contract containing the arbitration clause in Texas

2021As the ENGlobal court held, that type of “but for” reasoning is insufficient to constitute a “direct benefit.” Id.; see also Kellogg Brown & Root, 166 S.W.3d at 740 (holding a nonsignatory plaintiff cannot be compelled to arbitrate on the sole ground that, but for the contract containing the arbitration clause, the nonsignatory would have no basis to sue); see also Lincoln Fin.

2018See id.

2016See Brook v. Peak Int’l, Ltd., 294 F.3d 668 , 672 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Myer v. Americo Life, Inc., 232 S.W.3d 401, 408 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) (holding arbitrator’s authority is “defined by the contract containing the arbitration clause and by the issues actually submitted to arbitration”).

2013Horizons II, Ltd. v. Jacobson, 317 S.W.3d 421, 429 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.); e.g., Myer v. Americo Life, Inc., 232 S.W.3d 401, 408 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) (under FAA, “An arbitrator’s jurisdiction is defined by the contract containing the arbitration clause and by the issues actually submitted to arbitration.”).

2022Horizons II, Ltd. v. Jacobson, 317 S.W.3d 421, 429 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (“An arbitrator’s jurisdiction is defined by the contract containing the arbitration clause and by the issues actually submitted to arbitration.”).

2019Horizons II, Ltd. v. Jacobson, 317 S.W.3d 421, 429 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (“An arbitrator’s jurisdiction is defined by the contract containing the arbitration clause and by the issues actually submitted to arbitration.”).

2019Texas courts have recognized two ways in which a non-signatory can seek a direct benefit from the contract containing the arbitration clause: “(1) bring claims in a lawsuit that seek direct benefits from a contract containing an arbitration clause, or (2) deliberately seek and obtain substantial benefits from the contract itself outside of litigation.” Id. (emphasis added); see Meyer v. WMCO-GP, LLC, 211 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. 2006) (applying the equitable estoppel standard to an arbitration agreement governed by the TAA); In re Weekley Homes, 180 S.W.3d at 132.

2018Meyer v. WMCO-GP, LLC, 211 S.W.3d 302, 307 (Tex. 2006).

2015Anglin, 842 S.W.2d at 271 ; Hou-Scape, 945 S.W.2d at 205 ;see also Genesco, Inc. v. T.

2010Anglin Co. v. Tipps , 842 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. 1992); “inextricably enmeshed” with the contract, Griffin v. Semperit of Am., Inc. , 414 F.Supp. 1384, 1389 (S.D.

2016Id. at 129-30 . *537 The supreme court noted that Von Bar-gen advocated for a rule that would bind non-signatories to a contract with an arbitration clause only if the non-signatory brought contract claims; in contrast, Weekly argued for a broad application to any claim that “arises from or relates to” the contract containing the arbitration clause.

2016Indeed, the supreme court in Week-ley held the non-signatory plaintiff bound by her father’s obligation to arbitrate claims even though the plaintiff brought a personal-injury tort claim and did not sue under the contract containing the arbitration clause. 180 S.W.3d at 133 .

2016See Brook v. Peak Int’l, Ltd., 294 F.3d 668 , 672 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Myer v. Americo Life, Inc., 232 S.W.3d 401, 408 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) (holding arbitrator’s authority is “defined by the contract containing the arbitration clause and by the issues actually submitted to arbitration”).

2010Arbitration is a matter of contract, and “the power and authority of the arbitrators in an arbitration proceeding is *87 dependent on the provisions under which the arbitrators were appointed.” Brook v. Peak Int'l, Ltd., 294 F.3d 668, 672 (5th Cir.2002) (quoting Szuts v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 931 F.2d 830, 831 (11th Cir.1991); see also Myer, 232 S.W.3d at 408 (holding that arbitrator’s authority “is defined by the contract containing the arbitration clause and by the issues actually submitted to arbitration”).

2015Meyer, 211 S.W.3d at 306–07; In re Vesta, 192 S.W.3d at 762 ; PER Group, L.P. v. Dava Oncology, L.P., 294 S.W.3d 378 , 387–88 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.); see also In re Kellogg, 166 S.W.3d at 739 (listing estoppel and agency among the theories for requiring arbitration with non- signatory).

2015Meyer, 211 S.W.3d at 306-07 ; In re Vesta, 192 S.W.3d at 762 ; PER Group, L.P. v. Dava Oncology, L.P., 294 S.W.3d 378, 387-88 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.); see also In re Kellogg, 166 S.W.3d at 739 (listing estoppel and agency among the theories for requiring arbitration with non-signatory).

2014See Kergosien v. Ocean Energy, Inc., 390 F.3d 346, 354 (5th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds, 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2009).

2014See Kergosien v. Ocean Energy, Inc., 390 F.3d 346, 354 (5th Cir.2004), overruled on other grounds, Citigroup Global Markets Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir.2009).

2014See Kergosien v. Ocean Energy, Inc., 390 F.3d 346, 354 (5th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds, 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2009).

2014See Kergosien v. Ocean Energy, Inc., 390 F.3d 346, 354 (5th Cir.2004), overruled on other grounds, Citigroup Global Markets Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir.2009).

2010Arbitration is a matter of contract, and “the power and authority of the arbitrators in an arbitration proceeding is dependent on the provisions under which the arbitrators were appointed.” Brook v. Peak Int’l, Ltd. , 294 F.3d 668 , 672 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Szuts v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. , 931 F.2d 830, 831 (11th Cir. 1991); see also Myer , 232 S.W.3d at 408 (holding that arbitrator’s authority “is defined by the contract containing the arbitration clause and by the issues actually submitted to arbitration”).

2010Arbitration is a matter of contract, and “the power and authority of the arbitrators in an arbitration proceeding is *87 dependent on the provisions under which the arbitrators were appointed.” Brook v. Peak Int'l, Ltd., 294 F.3d 668, 672 (5th Cir.2002) (quoting Szuts v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 931 F.2d 830, 831 (11th Cir.1991); see also Myer, 232 S.W.3d at 408 (holding that arbitrator’s authority “is defined by the contract containing the arbitration clause and by the issues actually submitted to arbitration”).

2010Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex.1992); “inextricably enmeshed” with the contract, Griffin v. Semperit of Am., Inc., 414 F.Supp. 1384, 1389 (S.D.Tex.1976); or have a “significant relationship” to the contract, Am.

2010Anglin Co. v. Tipps , 842 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. 1992); “inextricably enmeshed” with the contract, Griffin v. Semperit of Am., Inc. , 414 F.Supp. 1384, 1389 (S.D.

2010Cf., e.g. , Myer v. Americo Life, Inc. , 232 S.W.3d 401, 408 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) (under Federal Arbitration Act, “An arbitrator’s jurisdiction is defined by the contract containing the arbitration clause and by the issues actually submitted to arbitration.”); cf. also Withers v. Patterson , 27 Tex. 491, 496 (1864) (“The jurisdiction of the court means the power or authority which is conferred upon a court, by the constitution and laws, to hear and determine causes between parties, and to carry its judgments into effect.”) (emphasis added).

2010Cf, e.g., Myer v. Americo Life, Inc., 232 S.W.3d 401, 408 (Tex.App.Dallas 2007, no pet.) (under Federal Arbitration Act, “An arbitrator’s jurisdiction is defined by the contract containing the arbitration clause and by the issues actually submitted to arbitration.”); cf. also Withers v. Patterson, 27 Tex. 491, 496 (1864) (“The jurisdiction of the court means the power or authority which is conferred upon a court, by the constitution and laws, to hear and determine causes between parties, and to carry its judgments into effect.”) (emphasis added).

2004See id. at 216, n.26 (citing Chastain v. Robinson‑Humphrey Co. , 957 F.2d 851 (11th Cir. 1992), where one party never signed the contract containing the arbitration clause); id. at 216, n.28 (citing Sphere Drake , 256 F.3d 587 , where party contended that agent who signed the agreement lacked authority to bind the party; Three Valleys , 925 F.2d 1136 , where individual who signed the agreements had no authority to bind the plaintiffs). [14] It is undisputed Wegner signed the subscription agreement, and he does not challenge his assent. [15] In their brief, the Deweys state that Wegner made a s

2004See id. at 216, n. 26 (citing Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., 957 F.2d 851 (11th Cir.1992), where one party never signed the contract containing the arbitration clause); id. at 216, n. 28 (citing Sphere Drake, 256 F.3d 587 , where party contended that agent who signed the agreement lacked authority to bind the party; Three Valleys, 925 F.2d 1136 , where individual who signed the agreements had no authority to bind the plaintiffs). 14 .

2018Ladymon, 318 S.W.3d at 520 .

2015The court stated that “[t]he Vesta court recognized that estoppel principles may require a nonparty to arbitrate if it seeks through its claim to obtain a direct benefit from the contract containing the arbitration clause.” Roe, 318 S.W.3d at 520 (citing Vesta, 192 S.W.3d at 762-63 ).

2014Ladymon, 318 S.W.3d at 514 (discussing First Options, 514 U.S. at 943-47 , 115 S.Ct. 1920 ).

2014Ladymon, 318 S.W.3d at 514 (discussing First Options, 514 U.S. at 943-47 , 115 S.Ct. 1920 ).

2023See Jody James Farms, JV v. Altman Group, Inc., 547 S.W.3d 624, 632 (Tex. 2018). 23 arbitrate disputes that they were not otherwise contractually compelled to arbitrate,” Miller v. Walker, 582 S.W.3d 300 , 305 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, no pet.); see Gordon v. Nickerson, No. 03-18-00228-CV, 2019 WL 2147587 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin May 17, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“An arbitrator’s jurisdiction is defined by the contract containing the arbitration clause and by the issues actually submitted to arbitration.” (citing New Med.

2023For purposes of our analysis, the parties are still on the first step regarding Tex’s capacity and whether a contract was formed under the MFP Agreement as modified by the Fifth Amendment. 7 being” are decided by the court); see also Brand FX, LLC v. Rhine, 458 S.W.3d 195, 203 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.); see generally Transcor Astra Grp.

2023Bottling Co., 475 S.W.3d 436, 443 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).

2020The Fifth Circuit has made the matter more explicit: “To satisfy the knowledge requirement, the case law requires that the non-signatory have had actual knowledge of the contract containing the arbitration clause.” Noble Drilling Servs., Inc. v. Certex USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 2010).

2019The dissent would conclude that the existence of an independent tort duty makes no difference here because it did not in Weekley.4 “[A]pplying direct-benefits estoppel to compel arbitration of a tort claim that does not rely upon—or require reference to—the contract containing the arbitration clause is the exception, not the rule.” Rocha v. Marks Transp., Inc., 512 S.W.3d 529, 539 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (emphasis added) (reversing order compelling arbitration in slip-and-fall at car dealership when plaintiff’s husband had signed arbitration agreement years prior upon pur

2017In re Dillard Dep’t Stores, 186 S.W.3d 514, 516 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam); Valerus, 417 S.W.3d at 208 .