antistacking clause in Illinois

2024We held that, “[w]hen read together with the declarations, *** the antistacking clause unambiguously prohibits stacking of bodily injury liability coverage.” Id. ¶ 26 We further stated that the appellate court had improperly compared the case to Cherry v. Elephant Insurance Co., 2018 IL App (5th) 170072 , and Johnson v. Davis, 377 Ill.

2024We held that, “[w]hen read together with the declarations, *** the antistacking clause unambiguously prohibits stacking of bodily injury liability coverage.” Id. ¶ 26 We further stated that the appellate court had improperly compared the case to Cherry v. Elephant Insurance Co., 2018 IL App (5th) 170072 , and Johnson v. Davis, 377 Ill.

2024We held that, “[w]hen read together with the declarations, *** the antistacking clause unambiguously prohibits stacking of bodily injury liability coverage.” Id. ¶ 26 We further stated that the appellate court had improperly compared the case to Cherry v. Elephant Insurance Co., 2018 IL App (5th) 170072 , and Johnson v. Davis, 377 Ill.

2024The antistacking clause in Cherry provided “ ‘[i]f more than one policy of uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage applies to an accident, the maximum the Insured may recover from all of the applicable coverage is the highest limit available under one policy for one auto.’ ” Cherry, 2018 IL App (5th) 170072, ¶ 6 .

1995This court rejected the plaintiff’s argument, reasoning that "the existence of any such subjective intent of the plaintiff is rebutted by the clear and unambiguous policy language from which it can be readily seen and understood that coverage was limited.” (Menke, 78 Ill. 2d at 425 .) This court further held that the intent of the defendant insurance company and plaintiff was "clearly expressed in the unambiguous language of the antistacking clause” and, thus, there was "no need to construe the policy language.” Menke, 78 Ill. 2d at 425 .

1995This court rejected the plaintiff’s argument, reasoning that "the existence of any such subjective intent of the plaintiff is rebutted by the clear and unambiguous policy language from which it can be readily seen and understood that coverage was limited.” (Menke, 78 Ill. 2d at 425 .) This court further held that the intent of the defendant insurance company and plaintiff was "clearly expressed in the unambiguous language of the antistacking clause” and, thus, there was "no need to construe the policy language.” Menke, 78 Ill. 2d at 425 .

2024App. 3d at 657 )) was directly contradictory to the antistacking clause, thus creating an ambiguity that permitted stacking (id. (citing Hall, 328 Ill.

2024App. 3d at 657 )) was directly contradictory to the antistacking clause, thus creating an ambiguity that permitted stacking (id. (citing Hall, 328 Ill.

2006Dec. 414 , 807 N.E.2d 1255 (2004) (there is no per se rule that multiple limits of coverage creates ambiguity); Pekin Insurance Co. v. Estate of Ritter, 322 Ill.App.3d 1004, 1005 , 255 Ill.Dec. 900 , 750 N.E.2d 1285 (2001) (coverages and premiums entered in the columns on the declaration merely showed the amount of coverage for each vehicle and the total premium allotted to that coverage, and any confusion that could arise as to stacking would be clarified by the antistacking clause); Frigo v. Motors Insurance Corp., 271 Ill.App.3d 50, 65 , 207 Ill.Dec. 724 , 648 N.E.2d 180 (1995) (stacking wa

2006Dec. 414 , 807 N.E.2d 1255 (2004) (there is no per se rule that multiple limits of coverage creates ambiguity); Pekin Insurance Co. v. Estate of Ritter, 322 Ill.App.3d 1004, 1005 , 255 Ill.Dec. 900 , 750 N.E.2d 1285 (2001) (coverages and premiums entered in the columns on the declaration merely showed the amount of coverage for each vehicle and the total premium allotted to that coverage, and any confusion that could arise as to stacking would be clarified by the antistacking clause); Frigo v. Motors Insurance Corp., 271 Ill.App.3d 50, 65 , 207 Ill.Dec. 724 , 648 N.E.2d 180 (1995) (stacking wa

2024Therefore, an - 13 - “antistacking clause must be read in conjunction with the policy as a whole.” Hess, 2020 IL 124649, ¶ 24 ; see Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 23 (uncertainty can arise if a declarations page is read in isolation, so we must examine the complete document in interpreting an insurance policy). ¶ 32 Thus, we keep the provisions of the antistacking clause in mind as we turn to the declarations pages.

2024Therefore, an “antistacking clause must be read in conjunction with the policy as a whole.” Hess, 2020 IL 124649, ¶ 24 ; see Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 23 (uncertainty can arise if a declarations page is read in isolation, so we must examine the complete document in interpreting an insurance policy). ¶ 32 Thus, we keep the provisions of the antistacking clause in mind as we turn to the declarations pages.

2010The antistacking clause at issue in In re Estate of Striplin stated, “ ‘The limits of liability applicable to any one auto *** will not be combined with or added to the limits of liability applicable to any other auto ***.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) In re Estate of Striplin, 347 Ill.

2010The antistacking clause at issue in In re Estate of Striplin stated, " 'The limits of liability applicable to any one auto *** will not be combined with or added to the limits of liability applicable to any other auto ***.' " In re Estate of Striplin, 347 Ill.

2006Dec. 414 , 807 N.E.2d 1255 (2004) (there is no per se rule that multiple limits of coverage creates ambiguity); Pekin Insurance Co. v. Estate of Ritter, 322 Ill.App.3d 1004, 1005 , 255 Ill.Dec. 900 , 750 N.E.2d 1285 (2001) (coverages and premiums entered in the columns on the declaration merely showed the amount of coverage for each vehicle and the total premium allotted to that coverage, and any confusion that could arise as to stacking would be clarified by the antistacking clause); Frigo v. Motors Insurance Corp., 271 Ill.App.3d 50, 65 , 207 Ill.Dec. 724 , 648 N.E.2d 180 (1995) (stacking wa

2006Dec. 414 , 807 N.E.2d 1255 (2004) (there is no per se rule that multiple limits of coverage creates ambiguity); Pekin Insurance Co. v. Estate of Ritter, 322 Ill.App.3d 1004, 1005 , 255 Ill.Dec. 900 , 750 N.E.2d 1285 (2001) (coverages and premiums entered in the columns on the declaration merely showed the amount of coverage for each vehicle and the total premium allotted to that coverage, and any confusion that could arise as to stacking would be clarified by the antistacking clause); Frigo v. Motors Insurance Corp., 271 Ill.App.3d 50, 65 , 207 Ill.Dec. 724 , 648 N.E.2d 180 (1995) (stacking wa

2024Furthermore, “[t]he payment of multiple premiums (and the notion that this entitles an insured to separate coverage) is of no consequence where an antistacking provision’s clear and unambiguous language manifests the parties’ contrary intent.” McFadden, 2012 IL App (2d) 120272, ¶ 31 . ¶ 37 As noted above, where an ambiguity in an insurance policy is found, we will construe it in favor of the insured.

2023Furthermore, “[t]he payment of multiple premiums (and the notion that this entitles an insured to separate coverage) is of no consequence where an antistacking provision’s clear and unambiguous language manifests the parties’ contrary intent.” McFadden, 2012 IL App (2d) 120272, ¶ 31 . ¶ 38 As noted above, where an ambiguity in an insurance policy is found, we will construe it in favor of the insured.

2010E.g., Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 23-25 , 823 N.E.2d at 567-69 ; Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 191-94 , 620 N.E.2d at 361-63 ; Abram v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 395 Ill.

2010E.g., Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 23-25 , 823 N.E.2d at 567-69 ; Bruder, 156 6 Ill. 2d at 191-94; 620 N.E.2d at 361-63 ; Abram v. United Services Automobile Ass'n, 395 Ill.

2007App. 3d 639 , 707 N.E.2d 1259 (1999), adopted the reasoning in Bruder and held that the antistacking clause in issue was ambiguous because the declarations page to which the clause referred listed two vehicles with separate coverages and separate premiums.

2007App. 3d 639 , 707 N.E.2d 1259 (1999), adopted the reasoning in Bruder and held that the antistacking clause in issue was ambiguous because the declarations page to which the clause referred listed two vehicles with separate coverages and separate premiums.

2006App.3d 417, 425-26 , 256 Ill.Dec. 247 , 751 N.E.2d 637 (2001) (an ambiguity in a specific provision of a policy cannot be cured by an antistacking clause in a general section of the policy).

2006App.3d 417, 425-26 , 256 Ill.Dec. 247 , 751 N.E.2d 637 (2001) (an ambiguity in a specific provision of a policy cannot be cured by an antistacking clause in a general section of the policy).

2006See Yates v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass'n, 311 Ill.App.3d 797, 800 , 244 Ill.Dec. 154 , 724 N.E.2d 1042 (2000) (a policy was ambiguous where an antistacking clause contradicted the declarations page which could have been read to permit stacking); Janes v. Western States Insurance Co., 335 Ill.App.3d 1109, 1115 , 270 Ill.Dec. 462 , 783 N.E.2d 37 (2001) (an antistacking clause did not erase the ambiguity created by a declarations page that showed coverage and premiums for each of three cars).

2006See Yates v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass'n, 311 Ill.App.3d 797, 800 , 244 Ill.Dec. 154 , 724 N.E.2d 1042 (2000) (a policy was ambiguous where an antistacking clause contradicted the declarations page which could have been read to permit stacking); Janes v. Western States Insurance Co., 335 Ill.App.3d 1109, 1115 , 270 Ill.Dec. 462 , 783 N.E.2d 37 (2001) (an antistacking clause did not erase the ambiguity created by a declarations page that showed coverage and premiums for each of three cars).

2026These three factors mean that someone who obtains insurance for multiple vehicles is required to have UIM and UM coverage for each vehicle, which necessarily means that if such a person is in an accident caused by an uninsured or underinsured vehicle, then that person is potentially covered by the UIM and UM at least twice, once for each vehicle.” (Emphasis in original.) Kuhn v. Owners Insurance Co., 2023 IL App (4th) 220827, ¶¶ 9-11 . ¶4 Antistacking provisions are provisions that allow insurers to limit liability coverage.

2023Stacking of Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverages ¶ 11 Stacking frequently arises in the context of underinsured motorist (UIM) or uninsured motorist (UM) coverage (see Progressive Premier Insurance Co. v. Cannon, 382 Ill.

2002Squire, 69 Ill. 2d at 173 , 370 N.E.2d at 1046 .

2002Squire, 69 Ill. 2d at 173 , 370 N.E.2d at 1046 .

2002Hall, 277 Ill.

2001The cases cited by the defendant in Allen , the same cases cited by defendant in the case at hand, were therefore found to be irrelevant: Frigo v. Motors Insurance Corp., 271 Ill.App.3d 50 , 207 Ill.Dec. 724 , 648 N.E.2d 180 (1995); Menke v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 78 Ill.2d 420 , 36 Ill.Dec. 698 , 401 N.E.2d 539 (1980); and Obenland v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 234 Ill.App.3d 99 , 174 Ill.Dec. 915 , 599 N.E.2d 999 (1992).

2001The cases cited by the defendant in Allen , the same cases cited by defendant in the case at hand, were therefore found to be irrelevant: Frigo v. Motors Insurance Corp., 271 Ill.App.3d 50 , 207 Ill.Dec. 724 , 648 N.E.2d 180 (1995); Menke v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 78 Ill.2d 420 , 36 Ill.Dec. 698 , 401 N.E.2d 539 (1980); and Obenland v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 234 Ill.App.3d 99 , 174 Ill.Dec. 915 , 599 N.E.2d 999 (1992).

1995The function of the court in construing an insurance policy is to ascertain and enforce the intention of the parties as expressed in the agreement, and the construction given the policy should be a natural and reasonable one. (de los Reyes v. Travelers Insurance Cos. (1990), 135 Ill. 2d 353, 358 , 553 N.E.2d 301, 304 .) If we examine what the insured expected to receive in this case — death claim coverage and an enforceable antistacking provision — with what the insurer provided — no death claim coverage — we cannot conclude that the insured is harmed where (1) death claim coverage is implied

1995The function of the court in construing an insurance policy is to ascertain and enforce the intention of the parties as expressed in the agreement, and the construction given the policy should be a natural and reasonable one. (de los Reyes v. Travelers Insurance Cos. (1990), 135 Ill. 2d 353, 358 , 553 N.E.2d 301, 304 .) If we examine what the insured expected to receive in this case — death claim coverage and an enforceable antistacking provision — with what the insurer provided — no death claim coverage — we cannot conclude that the insured is harmed where (1) death claim coverage is implied

1980This court has recognized that the purpose of the uninsured motorist statute is to provide coverage which would compensate the insured to at least the same extent as he would have been if he had been injured by a motorist who was insured in compliance with the Financial Responsibility Law. ( Putnam v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. (1970), 48 Ill.2d 71, 89 ; see also Glidden v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Association (1974), 57 Ill.2d 330, 338 .) That purpose is not defeated here by the antistacking clause.

1980(Putnam v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. (1970), 48 Ill. 2d 71, 89 ; see also Glidden v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Association (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 330, 338 .) That purpose is not defeated here by the antistacking clause.