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6 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1978–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fischer v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence1987Cf Fischer v. Commonwealth Department of Public Welfare, 85 Pa.Commw. 240, 260-262, 482 A.2d 1148, 1159-1160 (1984) (declaring that the provisions of the Public Welfare Code requiring a victim of a sexual offense report the crime within a specified time period were violative of the victim’s right to privacy as guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Constitution). 11 More recently, several members of our Supreme Court have acknowledged that the statutory physician-patient privilege has a constitutional basis. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re the June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury
green
2 sentences1995More recently several members of our Supreme Court recognized that the statutory physician-patient privilege is rooted in the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions in In Re The June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury, 490 Pa. 143 , 415 A.2d 73 (1980). 1995More recently several members of our Supreme Court recognized that the statutory physician-patient privilege is rooted in the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions in In Re The June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury, 490 Pa. 143 , 415 A.2d 73 (1980). | 2 | 1987–1995 |
People v. Al-Kanani
green
2 sentences2017CPLR 4504 and the New York legislative intent in enacting the statutory physician-patient privilege “is to protect those who are required to consult with physician[s] from the disclosure of secrets imparted to physician[s], to protect the relationship of patient and physicianf,] and to prevent physicians from disclosing information which might result in humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace to patients.” People v. Abdul Karim Al-Kanani, 33 N.Y.2d 260 , [264], 351 N.Y.S.2d 969 , 307 N.E.2d 43 (1973) (quotation marks, quotations, and citations omitted). 2017CPLR 4504 and the New York legislative intent in enacting the statutory physician-patient privilege “is to protect those who are required to consult with physician[s] from the disclosure of secrets imparted to physician[s], to protect the relationship of patient and physicianf,] and to prevent physicians from disclosing information which might result in humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace to patients.” People v. Abdul Karim Al-Kanani, 33 N.Y.2d 260 , [264], 351 N.Y.S.2d 969 , 307 N.E.2d 43 (1973) (quotation marks, quotations, and citations omitted). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v. Commonwealth, Department of Health
green
2 sentences1996In holding that the statutory physician-patient privilege did not apply, the court in Pennsylvania Dental Association observed that “[s]uch records would not normally divulge communications between the dentist and the patient, nor would the information on the records tend to blacken the character of the patient.” Id. (emphasis in original) The court did not, however, decide whether or not a constitutionally-based right of privacy applied to the dental records. 1996Id. at 14 , 461 A.2d at 332 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Phillips's Estate
green
2 sentences1980Under these unusual circumstances, it was proper for the supervising judge to consider the claim of *149 privilege even though such right or privilege is ordinarily properly asserted only by the patient. [5] Concerning the statutory physician-patient privilege, [6] our case law has drawn a distinction between information learned by a physician through communication to him by a patient and information acquired through examination and observation. [7] Phillips' Estate, 295 Pa. 349 , 145 A. 437 (1929); Massich v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co., 137 Pa.Super. 541 , 10 A.2d 98 (1939); Soltaniuk v. Metrop 1980Under these unusual circumstances, it was proper for the supervising judge to consider the claim of *149 privilege even though such right or privilege is ordinarily properly asserted only by the patient. [5] Concerning the statutory physician-patient privilege, [6] our case law has drawn a distinction between information learned by a physician through communication to him by a patient and information acquired through examination and observation. [7] Phillips' Estate, 295 Pa. 349 , 145 A. 437 (1929); Massich v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co., 137 Pa.Super. 541 , 10 A.2d 98 (1939); Soltaniuk v. Metrop | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Philadelphia Auburn-Cord Co. v. Shockcor
green
2 sentences1980Under these unusual circumstances, it was proper for the supervising judge to consider the claim of *149 privilege even though such right or privilege is ordinarily properly asserted only by the patient. [5] Concerning the statutory physician-patient privilege, [6] our case law has drawn a distinction between information learned by a physician through communication to him by a patient and information acquired through examination and observation. [7] Phillips' Estate, 295 Pa. 349 , 145 A. 437 (1929); Massich v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co., 137 Pa.Super. 541 , 10 A.2d 98 (1939); Soltaniuk v. Metrop 1980Under these unusual circumstances, it was proper for the supervising judge to consider the claim of privilege even though such right or privilege is ordinarily properly asserted only by the patient. 5 Concerning the statutory physician-patient privilege, 6 our case law has drawn a distinction between information learned by a physician through communication to him by a patient and information acquired through examination and observation. 7 Phillips’ Estate, 295 Pa. 349 , 145 A. 437 (1929); Massich v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co., 137 Pa.Super. 541 , 10 A.2d 98 (1939); Soltaniuk v. Metropolitan Life | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Massich v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co.
neutral
2 sentences1980Under these unusual circumstances, it was proper for the supervising judge to consider the claim of *149 privilege even though such right or privilege is ordinarily properly asserted only by the patient. [5] Concerning the statutory physician-patient privilege, [6] our case law has drawn a distinction between information learned by a physician through communication to him by a patient and information acquired through examination and observation. [7] Phillips' Estate, 295 Pa. 349 , 145 A. 437 (1929); Massich v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co., 137 Pa.Super. 541 , 10 A.2d 98 (1939); Soltaniuk v. Metrop 1980Under these unusual circumstances, it was proper for the supervising judge to consider the claim of *149 privilege even though such right or privilege is ordinarily properly asserted only by the patient. [5] Concerning the statutory physician-patient privilege, [6] our case law has drawn a distinction between information learned by a physician through communication to him by a patient and information acquired through examination and observation. [7] Phillips' Estate, 295 Pa. 349 , 145 A. 437 (1929); Massich v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co., 137 Pa.Super. 541 , 10 A.2d 98 (1939); Soltaniuk v. Metrop | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Soltaniuk v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
green
2 sentences1980Under these unusual circumstances, it was proper for the supervising judge to consider the claim of *149 privilege even though such right or privilege is ordinarily properly asserted only by the patient. [5] Concerning the statutory physician-patient privilege, [6] our case law has drawn a distinction between information learned by a physician through communication to him by a patient and information acquired through examination and observation. [7] Phillips' Estate, 295 Pa. 349 , 145 A. 437 (1929); Massich v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co., 137 Pa.Super. 541 , 10 A.2d 98 (1939); Soltaniuk v. Metrop 1980Under these unusual circumstances, it was proper for the supervising judge to consider the claim of privilege even though such right or privilege is ordinarily properly asserted only by the patient. 5 Concerning the statutory physician-patient privilege, 6 our case law has drawn a distinction between information learned by a physician through communication to him by a patient and information acquired through examination and observation. 7 Phillips’ Estate, 295 Pa. 349 , 145 A. 437 (1929); Massich v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co., 137 Pa.Super. 541 , 10 A.2d 98 (1939); Soltaniuk v. Metropolitan Life | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Reed v. Sloan
green
2 sentences1978We have long condemned the practice of appellate courts anticipating arguments not presented by parties to a controversy. *495 See, e.g., Girard School District v. Pittinger, 481 Pa. 91 , ___ n. 10, 392 A.2d 261 , 265 n. 10 (1978); Reed v. Sloan, 475 Pa. 570 , 575 n. 4, 381 A.2d 421 (1977); Wiegand v. Wiegand, 461 Pa. 482 , 337 A.2d 256 (1975). 1978We have long condemned the practice of appellate courts anticipating arguments not presented by parties to a controversy. *495 See, e.g., Girard School District v. Pittinger, 481 Pa. 91 , ___ n. 10, 392 A.2d 261 , 265 n. 10 (1978); Reed v. Sloan, 475 Pa. 570 , 575 n. 4, 381 A.2d 421 (1977); Wiegand v. Wiegand, 461 Pa. 482 , 337 A.2d 256 (1975). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Wiegand v. Wiegand
green
2 sentences1978We have long condemned the practice of appellate courts anticipating arguments not presented by parties to a controversy. *495 See, e.g., Girard School District v. Pittinger, 481 Pa. 91 , ___ n. 10, 392 A.2d 261 , 265 n. 10 (1978); Reed v. Sloan, 475 Pa. 570 , 575 n. 4, 381 A.2d 421 (1977); Wiegand v. Wiegand, 461 Pa. 482 , 337 A.2d 256 (1975). 1978We have long condemned the practice of appellate courts anticipating arguments not presented by parties to a controversy. *495 See, e.g., Girard School District v. Pittinger, 481 Pa. 91 , ___ n. 10, 392 A.2d 261 , 265 n. 10 (1978); Reed v. Sloan, 475 Pa. 570 , 575 n. 4, 381 A.2d 421 (1977); Wiegand v. Wiegand, 461 Pa. 482 , 337 A.2d 256 (1975). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Girard School District v. Pittenger
green
2 sentences1978We have long condemned the practice of appellate courts anticipating arguments not presented by parties to a controversy. *495 See, e.g., Girard School District v. Pittinger, 481 Pa. 91 , ___ n. 10, 392 A.2d 261 , 265 n. 10 (1978); Reed v. Sloan, 475 Pa. 570 , 575 n. 4, 381 A.2d 421 (1977); Wiegand v. Wiegand, 461 Pa. 482 , 337 A.2d 256 (1975). 1978We have long condemned the practice of appellate courts anticipating arguments not presented by parties to a controversy. *495 See, e.g., Girard School District v. Pittinger, 481 Pa. 91 , ___ n. 10, 392 A.2d 261 , 265 n. 10 (1978); Reed v. Sloan, 475 Pa. 570 , 575 n. 4, 381 A.2d 421 (1977); Wiegand v. Wiegand, 461 Pa. 482 , 337 A.2d 256 (1975). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.