competent and intelligent waiver (Pennsylvania) · Go Syfert
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competent and intelligent waiver in Pennsylvania

6 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1969–2023 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
Commonwealth v. Grantgreen
pasuperct · 1974 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1989–2023
2 sentences

1989However, as in the instant case, the intransigent behavior by the appellant does not negate the requirement for a full and complete colloquy in order that appellant may make a competent and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. *180 Commonwealth v. Grant, supra 229 Pa.Super. at 426-427, 323 A.2d at 358-359 (footnote omitted).

1989However, as in the instant case, the intransigent behavior by the appellant does not negate the requirement for a full and complete colloquy in order that appellant may make a competent and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. *180 Commonwealth v. Grant, supra 229 Pa.Super. at 426-427, 323 A.2d at 358-359 (footnote omitted).

22
Von Moltke v. Gilliesgreen
scotus · 1948 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1979–1982
2 sentences

1982We quoted from Von Moltke v. Gilles, 332 U.S. 708, 724 , 68 S.Ct. 316, 323 , 92 L.Ed. 309, 321 (1948), wherein the Supreme Court explained the trial court’s responsibility in determining whether there is a competent and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel: To be valid such a waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included with them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges, and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the matter.

1982We quoted from Von Moltke v. Gilles, 332 U.S. 708, 724 , 68 S.Ct. 316, 323 , 92 L.Ed. 309, 321 (1948), wherein the Supreme Court explained the trial court’s responsibility in determining whether there is a competent and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel: To be valid such a waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included with them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges, and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the matter.

12
cluster 486380green
ca3 · 1987 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
1 sentence

2004Co., 815 F.2d 890, 902 (3d Cir. 1987) (“[C]ourts have required a showing not only of the loss of substantial defense opportunities, but also of a likelihood of success in defending liability or damages... [which] makes particular sense in cases involving excess coverage because excess carriers generally have no right to control a lawsuit and because notice to the primary carrier generally ensures a competent and intelligent defense.”).

11
Cameron v. Bergergreen
pa · 1939 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
2 sentences

2004See also, Cameron v. Berger, 336 Pa. 229 , 7 A.2d 293 (1939) (insured who disappeared and was thereby unavailable as a witness at trial breached its duty to cooperate); Metal Bank of America Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 360 Pa. Super. 350 , 520 A.2d 493 (1987) (insured prejudiced its insurers’ interests by defending action for two years to the point of settlement before notifying them of claim).

2004See also, Cameron v. Berger, 336 Pa. 229 , 7 A.2d 293 (1939) (insured who disappeared and was thereby unavailable as a witness at trial breached its duty to cooperate); Metal Bank of America Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 360 Pa. Super. 350 , 520 A.2d 493 (1987) (insured prejudiced its insurers’ interests by defending action for two years to the point of settlement before notifying them of claim).

11
Johnson v. Zerbstgreen
scotus · 1938 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1969–1969
2 sentences

1969See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).

1969See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (1)

CaseCitedYears
Metal Bank of America, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America green
pa · 1987
2 sentences

2004See also, Cameron v. Berger, 336 Pa. 229 , 7 A.2d 293 (1939) (insured who disappeared and was thereby unavailable as a witness at trial breached its duty to cooperate); Metal Bank of America Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 360 Pa. Super. 350 , 520 A.2d 493 (1987) (insured prejudiced its insurers’ interests by defending action for two years to the point of settlement before notifying them of claim).

2004See also, Cameron v. Berger, 336 Pa. 229 , 7 A.2d 293 (1939) (insured who disappeared and was thereby unavailable as a witness at trial breached its duty to cooperate); Metal Bank of America Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 360 Pa. Super. 350 , 520 A.2d 493 (1987) (insured prejudiced its insurers’ interests by defending action for two years to the point of settlement before notifying them of claim).

12004–2004

Where else courts name it

CA 14 (1947–1979) TN 8 (1975–2025) FL 7 (1964–1971) PA 6 (1969–2023) TX 2 (1964–2005)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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