Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
6 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 2005–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hallgreen2 sentences2014The court explained: “Given the close temporal proximity between the illegal detention and [the] defendant’s consent, and the absence of any intervening circumstances or other circumstances mitigating the effect of that unlawful police conduct, we cannot say that the state has proved that the defendant’s decision to consent, even if voluntary, was not the product of the preceding violation of [the] defendant’s rights under Article I, section 9.” Id. 2014Given the totality of the circumstances in that case, including that the officer requested consent to search immediately after he had asked the defendant about whether he was carrying weapons or illegal drugs, and while he was awaiting the results of a warrant check, the court held that the state had not proved that the “defendant’s decision to consent, even if voluntary, was not the product of the preceding violation of [the] defendant’s rights under Article I, section 9.” Id. at 36 . | 1 | 4 |
State v. Toevsgreen2 sentences2006Under those circumstances, this court concluded: “Given the close temporal proximity between the illegal detention and defendant’s consent, and the absence of any intervening circumstances or other circumstances mitigating the effect of that unlawful police conduct, we cannot say that the state has proved that defendant’s decision to consent, even if voluntary, was not the product of the preceding violation of defendant’s rights under Article I, section 9.” Id.; see also State v. Toevs, 327 Or 525, 537-38 , 964 P2d 1007 (1998) (requiring suppression of evidence where defendant voluntarily cons 2006Under those circumstances, this court concluded: “Given the close temporal proximity between the illegal detention and defendant’s consent, and the absence of any intervening circumstances or other circumstances mitigating the effect of that unlawful police conduct, we cannot say that the state has proved that defendant’s decision to consent, even if voluntary, was not the product of the preceding violation of defendant’s rights under Article I, section 9.” Id.; see also State v. Toevs, 327 Or 525, 537-38 , 964 P2d 1007 (1998) (requiring suppression of evidence where defendant voluntarily cons | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hemenway
green
1 sentence2013The majority holds that the evidence that the police obtained when defendant first consented to the search was admissible because it was not the product of the preceding violation. 353 Or at 154 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Thompkin
green
2 sentences2010Thus, the court held, because of the close temporal proximity between the illegal seizure of the defendant and her surrender of the crack pipe, as well as the absence of any intervening circumstances attenuating the effects of the unlawful police conduct, "the state failed to prove that [the] defendant's decision to surrender incriminating evidence, even if voluntary, was not the product of the preceding violation of her rights under Article I, section 9." Id. at 381 , 143 P.3d 530 . 2010Thus, the court held, because of the close temporal proximity between the illegal seizure of the defendant and her surrender of the crack pipe, as well as the absence of any intervening circumstances attenuating the effects of the unlawful police conduct, “the state failed to prove that [the] defendant’s decision to surrender incriminating evidence, even if voluntary, was not the product of the preceding violation of her rights under Article I, section 9.” Id. at 381 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Dominguez-Martinez
green
2 sentences2006Under those circumstances, this court concluded: “Given the close temporal proximity between the illegal detention and defendant’s consent, and the absence of any intervening circumstances or other circumstances mitigating the effect of that unlawful police conduct, we cannot say that the state has proved that defendant’s decision to consent, even if voluntary, was not the product of the preceding violation of defendant’s rights under Article I, section 9.” Id.; see also State v. Toevs, 327 Or 525, 537-38 , 964 P2d 1007 (1998) (requiring suppression of evidence where defendant voluntarily cons 2006Under those circumstances, this court concluded: “Given the close temporal proximity between the illegal detention and defendant’s consent, and the absence of any intervening circumstances or other circumstances mitigating the effect of that unlawful police conduct, we cannot say that the state has proved that defendant’s decision to consent, even if voluntary, was not the product of the preceding violation of defendant’s rights under Article I, section 9.” Id.; see also State v. Toevs, 327 Or 525, 537-38 , 964 P2d 1007 (1998) (requiring suppression of evidence where defendant voluntarily cons | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.