Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
6 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1895–2006 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Troutman v. Erlandsongreen1 sentence2006The court held the second action barred by claim preclusion, explaining: “The only reason for permitting plaintiff to maintain this second case would be his asserted lack of actual and constructive knowledge of the fraud in time to give evidence of it at the trial of the first case.” Id. at 210 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ruckman v. Union Railway Co.
green
2 sentences1996If the second action or defense is upon the same claim or demand, the former judgment is a bar not only as to matters actually determined, but such as could have been litigated; but, if it is upon another claim or demand, the former judgment is not a bar, except as to questions actually determined or directly in issue.’ ” 153 Or at 513 -14 (quoting Ruckman v. Union Railway Co., 45 Or 578, 581 , 78 P 748 (1904)) (emphasis added; citations omitted). 1996If the second action or defense is upon the same claim or demand, the former judgment is a bar not only as to matters actually determined, but such as could have been litigated; but, if it is upon another claim or demand, the former judgment is not a bar, except as to questions actually determined or directly in issue.’ ” 153 Or at 513 -14 (quoting Ruckman v. Union Railway Co., 45 Or 578, 581 , 78 P 748 (1904)) (emphasis added; citations omitted). | 2 | 1957–1996 |
Wagner v. Savage, as Adm'r
green
2 sentences1961If the second action or defense is upon the same claim or demand, the former judgment is a bar not only as to matters actually determined, but such as could have been litigated; but, if it is upon another claim or demand, the former judgment is not a bar, except as to questions actually determined or directly in issue.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) See also Nusom et ux v. Fromm et ux, 217 Or 36 , 340 P2d 186 ; Kelley et ux v. Mallory et ux, 202 Or 690 , 277 P2d 767 ; and Wagner v. Savage, Adm’r, 195 Or 128, 147 , 244 P2d 161 . 1961If the second action or defense is upon the same claim or demand, the former judgment is a bar not only as to matters actually determined, but such as could have been litigated; but, if it is upon another claim or demand, the former judgment is not a bar, except as to questions actually determined or directly in issue.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) See also Nusom et ux v. Fromm et ux, 217 Or 36 , 340 P2d 186 ; Kelley et ux v. Mallory et ux, 202 Or 690 , 277 P2d 767 ; and Wagner v. Savage, Adm’r, 195 Or 128, 147 , 244 P2d 161 . | 2 | 1957–1961 |
Winters v. Bisaillon
green
2 sentences1996If the second action or defense is upon the same claim or demand, the former judgment is a bar not only as to matters actually determined, but such as could have been litigated; but, if it is upon another claim or demand, the former judgment is not a bar, except as to questions actually determined or directly in issue.’ ” 153 Or at 513 -14 (quoting Ruckman v. Union Railway Co., 45 Or 578, 581 , 78 P 748 (1904)) (emphasis added; citations omitted). 1996As that passage demonstrates, the first question before the Winters court, in applying the doctrine of claim preclusion, was whether the plaintiffs actions for damage to person and to property were “upon the same claim or cause of suit.” 153 Or at 513 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Nusom Et Ux v. Fromm Et Ux
neutral
2 sentences1961If the second action or defense is upon the same claim or demand, the former judgment is a bar not only as to matters actually determined, but such as could have been litigated; but, if it is upon another claim or demand, the former judgment is not a bar, except as to questions actually determined or directly in issue.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) See also Nusom et ux v. Fromm et ux, 217 Or 36 , 340 P2d 186 ; Kelley et ux v. Mallory et ux, 202 Or 690 , 277 P2d 767 ; and Wagner v. Savage, Adm’r, 195 Or 128, 147 , 244 P2d 161 . 1961If the second action or defense is upon the same claim or demand, the former judgment is a bar not only as to matters actually determined, but such as could have been litigated; but, if it is upon another claim or demand, the former judgment is not a bar, except as to questions actually determined or directly in issue.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) See also Nusom et ux v. Fromm et ux, 217 Or 36 , 340 P2d 186 ; Kelley et ux v. Mallory et ux, 202 Or 690 , 277 P2d 767 ; and Wagner v. Savage, Adm’r, 195 Or 128, 147 , 244 P2d 161 . | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Kelley Et Ux. v. Mallory Et Ux.
green
2 sentences1961If the second action or defense is upon the same claim or demand, the former judgment is a bar not only as to matters actually determined, but such as could have been litigated; but, if it is upon another claim or demand, the former judgment is not a bar, except as to questions actually determined or directly in issue.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) See also Nusom et ux v. Fromm et ux, 217 Or 36 , 340 P2d 186 ; Kelley et ux v. Mallory et ux, 202 Or 690 , 277 P2d 767 ; and Wagner v. Savage, Adm’r, 195 Or 128, 147 , 244 P2d 161 . 1961If the second action or defense is upon the same claim or demand, the former judgment is a bar not only as to matters actually determined, but such as could have been litigated; but, if it is upon another claim or demand, the former judgment is not a bar, except as to questions actually determined or directly in issue.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) See also Nusom et ux v. Fromm et ux, 217 Or 36 , 340 P2d 186 ; Kelley et ux v. Mallory et ux, 202 Or 690 , 277 P2d 767 ; and Wagner v. Savage, Adm’r, 195 Or 128, 147 , 244 P2d 161 . | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Cromwell v. County of Sac
green
2 sentences1936R. 504), and Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U. S. 351 ( 24 L. 1936R. 504), and Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U. S. 351 ( 24 L. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Beezley v. City of Astoria
green
2 sentences1936If the second action or defense is upon the same claim or demand, the former judgment is a bar not only as to matters actually determined, but such as could have been litigated; but, if it is upon another claim or demand, the former judgment is not a bar, except as to questions actually determined or directly in issue. ’ ’ To the same effect see First National Bank v. Buckland, 130 Or. 364 ( 280 P. 331 ); Beezley v. Astoria, 126 Or. 177 ( 269 P. 216 , 60 A. L. 1936If the second action or defense is upon the same claim or demand, the former judgment is a bar not only as to matters actually determined, but such as could have been litigated; but, if it is upon another claim or demand, the former judgment is not a bar, except as to questions actually determined or directly in issue. ’ ’ To the same effect see First National Bank v. Buckland, 130 Or. 364 ( 280 P. 331 ); Beezley v. Astoria, 126 Or. 177 ( 269 P. 216 , 60 A. L. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
First Nat. Bank of Burns v. Buckland
green
2 sentences1936If the second action or defense is upon the same claim or demand, the former judgment is a bar not only as to matters actually determined, but such as could have been litigated; but, if it is upon another claim or demand, the former judgment is not a bar, except as to questions actually determined or directly in issue. ’ ’ To the same effect see First National Bank v. Buckland, 130 Or. 364 ( 280 P. 331 ); Beezley v. Astoria, 126 Or. 177 ( 269 P. 216 , 60 A. L. 1936If the second action or defense is upon the same claim or demand, the former judgment is a bar not only as to matters actually determined, but such as could have been litigated; but, if it is upon another claim or demand, the former judgment is not a bar, except as to questions actually determined or directly in issue. ’ ’ To the same effect see First National Bank v. Buckland, 130 Or. 364 ( 280 P. 331 ); Beezley v. Astoria, 126 Or. 177 ( 269 P. 216 , 60 A. L. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Sturdy v. Jackaway
neutral
1 sentence1895The effect of a verdict and judgment under such statutes is to bar a second action to test the validity of the same title: Sturdy v. Jackaway, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 174 . | 1 | 1895–1895 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.