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6 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 2001–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brian v. Oregon Government Ethics Commissiongreen2 sentences2015See also Brian v. Oregon Government Ethics Commission, 319 Or 151, 156 , 874 P2d 1294 (1994) (quoting People for Ethical Treatment, 312 Or at 99 ). 2015See also Brian v. Oregon Government Ethics Commission, 319 Or 151, 156 , 874 P2d 1294 (1994) (quoting People for Ethical Treatment, 312 Or at 99 ). | 2 | 2 |
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Institutional Animal Care & Use Committeegreen2 sentences2015See also Brian v. Oregon Government Ethics Commission, 319 Or 151, 156 , 874 P2d 1294 (1994) (quoting People for Ethical Treatment, 312 Or at 99 ). 2015See also Brian v. Oregon Government Ethics Commission, 319 Or 151, 156 , 874 P2d 1294 (1994) (quoting People for Ethical Treatment, 312 Or at 99 ). | 2 | 2 |
Utsey v. Coos Countygreen2 sentences2001As noted above, it points to the court's statement that "`[a] second requirement for a justiciable controversy is that the court's decision * * * will have some practical effect on the rights of the parties to the controversy.'" 176 Or.App. at 540, 32 P.3d at 942 (quoting Brumnett, 315 Or at 405 , 848 P.2d 1194 ). 2001As noted above, it points to the court's statement that "`[a] second requirement for a justiciable controversy is that the court's decision * * * will have some practical effect on the rights of the parties to the controversy.'" 176 Or.App. at 540, 32 P.3d at 942 (quoting Brumnett, 315 Or at 405 , 848 P.2d 1194 ). | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fox v. Country Mutual Insurance
green
2 sentences2001In our recent decision in Poddar v. Clatsop County, 167 Or.App. 162, 169 , 2 P.3d 929 , adhered to on recons., 168 Or.App. 556 , 7 P.3d 677 , rev. den. 331 Or. 193 , 10 P.3d 944 (2000), for example, we began our discussion of standing by noting that we should not lose sight of the fact that standing is not a generic concept: what constitutes standing depends on the specific statutory standard in the particular case. 2001In our recent decision in Poddar v. Clatsop County, 167 Or.App. 162, 169 , 2 P.3d 929 , adhered to on recons., 168 Or.App. 556 , 7 P.3d 677 , rev. den. 331 Or. 193 , 10 P.3d 944 (2000), for example, we began our discussion of standing by noting that we should not lose sight of the fact that standing is not a generic concept: what constitutes standing depends on the specific statutory standard in the particular case. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Gruber v. Lincoln Hospital District
green
2 sentences2001The applicable statutory *957 standing requirement was the Declaratory Judgment Act, which provided: "Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writing constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a constitution, statute, municipal charter, ordinance, contract or franchise may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under any such instrument, constitution, statute, municipal charter, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder." Gru 2001The applicable statutory standing requirement was the Declaratory Judgment Act, which provided: “Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writing constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a constitution, statute, municipal charter, ordinance, contract or franchise may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under any such instrument, constitution, statute, municipal charter, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.” Gruber, | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Brumnett v. Psychiatric Security Review Board
green
2 sentences2001As noted above, it points to the court's statement that "`[a] second requirement for a justiciable controversy is that the court's decision * * * will have some practical effect on the rights of the parties to the controversy.'" 176 Or.App. at 540, 32 P.3d at 942 (quoting Brumnett, 315 Or at 405 , 848 P.2d 1194 ). 2001As noted above, it points to the court's statement that "`[a] second requirement for a justiciable controversy is that the court's decision * * * will have some practical effect on the rights of the parties to the controversy.'" 176 Or.App. at 540, 32 P.3d at 942 (quoting Brumnett, 315 Or at 405 , 848 P.2d 1194 ). | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Budget Rent-A-Car of Washington-Oregon, Inc. v. Multnomah County
green
2 sentences2001The court concluded: "The statute's reference to an effect on `rights, status or other legal relations' requires a plaintiff seeking declaratory relief to allege `some injury or other impact on a legally recognized interest beyond an abstract interest in the correct application or the validity of a law.' Budget Rent-A-Car v. Multnomah Co., 287 Or. 93, 95 , 597 P.2d 1232 (1979). 2001The court concluded: "The statute's reference to an effect on `rights, status or other legal relations' requires a plaintiff seeking declaratory relief to allege `some injury or other impact on a legally recognized interest beyond an abstract interest in the correct application or the validity of a law.' Budget Rent-A-Car v. Multnomah Co., 287 Or. 93, 95 , 597 P.2d 1232 (1979). | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Poddar v. Clatsop County
green
2 sentences2001In our recent decision in Poddar v. Clatsop County, 167 Or.App. 162, 169 , 2 P.3d 929 , adhered to on recons., 168 Or.App. 556 , 7 P.3d 677 , rev. den. 331 Or. 193 , 10 P.3d 944 (2000), for example, we began our discussion of standing by noting that we should not lose sight of the fact that standing is not a generic concept: what constitutes standing depends on the specific statutory standard in the particular case. 2001In our recent decision in Poddar v. Clatsop County, 167 Or.App. 162, 169 , 2 P.3d 929 , adhered to on recons., 168 Or.App. 556 , 7 P.3d 677 , rev. den. 331 Or. 193 , 10 P.3d 944 (2000), for example, we began our discussion of standing by noting that we should not lose sight of the fact that standing is not a generic concept: what constitutes standing depends on the specific statutory standard in the particular case. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Poddar v. Clatsop County
green
2 sentences2001In our recent decision in Poddar v. Clatsop County, 167 Or.App. 162, 169 , 2 P.3d 929 , adhered to on recons., 168 Or.App. 556 , 7 P.3d 677 , rev. den. 331 Or. 193 , 10 P.3d 944 (2000), for example, we began our discussion of standing by noting that we should not lose sight of the fact that standing is not a generic concept: what constitutes standing depends on the specific statutory standard in the particular case. 2001In our recent decision in Poddar v. Clatsop County, 167 Or.App. 162, 169 , 2 P.3d 929 , adhered to on recons., 168 Or.App. 556 , 7 P.3d 677 , rev. den. 331 Or. 193 , 10 P.3d 944 (2000), for example, we began our discussion of standing by noting that we should not lose sight of the fact that standing is not a generic concept: what constitutes standing depends on the specific statutory standard in the particular case. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Kellas v. Department of Corrections
green
2 sentences2015In sum, in light of the Supreme Court’s holding that the practical effects requirement that we consider to determine whether a controversy is moot is also part of the statutory standing inquiry under the DJA, we address the statutory question and the constitutional question together; we perceive no basis for distinguishing between the two. 7 See Orr v. East Valley Water District, 203 Or App 430, 437 , 125 P3d 834 (2005), rev den, 340 Or 308 (2006), abrogated in part by Kellas v. Dept. of Corrections, 341 Or 471 , 145 P3d 139 (2006) (addressing issue of statutory standing and issue of justiciab 2015In sum, in light of the Supreme Court’s holding that the practical effects requirement that we consider to determine whether a controversy is moot is also part of the statutory standing inquiry under the DJA, we address the statutory question and the constitutional question together; we perceive no basis for distinguishing between the two. 7 See Orr v. East Valley Water District, 203 Or App 430, 437 , 125 P3d 834 (2005), rev den, 340 Or 308 (2006), abrogated in part by Kellas v. Dept. of Corrections, 341 Or 471 , 145 P3d 139 (2006) (addressing issue of statutory standing and issue of justiciab | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Orr v. East Valley Water District
neutral
2 sentences2015In sum, in light of the Supreme Court’s holding that the practical effects requirement that we consider to determine whether a controversy is moot is also part of the statutory standing inquiry under the DJA, we address the statutory question and the constitutional question together; we perceive no basis for distinguishing between the two. 7 See Orr v. East Valley Water District, 203 Or App 430, 437 , 125 P3d 834 (2005), rev den, 340 Or 308 (2006), abrogated in part by Kellas v. Dept. of Corrections, 341 Or 471 , 145 P3d 139 (2006) (addressing issue of statutory standing and issue of justiciab 2015In sum, in light of the Supreme Court’s holding that the practical effects requirement that we consider to determine whether a controversy is moot is also part of the statutory standing inquiry under the DJA, we address the statutory question and the constitutional question together; we perceive no basis for distinguishing between the two. 7 See Orr v. East Valley Water District, 203 Or App 430, 437 , 125 P3d 834 (2005), rev den, 340 Or 308 (2006), abrogated in part by Kellas v. Dept. of Corrections, 341 Or 471 , 145 P3d 139 (2006) (addressing issue of statutory standing and issue of justiciab | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Gamboa
green
1 sentence2015In sum, in light of the Supreme Court’s holding that the practical effects requirement that we consider to determine whether a controversy is moot is also part of the statutory standing inquiry under the DJA, we address the statutory question and the constitutional question together; we perceive no basis for distinguishing between the two. 7 See Orr v. East Valley Water District, 203 Or App 430, 437 , 125 P3d 834 (2005), rev den, 340 Or 308 (2006), abrogated in part by Kellas v. Dept. of Corrections, 341 Or 471 , 145 P3d 139 (2006) (addressing issue of statutory standing and issue of justiciab | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Oregon Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Oregon Department of Corrections
green
1 sentence2006Id. at 118 n 1. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.