6 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1949–1986 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Armour and Co. v. Pittsburghgreen2 sentences1985We must determine whether Judge Diggins correctly concluded that the license fee was reasonable. 1 In Armour & Company v. City of Pittsburgh, 363 Pa. 109, 112-13 , 69 A.2d 405, 407 (1949), the Supreme Court characterized a “license fee” as one exacted for the purpose of regulating an occupation or privilege which is deemed to be in need of public control, and, ordinarily, it is designed for the sole purpose of reimbursing the sovereign, in whole or in part, for the necessary expense of administering such control; if it exceeded the amount required for that purpose it would become a tax revenue 1985We must determine whether Judge Diggins correctly concluded that the license fee was reasonable. 1 In Armour & Company v. City of Pittsburgh, 363 Pa. 109, 112-13 , 69 A.2d 405, 407 (1949), the Supreme Court characterized a “license fee” as one exacted for the purpose of regulating an occupation or privilege which is deemed to be in need of public control, and, ordinarily, it is designed for the sole purpose of reimbursing the sovereign, in whole or in part, for the necessary expense of administering such control; if it exceeded the amount required for that purpose it would become a tax revenue | 1 | 2 |
Delaware & Atlantic Telegraph & Telephone Co.'s Petitiongreen2 sentences1970See Delaware and Atlantic Telegraph and Telephone Company's Petition, 224 Pa. 55 , 73 Atl. 175 (1909); Point Bridge Company v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 240 Pa. 105 , 87 Atl. 614 (1913); and White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259 , 134 Atl. 409 (1926). [4] Whether or not this rule is wise or worthy of retention is not now in issue. 1970See Delaware and Atlantic Telegraph and Telephone Company's Petition, 224 Pa. 55 , 73 Atl. 175 (1909); Point Bridge Company v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 240 Pa. 105 , 87 Atl. 614 (1913); and White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259 , 134 Atl. 409 (1926). [4] Whether or not this rule is wise or worthy of retention is not now in issue. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Banger's Appeal
green
2 sentences1986An occupation tax was defined by our Supreme Court as long ago as 1885 when in Banger’s Appeal, 109 Pa. 79 (1885), at page 95 it used this language: ‘An “occupation” tax is peculiar in its character. 1971An occupation tax was defined by our Supreme Court as long ago as 1885 when in Banger’s Appeal, 109 Pa. 79 (1885), at page 95 it used this language: “An ‘occupation’ tax is peculiar in its character. | 2 | 1971–1986 |
Gaugler v. Allentown
green
2 sentences1975In Gaugler v. Allentown, 410 Pa. 315 , 189 A. 2d 264 (1963), the lower court ruled that an occupation privilege tax of $10 could not be imposed on non-residents, because it was, in reality, a capitation or poll tax and hence illegal as to non-residents. 1975In Gaugler v. Allentown, 410 Pa. 315 , 189 A. 2d 264 (1963), the lower court ruled that an occupation privilege tax of $10 could not be imposed on non-residents, because it was, in reality, a capitation or poll tax and hence illegal as to non-residents. | 2 | 1971–1975 |
Taylor v. Coatesville Area School District
neutral
2 sentences1986This Court’s discussion of tbe differences between an occupation tax and an occupational privilege tax in tbe case of Taylor v. Coatesville Area School District, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 510, 279 A.2d 90 (1971) is instructive: What appellant fails to consider is that here we are confronted with an occupation tax and not an occupation privilege tax or a capitation tax. 1986This Court’s discussion of tbe differences between an occupation tax and an occupational privilege tax in tbe case of Taylor v. Coatesville Area School District, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 510, 279 A.2d 90 (1971) is instructive: What appellant fails to consider is that here we are confronted with an occupation tax and not an occupation privilege tax or a capitation tax. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Saulsbury v. Bethlehem Steel Co.
green
2 sentences1971The Supreme Court reaffirmed the legal power of a municipality to levy a true occupational privilege tax in Saulsbury v. Bethlehem Steel Company, 413 Pa. 316 , 196 A. 2d 664 (1964). 1971The Supreme Court reaffirmed the legal power of a municipality to levy a true occupational privilege tax in Saulsbury v. Bethlehem Steel Company, 413 Pa. 316 , 196 A. 2d 664 (1964). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Point Bridge Co. v. Pittsburgh Railways Co.
neutral
2 sentences1970See Delaware and Atlantic Telegraph and Telephone Company's Petition, 224 Pa. 55 , 73 Atl. 175 (1909); Point Bridge Company v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 240 Pa. 105 , 87 Atl. 614 (1913); and White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259 , 134 Atl. 409 (1926). [4] Whether or not this rule is wise or worthy of retention is not now in issue. 1970See Delaware and Atlantic Telegraph and Telephone Company's Petition, 224 Pa. 55 , 73 Atl. 175 (1909); Point Bridge Company v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 240 Pa. 105 , 87 Atl. 614 (1913); and White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259 , 134 Atl. 409 (1926). [4] Whether or not this rule is wise or worthy of retention is not now in issue. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
White's Appeal
green
2 sentences1970See Delaware and Atlantic Telegraph and Telephone Company's Petition, 224 Pa. 55 , 73 Atl. 175 (1909); Point Bridge Company v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 240 Pa. 105 , 87 Atl. 614 (1913); and White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259 , 134 Atl. 409 (1926). [4] Whether or not this rule is wise or worthy of retention is not now in issue. 1970See Delaware and Atlantic Telegraph and Telephone Company's Petition, 224 Pa. 55 , 73 Atl. 175 (1909); Point Bridge Company v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 240 Pa. 105 , 87 Atl. 614 (1913); and White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259 , 134 Atl. 409 (1926). [4] Whether or not this rule is wise or worthy of retention is not now in issue. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Pa. Liq. Con. Bd. v. Publicker
green
2 sentences1949“A license fee is a charge which is imposed by the sovereign, in the exercise of its police power, upon a person within its jurisdiction for the privilege of performing certain acts and which has for its purpose the defraying of the expense of the regulation of such acts for the benefit of the general public”: Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Publicker Commercial Alcohol Co., 347 Pa. 555, 560 , 32 A. 2d 914, 917 . 1949“A license fee is a charge which is imposed by the sovereign, in the exercise of its police power, upon a person within its jurisdiction for the privilege of performing certain acts and which has for its purpose the defraying of the expense of the regulation of such acts for the benefit of the general public”: Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Publicker Commercial Alcohol Co., 347 Pa. 555, 560 , 32 A. 2d 914, 917 . | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.