brookside-Pratt Mining Company v. Booth, 211 Ala. 268 , 10

11944–1944

Where else courts name it

WA 60 (1974–2026) CO 34 (1991–2026) LA 33 (1957–2025) NC 23 (1995–2026) IL 14 (1986–2024) CT 10 (1998–2025) NY 8 (1979–2025) FL 7 (1991–2026) KY 6 (1958–2025) OR 6 (1944–2026) WY 5 (1983–2026) AZ 4 (1963–1990) CA 4 (1972–2024) MI 4 (1957–1986) TN 4 (1998–2015) TX 3 (2003–2026) MO 2 (2018–2019) AR 2 (1954–1976) WV 2 (1982–2020)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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