third-degree felony violation in Ohio

2014Appellant appealed, and we affirmed his conviction but vacated his sentence and remanded the matter for resentencing based on State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , 845 N.E.2d 470 .

2014Appellant appealed, and we affirmed his conviction but vacated his sentence and remanded the matter for resentencing based on State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , 845 N.E.2d 470 .

2024Montgomery No. 28747, 2021-Ohio-76, ¶ 16 . {¶9} With regard to the maximum sentences imposed on Counts 4 and 6, Raines was convicted on Count 4 of Having Weapons While Under Disability, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), and was convicted on Count 6 of Aggravated Trafficking in Drugs, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) and (C)(1)(c).

2023Montgomery No. 28747, 2021-Ohio-76, ¶ 15 . {¶29} In the instant case, Barnett was convicted of Money Laundering, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 1315.55(A)(3) and 1315.99(C).

2024Reversing a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence and ordering a new trial should be reserved for only the “exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Id. {¶22} Calloway was found guilty of intimidation of an attorney, victim, or witness in a criminal case, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2921.04(B).

2023On March 23, 2022, the court sentenced Samantha to a maximum term of 3 years imprisonment. {¶24} Valorie timely appeals and raises three assignments of error. {¶25} Valorie’s first two assignments address sufficiency and we consider both assignments together. {¶26} First assignment of error: “The verdicts are against the manifest weight of the evidence and the sufficiency of the evidence.” {¶27} Second assignment of error: “The Appellant’s convictions for involuntary manslaughter and endangering children were not supported by sufficient evidence.” {¶28} “‘Sufficiency’ is a term of art meaning

2014Scioto No. 07CA3163, 2008-Ohio-2711, ¶ 19 ; quoting State v. Perryman, 49 Ohio St.2d 14 , 358 N.E.2d 1040 (1976), paragraph five of the syllabus, vacated in part on other grounds by Perryman v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 911 , 98 S.Ct. 3136 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1156 (1978). “ ‘To support a conviction for complicity by aiding and abetting pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), the Highland App. No. 14CA11 13 evidence must show that the defendant supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal in the commission of the crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the princ

2014Scioto No. 07CA3163, 2008-Ohio-2711, ¶ 19 ; quoting State v. Perryman, 49 Ohio St.2d 14 , 358 N.E.2d 1040 (1976), paragraph five of the syllabus, vacated in part on other grounds by Perryman v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 911 , 98 S.Ct. 3136 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1156 (1978). “ ‘To support a conviction for complicity by aiding and abetting pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), the Highland App. No. 14CA11 13 evidence must show that the defendant supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal in the commission of the crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the princ

2014Scioto No. 07CA3163, 2008-Ohio-2711, ¶ 19 ; quoting State v. Perryman, 49 Ohio St.2d 14 , 358 N.E.2d 1040 (1976), paragraph five of the syllabus, vacated in part on other grounds by Perryman v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 911 , 98 S.Ct. 3136 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1156 (1978). “ ‘To support a conviction for complicity by aiding and abetting pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), the Highland App. No. 14CA11 13 evidence must show that the defendant supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal in the commission of the crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the princ

2014Scioto No. 07CA3163, 2008-Ohio-2711, ¶ 19 ; quoting State v. Perryman, 49 Ohio St.2d 14 , 358 N.E.2d 1040 (1976), paragraph five of the syllabus, vacated in part on other grounds by Perryman v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 911 , 98 S.Ct. 3136 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1156 (1978). “ ‘To support a conviction for complicity by aiding and abetting pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), the Highland App. No. 14CA11 13 evidence must show that the defendant supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal in the commission of the crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the princ

2014Scioto No. 07CA3163, 2008-Ohio-2711, ¶ 19 ; quoting State v. Perryman, 49 Ohio St.2d 14 , 358 N.E.2d 1040 (1976), paragraph five of the syllabus, vacated in part on other grounds by Perryman v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 911 , 98 S.Ct. 3136 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1156 (1978). “ ‘To support a conviction for complicity by aiding and abetting pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), the Highland App. No. 14CA11 13 evidence must show that the defendant supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal in the commission of the crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the princ

2014Scioto No. 07CA3163, 2008-Ohio-2711, ¶ 19 ; quoting State v. Perryman, 49 Ohio St.2d 14 , 358 N.E.2d 1040 (1976), paragraph five of the syllabus, vacated in part on other grounds by Perryman v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 911 , 98 S.Ct. 3136 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1156 (1978). “ ‘To support a conviction for complicity by aiding and abetting pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), the Highland App. No. 14CA11 13 evidence must show that the defendant supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal in the commission of the crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the princ

2026State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1 . {¶12} Appellant was convicted of a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2903.08 and a fourth-degree felony.

2025Id., citing State v. Dorsey, 2021-Ohio- 76, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.). {¶18} With regard to the sentence imposed in the instant case, Carpenter was convicted of Endangering Children, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2919.22(A) and (E)(2)(c).

2023Belmont No. 02 BE 71, 2003-Ohio-6545, ¶ 10 ; State v. Olah, 146 Ohio App.3d 586, 597 , 767 N.E.2d 755 (9th Dist. 2001). {¶77} Appellant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), which states: “No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog.” {¶78} He was also charged with one count of illegal conveyance of prohibited items onto the grounds of a detention facility, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2921.36(A)(2), which states: (A) No person shall knowingly convey * * * onto the grounds of a

2023Belmont No. 02 BE 71, 2003-Ohio-6545, ¶ 10 ; State v. Olah, 146 Ohio App.3d 586, 597 , 767 N.E.2d 755 (9th Dist. 2001). {¶77} Appellant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), which states: “No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog.” {¶78} He was also charged with one count of illegal conveyance of prohibited items onto the grounds of a detention facility, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2921.36(A)(2), which states: (A) No person shall knowingly convey * * * onto the grounds of a

2023Belmont No. 02 BE 71, 2003-Ohio-6545, ¶ 10 ; State v. Olah, 146 Ohio App.3d 586, 597 , 767 N.E.2d 755 (9th Dist. 2001). {¶77} Appellant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), which states: “No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog.” {¶78} He was also charged with one count of illegal conveyance of prohibited items onto the grounds of a detention facility, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2921.36(A)(2), which states: (A) No person shall knowingly convey * * * onto the grounds of a

2022Belmont No. 19 BE 0049, 2021-Ohio-1281, ¶ 18 . {¶8} Appellant pleaded guilty to a third-degree felony in violation of 2919.25(A).

2022Id. {¶119} As stated, Appellant was convicted of count three: aggravated trafficking in drugs, methamphetamine, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) and 2925.03(C)(1)(c) with a forfeiture of money specification.

2021Richland No. 2019 CA 0112, 2020-Ohio-3617 , 2020 WL 3639556 , ¶ 22. {¶34} We next find that Lichtenwalter’s claim of a speedy trial violation was waived when he withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a plea of guilty to one count of failure to comply with the order or signal of a police officer, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B). {¶35} The right to a speedy trial is encompassed within the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

2021The availability of a speedy trial to a person accused of a crime is a fundamental right made obligatory on the states through the Fourteenth [Cite as State v. Lichtenwalter, 2021-Ohio-1394 .] Amendment.

2021Licking No. 16-CA-92, 2017-Ohio-6991, ¶ 2 [Ahmad I]. {¶3} On August 4, 2016, appellant was charged by indictment as follows: Count One: Trafficking in Cocaine, a first-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1)(2)(C)(4)(f); Count Two: Trafficking in Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1)(C)(4)(a); Count Three: Trafficking in Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1)(C)(4)(a); Count Four: Possession of Heroin, a fourth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(6)(b); Count Five: Tampering with Evidence, a third-degree felony in vio

2021Tampering with Evidence, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), with a firearm specification. [Cite as State v. Tupuola, 2021-Ohio-2577 .] {¶3} Tupuola was arraigned on May 13, 2020 and entered a not guilty plea to all charges. {¶4} Counsel for Tupuola filed a Suggestion of Incompetence to Stand Trial and requested a mental evaluation.

2020Seneca No. 13-16-06, 2016-Ohio-5554, ¶ 32 , quoting State v. Abrams, 8th Dist.

2019“This is because, other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., quoting Cargill at ¶21, citing Apprendi; Blakely. “‘The ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely 13 on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Id. quoting Blakely at 303. {¶46} After a thorough review of the plea and sentencing hearings, it is clear the trial court did not engage in

2019“This is because, other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., quoting Cargill at ¶21, citing Apprendi; Blakely. “‘The ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely 13 on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Id. quoting Blakely at 303. {¶46} After a thorough review of the plea and sentencing hearings, it is clear the trial court did not engage in

2018Carol Ann Robb Dated: May 10, 2018 [Cite as State v. Gheen, 2018-Ohio-1924 .] PER CURIAM. {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Austin Gheen, appeals from a Belmont County Common Pleas Court judgment convicting him of burglary following his guilty plea. {¶2} On March 2, 2017, a Belmont County Grand Jury indicted appellant on one count of burglary, a second-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(1); and one count of theft, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1).

2018Harper was arraigned on October 6, 2016; he pled not guilty to the indictment. {¶ 4} On November 29, 2016, Harper filed a motion to exclude certain testimony pursuant to Evid.R. 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).

2018Harper was arraigned on October 6, 2016; he pled not guilty to the indictment. {¶ 4} On November 29, 2016, Harper filed a motion to exclude certain testimony pursuant to Evid.R. 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).

2018State v. Piacella, 27 Ohio St.2d 92, 96 , 271 N.E.2d 852 (1971). {¶ 18} In addition, “[b]efore accepting an Alford plea, the trial court must * * * require the state to show a basic factual framework for the charge and plea.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Woods, 6th Dist.

2018State v. Piacella, 27 Ohio St.2d 92, 96 , 271 N.E.2d 852 (1971). {¶ 18} In addition, “[b]efore accepting an Alford plea, the trial court must * * * require the state to show a basic factual framework for the charge and plea.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Woods, 6th Dist.

2018“Furthermore, it is well settled under Ohio law that an inmate is not entitled to the issuance of the writ when there exists an alternative legal remedy through which he could obtain the identical relief sought under the habeas corpus claim.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Cornell v. Schotten, 69 Ohio St.3d 466, 467 (1994) (habeas corpus may not be used as a substitute for other forms of action, such as a direct appeal or postconviction relief petition). {¶3} In September 2013, petitioner pled guilty to Burglary, a second-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(1); Burglary, a fourth-d

2018As set forth above, Appellant pleaded guilty to trafficking in cocaine, a second-degree felony in Jackson App. No. 17CA8 5 violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), and trafficking in heroin, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), both of which subjected Appellant to a mandatory fine per R.C. 2929.18(B)(1). {¶6} This Court recently noted in State v. Fisher, supra, at ¶ 29 as follows: “ ‘[T]he imposition of a mandatory fine under R.C. 2929.18(B)(1) is required unless (1) the offender's affidavit is filed prior to sentencing and (2) the trial court finds that the offender is an indigen

2018As set forth above, Appellant pleaded guilty to trafficking in cocaine, a second-degree felony in Jackson App. No. 17CA8 5 violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), and trafficking in heroin, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), both of which subjected Appellant to a mandatory fine per R.C. 2929.18(B)(1). {¶6} This Court recently noted in State v. Fisher, supra, at ¶ 29 as follows: “ ‘[T]he imposition of a mandatory fine under R.C. 2929.18(B)(1) is required unless (1) the offender's affidavit is filed prior to sentencing and (2) the trial court finds that the offender is an indigen