occupation privilege in Alabama

2003This is not, then, a property or income tax, but an occupation or privilege tax, the amount being regulated by the extent to which the privilege has been enjoyed." 38 Ala. at 159 .

2003This is not, then, a property or income tax, but an occupation or privilege tax, the amount being regulated by the extent to which the privilege has been enjoyed.” 38 Ala. at 159 .

1956We wish again to refer to that case to quote as follows: ‘This power to tax, while inhering in the state, cannot be so used by the state nor by a municipal corporation so as to “embarrass and destroy useful and harmless occupations, that are essential to the prosperity of the people, and thus defeat the very purpose for which the power is conferred” ’; and, ‘ “the power to license an occupation or privilege implies the right to fix the amount of the fee, and the action of a municipal body in fixing a fee will only be disturbed, in case of manifest abuse of that power.” ’ And, further, ‘a licen

1956We wish again to refer to that case to quote as follows: ‘This power to tax, while inhering in the state, cannot be so used by the state nor by a municipal corporation so as to “embarrass and destroy useful and harmless occupations, that are essential to the prosperity of the people, and thus defeat the very purpose for which the power is conferred” ’; and, ‘ “the power to license an occupation or privilege implies the right to fix the amount of the fee, and the action of a municipal body in fixing a fee will only be disturbed, in case of manifest abuse of that power.” ’ And, further, ‘a licen

1936State v. Stephens, 4 Tex. 137, 140 ; Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo. 479 ; Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. 73, 83 [ 12 L.Ed. 992 ] ; and authorities supra. Subdivision 5 of said section 454, must be construed, therefore, as a provision for an occupation or privilege tax, and not as a tax proper on property; and the clame in said subdivision, — ‘aft er deducting the expenses of carrying on such business,1 — as indicating no more than the method adopted by the legislature in ascertaining the extent to which the occupation or business has been enjoyed and for which it ought to be taxed.” (Italics supplied.)

1897As was well said in Lott v. Ross, 38 Ala. 156 , supra, in respect to the imposition of a tax on gross receipts, it is not “a property or income tax, but an occupation or privilege tax, the amount being regulated by the-extent to which the privilege has been enjoyed,” The legislature having the constitutional right to tax gross receipts or occupations and privileges, the mode in which it should be exercised, within constitutional limitations, was a matter wholly with them, not to be questioned by the courts. — The State v. Stephens, 4 Tex. 137, 140; Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo. 479 ; Nathan v. Loui

1979Frazier v. State Tax Commission, 234 Ala. 353 , 175 So. 402 (1937).

1979Frazier v. State Tax Commission, 234 Ala. 353 , 175 So. 402 (1937).

1979In Nachman , we stated: This court more than seventy years ago committed itself to the proposition that a tax upon “the gross amount of sales mer chandise” was not a tax upon the goods themselves, or fruits of sale, but upon the business or act of selling; that it was not a property or income tax, but an occupation or privilege tax, the amount being regulated by the extent to which the privilege has been enjoyed. 233 Ala. at 635 , 173 So. at 31 .

1979In Nachman , we stated: This court more than seventy years ago committed itself to the proposition that a tax upon “the gross amount of sales mer chandise” was not a tax upon the goods themselves, or fruits of sale, but upon the business or act of selling; that it was not a property or income tax, but an occupation or privilege tax, the amount being regulated by the extent to which the privilege has been enjoyed. 233 Ala. at 635 , 173 So. at 31 .

1979See also Capita] City Water Co. v. Board of Revenue of Montgomery County, 117 Ala. 303 , 23 So. 970 (1897); Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. State, 204 Ala. 469 , 86 So. 65 (1920).

1979See also Capita] City Water Co. v. Board of Revenue of Montgomery County, 117 Ala. 303 , 23 So. 970 (1897); Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. State, 204 Ala. 469 , 86 So. 65 (1920).

1936State v. Stephens, 4 Tex. 137, 140 ; Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo. 479 ; Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. 73, 83 [ 12 L.Ed. 992 ] ; and authorities supra. Subdivision 5 of said section 454, must be construed, therefore, as a provision for an occupation or privilege tax, and not as a tax proper on property; and the clame in said subdivision, — ‘aft er deducting the expenses of carrying on such business,1 — as indicating no more than the method adopted by the legislature in ascertaining the extent to which the occupation or business has been enjoyed and for which it ought to be taxed.” (Italics supplied.)

1936State v. Stephens, 4 Tex. 137, 140 ; Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo. 479 ; Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. 73, 83 [ 12 L.Ed. 992 ] ; and authorities supra. Subdivision 5 of said section 454, must be construed, therefore, as a provision for an occupation or privilege tax, and not as a tax proper on property; and the clame in said subdivision, — ‘aft er deducting the expenses of carrying on such business,1 — as indicating no more than the method adopted by the legislature in ascertaining the extent to which the occupation or business has been enjoyed and for which it ought to be taxed.” (Italics supplied.)

1936Co., 164 Ala. 482 , 51 So. 523, 525 , 27 L.R.A.

1936Co., 164 Ala. 482 , 51 So. 523, 525 , 27 L.R.A.

1936Mercantile Co. v. Grimes, 204 Ala. 492 , 86 So. 56 , 11 A.L.R. 300 , the state’s contention was that the income tax levy in the general revenue act of 1919 (Gen.Acts 1919, p. 282) was an excise tax, and outside of the influence of the limitations of the Constitution embodied in sections 211 and 214 of the Constitution.

1936Mercantile Co. v. Grimes, 204 Ala. 492 , 86 So. 56 , 11 A.L.R. 300 , the state’s contention was that the income tax levy in the general revenue act of 1919 (Gen.Acts 1919, p. 282) was an excise tax, and outside of the influence of the limitations of the Constitution embodied in sections 211 and 214 of the Constitution.

1885In Board of Revenue v. Gas Light Co., 64 Ala. 269 , and in State v. Board of Revenue, 73 Ala. 65 , the tax was imposed on the net income, and not on the business.

1885In Board of Revenue v. Gas Light Co., 64 Ala. 269 , and in State v. Board of Revenue, 73 Ala. 65 , the tax was imposed on the net income, and not on the business.

1861A tax upon “the gross amount of sales of merchandise”/under section 391 of the Code, is not a tax upon the goods themselves, or the fruits of the sale, but upon the business or acfr. of selling.- This is not, then, aproperty-or income .tax, -but an occupation or privilege.tax, the amount being regulated by the extent to which the privilege has-been- enjoyed.— See Mosely v. Tift, 4 Florida, 402 ; State v. Stephens, 4 Texas, 137 ; State v. Bock, 9 Texas, 369 ; De Witt v. Hays, 2 Cal. 468 ; Code, § 392 ; Acts ’53-4, p. 4, § 5 ; Acts ’59-60, p. 12 ; Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How.

1861A tax upon “the gross amount of sales of merchandise”/under section 391 of the Code, is not a tax upon the goods themselves, or the fruits of the sale, but upon the business or acfr. of selling.- This is not, then, aproperty-or income .tax, -but an occupation or privilege.tax, the amount being regulated by the extent to which the privilege has-been- enjoyed.— See Mosely v. Tift, 4 Florida, 402 ; State v. Stephens, 4 Texas, 137 ; State v. Bock, 9 Texas, 369 ; De Witt v. Hays, 2 Cal. 468 ; Code, § 392 ; Acts ’53-4, p. 4, § 5 ; Acts ’59-60, p. 12 ; Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How.