general nature requirement (Pennsylvania) · Go Syfert
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general nature requirement in Pennsylvania

6 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1990–2026 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

CaseFollowedCited
Commonwealth v. Travagliagreen
pa · 1983 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026See Green, 683 A.2d at 664 ; see also Travaglia, 467 A.2d at 293 .

11
Commonwealth v. Greengreen
pasuperct · 1996 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026See Green, 683 A.2d at 664 ; see also Travaglia, 467 A.2d at 293 .

11
Travelers Insurance v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Boardgreen
pacommwct · 1982 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
1 sentence

2003In Antimary v. Workermen’s Com *639 pensation Appeal Board (U.S. # 1 Auto Sales & KLM Insurance Group), 655 A.2d 659, 661 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995), we further determined that a WCJ “does have jurisdiction over the scope of insurance coverage and whether there is liability under an insurance policy.” In fact, we noted that “a determination of liability of the insurance carrier was within [the referee’s] province.” Id., quoting Travelers Insurance Company v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Levine), 68 Pa.Cmwlth.24, 447 A.2d 1116, 1118 (1982).

11
Antimary v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Boardgreen
pacommwct · 1995 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
2 sentences

2003In Antimary v. Workermen’s Com *639 pensation Appeal Board (U.S. # 1 Auto Sales & KLM Insurance Group), 655 A.2d 659, 661 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995), we further determined that a WCJ “does have jurisdiction over the scope of insurance coverage and whether there is liability under an insurance policy.” In fact, we noted that “a determination of liability of the insurance carrier was within [the referee’s] province.” Id., quoting Travelers Insurance Company v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Levine), 68 Pa.Cmwlth.24, 447 A.2d 1116, 1118 (1982).

2003In Antimary v. Workermen’s Com *639 pensation Appeal Board (U.S. # 1 Auto Sales & KLM Insurance Group), 655 A.2d 659, 661 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995), we further determined that a WCJ “does have jurisdiction over the scope of insurance coverage and whether there is liability under an insurance policy.” In fact, we noted that “a determination of liability of the insurance carrier was within [the referee’s] province.” Id., quoting Travelers Insurance Company v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Levine), 68 Pa.Cmwlth.24, 447 A.2d 1116, 1118 (1982).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (5)

CaseCitedYears
Overhead Door Co. of Lewistown, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board green
pacommwct · 2003
2 sentences

2005Overhead Door Company, 819 A.2d at 638 .

2005Overhead Door Company, 819 A.2d at 638 .

22005–2005
Commonwealth v. Sheehan green
pa · 1971
2 sentences

1996This doctrine, as ultimately crafted by our Supreme Court, provided that a collateral attack upon a conviction for which a sentence has been fully served is not moot where the petitioner can demonstrate that the conviction will affect a subsequent criminal prosecution, Commonwealth *130 v. Sheehan, 446 Pa. 35 , 285 A.2d 465 (1971), or will have either actual or potential civil consequences, Commonwealth v. Doria, 468 Pa. 534 , 364 A.2d 322 (1976).

1996This doctrine, as ultimately crafted by our Supreme Court, provided that a collateral attack upon a conviction for which a sentence has been fully served is not moot where the petitioner can demonstrate that the conviction will affect a subsequent criminal prosecution, Commonwealth *130 v. Sheehan, 446 Pa. 35 , 285 A.2d 465 (1971), or will have either actual or potential civil consequences, Commonwealth v. Doria, 468 Pa. 534 , 364 A.2d 322 (1976).

21990–1996
Beltrami Enterprises, Inc. v. Commonwealth green
pacommwct · 1993
2 sentences

2003In Riedel , the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also noted with approval our decision in Beltrami Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Resources, 159 Pa.Cmwlth. 72 , 632 A.2d 989 (1993), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 538 Pa. 615 , 645 A.2d 1318 (1994), where we stated that whether or not a particular agency had the power to afford relief in a particular case was not relevant in determining whether it had general subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy- As noted above, the WCJ in the instant matter obviously had subject matter jurisdiction over the general nature of t

2003In Riedel , the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also noted with approval our decision in Beltrami Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Resources, 159 Pa.Cmwlth. 72 , 632 A.2d 989 (1993), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 538 Pa. 615 , 645 A.2d 1318 (1994), where we stated that whether or not a particular agency had the power to afford relief in a particular case was not relevant in determining whether it had general subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy- As noted above, the WCJ in the instant matter obviously had subject matter jurisdiction over the general nature of t

12003–2003
Commonwealth v. Doria green
pa · 1976
2 sentences

1996This doctrine, as ultimately crafted by our Supreme Court, provided that a collateral attack upon a conviction for which a sentence has been fully served is not moot where the petitioner can demonstrate that the conviction will affect a subsequent criminal prosecution, Commonwealth *130 v. Sheehan, 446 Pa. 35 , 285 A.2d 465 (1971), or will have either actual or potential civil consequences, Commonwealth v. Doria, 468 Pa. 534 , 364 A.2d 322 (1976).

1996This doctrine, as ultimately crafted by our Supreme Court, provided that a collateral attack upon a conviction for which a sentence has been fully served is not moot where the petitioner can demonstrate that the conviction will affect a subsequent criminal prosecution, Commonwealth *130 v. Sheehan, 446 Pa. 35 , 285 A.2d 465 (1971), or will have either actual or potential civil consequences, Commonwealth v. Doria, 468 Pa. 534 , 364 A.2d 322 (1976).

11996–1996
Commonwealth v. Pierce green
pa · 1990
2 sentences

1996The Court then noted that "[b]ecause of the general nature of this requirement, the Supreme Court created an exception to the mootness doctrine, which was known as the `collateral consequences' doctrine." Id. at 129, 579 A.2d at 964-965 .

1996The Court then noted that “[b]ecause of the general nature of this requirement, the Supreme Court created an exception to the mootness doctrine, which was known as the ‘collateral consequences’ doctrine.” Id. at 129, 579 A.2d at 964-965 .

11996–1996

Where else courts name it

WA 21 (1977–2024) NY 13 (1983–2024) IA 8 (1989–2024) PA 6 (1990–2026) CA 6 (1940–2025) HI 5 (2000–2012) OR 2 (2006–2021) MO 2 (1904–1912)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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