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6 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1970–1987 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Merlogreen2 sentences1976In State v. Merlo, 92 Or 678, 699, 173 P 317 , 182 P153 (1919) this court stated the applicable rule as follows: "* * * If the witness merely fails to testify as he was expected to do, or fails to testify as strongly as was expected, or gives testimony which is favorable to neither party, and does not give testimony prejudicial to the party calling him, then the party producing the witness cannot impeach him by showing inconsistent statements. * * *” We think the trial court did not err in its ruling on this question. 1976In State v. Merlo, 92 Or 678, 699, 173 P 317 , 182 P153 (1919) this court stated the applicable rule as follows: "* * * If the witness merely fails to testify as he was expected to do, or fails to testify as strongly as was expected, or gives testimony which is favorable to neither party, and does not give testimony prejudicial to the party calling him, then the party producing the witness cannot impeach him by showing inconsistent statements. * * *” We think the trial court did not err in its ruling on this question. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dean v. Exotic Veneers, Inc.
green
2 sentences1987Troutman v. Erlandson, 287 Or 187, 201-07 , 598 P2d 1211 (1979); Dean v. Exotic Veneers, Inc., 271 Or 188 , 531 P2d 266 (1975).” 2 Bank does not contend that the petition to reopen is not based on the same factual transaction as the restitution action or that the petition does not seek an additional or alternative remedy or that the petition could not have been joined with the 1983 restitution action. 1987Troutman v. Erlandson, 287 Or 187, 201-07 , 598 P2d 1211 (1979); Dean v. Exotic Veneers, Inc., 271 Or 188 , 531 P2d 266 (1975).” 2 Bank does not contend that the petition to reopen is not based on the same factual transaction as the restitution action or that the petition does not seek an additional or alternative remedy or that the petition could not have been joined with the 1983 restitution action. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Rennie v. Freeway Transport
green
2 sentences1987In Rennie v. Freeway Transport, 294 Or 319, 323 , 656 P2d 919 (1982), the court stated the applicable principle: “We start with the general rule, well established in this state, that a plaintiff who has prosecuted one action against a defendant through to a final judgment binding on the parties is barred on res judicata grounds from prosecuting another action against the same defendant where the claim in the second action is one which is based on the same factual transaction that was at issue in the first, seeks a remedy additional or alternative to the one sought earlier, and is of such a nat 1987In Rennie v. Freeway Transport, 294 Or 319, 323 , 656 P2d 919 (1982), the court stated the applicable principle: “We start with the general rule, well established in this state, that a plaintiff who has prosecuted one action against a defendant through to a final judgment binding on the parties is barred on res judicata grounds from prosecuting another action against the same defendant where the claim in the second action is one which is based on the same factual transaction that was at issue in the first, seeks a remedy additional or alternative to the one sought earlier, and is of such a nat | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Troutman v. Erlandson
green
2 sentences1987Troutman v. Erlandson, 287 Or 187, 201-07 , 598 P2d 1211 (1979); Dean v. Exotic Veneers, Inc., 271 Or 188 , 531 P2d 266 (1975).” 2 Bank does not contend that the petition to reopen is not based on the same factual transaction as the restitution action or that the petition does not seek an additional or alternative remedy or that the petition could not have been joined with the 1983 restitution action. 1987Troutman v. Erlandson, 287 Or 187, 201-07 , 598 P2d 1211 (1979); Dean v. Exotic Veneers, Inc., 271 Or 188 , 531 P2d 266 (1975).” 2 Bank does not contend that the petition to reopen is not based on the same factual transaction as the restitution action or that the petition does not seek an additional or alternative remedy or that the petition could not have been joined with the 1983 restitution action. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Melgard v. Hanna
green
2 sentences1982In Melgard v. Hanna, 45 Or App 133, 136 , 607 P2d 795 (1980), a professional malpractice case also involving the discovery rationale for the commencement of the statute of limitations, the court stated the applicable rule as follows: 5 “The statute [ORS 12.110(1)] does not commence to run until the occurrence of the harm and until such time as it appears reasonably probable that the damage complained of was caused by the negligence of defendants and not by some other cause.” (Emphasis added.) We hold that the requested instruction was neither misleading nor incorrect. 1982In Melgard v. Hanna, 45 Or App 133, 136 , 607 P2d 795 (1980), a professional malpractice case also involving the discovery rationale for the commencement of the statute of limitations, the court stated the applicable rule as follows: 5 “The statute [ORS 12.110(1)] does not commence to run until the occurrence of the harm and until such time as it appears reasonably probable that the damage complained of was caused by the negligence of defendants and not by some other cause.” (Emphasis added.) We hold that the requested instruction was neither misleading nor incorrect. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
South of Sunnyside Neighborhood League v. Board of Commissioners
neutral
1 sentence1977Cf. ORS 197.015(4).” (Footnote omitted.) 27 Or App at 654 . | 1 | 1977–1977 |
State v. Wolfe
neutral
2 sentences1975In State v. Wolfe, 21 Or App 717, 720 , 536 P2d 555 , Sup Ct review allowed (1975), the court stated the applicable rule as follows: “It is within the discretion of the trial judge to suppress evidence if the pretrial discovery statutes are not followed. 1975In State v. Wolfe, 21 Or App 717, 720 , 536 P2d 555 , Sup Ct review allowed (1975), the court stated the applicable rule as follows: “It is within the discretion of the trial judge to suppress evidence if the pretrial discovery statutes are not followed. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Wigan v. Follett
green
2 sentences1970The law does not require the doing of a vain or idle thing: Wigan v. La Follett, 84 Or. 488 ( 165 Pac. 579 ). * * *” See, also, Seidenberg v. Tautfest, 155 Or 420, 426 , 64 P2d 534 (1937). 1970The law does not require the doing of a vain or idle thing: Wigan v. La Follett, 84 Or. 488 ( 165 Pac. 579 ). * * *” See, also, Seidenberg v. Tautfest, 155 Or 420, 426 , 64 P2d 534 (1937). | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Otto Seidenberg, Inc. v. Tautfest
neutral
2 sentences1970The law does not require the doing of a vain or idle thing: Wigan v. La Follett, 84 Or. 488 ( 165 Pac. 579 ). * * *” See, also, Seidenberg v. Tautfest, 155 Or 420, 426 , 64 P2d 534 (1937). 1970The law does not require the doing of a vain or idle thing: Wigan v. La Follett, 84 Or. 488 ( 165 Pac. 579 ). * * *” See, also, Seidenberg v. Tautfest, 155 Or 420, 426 , 64 P2d 534 (1937). | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.