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34 California opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2026 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc.green2 sentences2021(Citing Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc. (9th Cir. 1999) 175 F.3d 716 , 721.) But here Singh’s claims arise from a contract entirely separate from the contract containing the arbitration clause. 2016We likewise conclude that the language ‘arising in connection with’ reaches every dispute between the parties having a significant relationship to the contract and all disputes having their origin or genesis in the contract.” ( 175 F.3d at p. 721 .) “To require arbitration, [the] factual allegations need only ‘touch matters’ covered by the contract containing the arbitration clause and all doubts are to be resolved in favor of arbitrability.” (Ibid.) But clauses requiring arbitration of a claim, dispute, or controversy “arising from” or “arising out of’ an agreement, i.e., excluding language s | 3 | 6 |
Ramos v. Superior Court of San Francisco Cnty.green2 sentences2021“There is no requirement that the cause of action arising out of a contractual dispute must be itself contractual.”’” (Ibid.; see Howard v. Goldbloom (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 659, 663-664 .) “For a party’s claims to come within the scope of such a clause, the factual allegations of the complaint ‘need only “touch matters” covered by the contract containing the arbitration clause.’” (Ramos v. Superior Court (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1042, 1052 .) “Broad arbitration clauses are interpreted to apply to extracontractual disputes between the contracting parties, ‘“so long as they have their roots in the r 2018At most, the requirement is that the dispute must arise out of the contract." ' " ( Rice v. Downs (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 175 , 186, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 555 ( Rice ); accord Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital v. Blue Cross of California (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 677 , 684-686, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 809 [arbitration required where hospital's complaint was based on insurer's refusal to renegotiate reimbursement rates provided for in contract].) Put another way, "[f]or a party's claims to come within the scope of such a clause, the factual allegations of the complaint 'need only "touch matters" covered by the contract | 3 | 3 |
Cobler v. Stanley, Barber, Southard, Brown & Associatesgreen2 sentences2016We likewise conclude that the language ‘arising in connection with’ reaches every dispute between the parties having a significant relationship to the contract and all disputes having their origin or genesis in the contract.” ( 175 F.3d at p. 721 .) “To require arbitration, [the] factual allegations need only ‘touch matters’ covered by the contract containing the arbitration clause and all doubts are to be resolved in favor of arbitrability.” (Ibid.) But clauses requiring arbitration of a claim, dispute, or controversy “arising from” or “arising out of’ an agreement, i.e., excluding language s 2016We likewise conclude that the language ‘arising in connection with’ reaches every dispute between the parties having a significant relationship to the contract and all disputes having their origin or genesis in the contract.” ( 175 F.3d at p. 721 .) “To require arbitration, [the] factual allegations need only ‘touch matters’ covered by the contract containing the arbitration clause and all doubts are to be resolved in favor of arbitrability.” (Ibid.) But clauses requiring arbitration of a claim, dispute, or controversy “arising from” or “arising out of’ an agreement, i.e., excluding language s | 3 | 3 |
Jsm Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2025Likewise, the manufacturer may be dismayed to find out that thousands of consumers may be able to force it to arbitrate their claims pursuant to an arbitration agreement it never signed or authorized, requiring them to incur the substantial fees for those arbitrations.9 (See JSM Tuscany, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 1241 [“A nonsignatory plaintiff can be compelled to arbitrate a claim even against a nonsignatory defendant, when the claim is itself based on, or inextricably intertwined with, the contract containing the arbitration clause”].) There is nothing fair about imposing arbitration unde 2023(JSM Tuscany, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 1241 .) “The equitable estoppel doctrine extends to claims that are dependent upon or inextricably intertwined with the obligations imposed by the contract containing the arbitration clause. | 2 | 6 |
Soltero v. Precise Distributiongreen2 sentences2026They also argue “the factual and legal bases for McCoy’s claims against [the] LLC and Masonite are inextricably intertwined with his claims against 18 Fleetwood.” But the “critical question” remains “whether the plaintiff’s claims against the nonsignatory defendant[s] actually rely on the terms of the contract containing the arbitration clause.” (Soltero, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 895.) In our view, the claims here do not. 2025(See Soltero v. Precise Distribution, Inc. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 887 , 894-897 (Soltero) [citing cases].) “For several reasons, we agree that Garcia misapplied California law” (Soltero, at p. 895), by relying on the idea that the arbitration provision was broad enough to cover statutory claims, and by failing to explain how those claims relied on the substantive terms of the contract containing the arbitration clause (see id. at pp. 895–-897). | 2 | 3 |
Kevin Comer v. Micor, Inc. Kenneth C. Smith Elliot H. Wagner Barbara Arbucci, and Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.green2 sentences2020(Epitech, Inc. v. Kann (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1365 , 1371–1372.) Under the equitable estoppel theory, a nonsignatory “ ‘is estopped from avoiding arbitration if it knowingly seeks the benefits of the contract containing the arbitration clause.’” (Crowley, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1070 .) Equitable estoppel, thus, “ ‘precludes a party from claiming the benefits of a contract while simultaneously attempting to avoid the burdens that contract imposes.’ ” (Comer v. Micor, Inc. (9th Cir. 2006) 436 F.3d 1098, 1101 .) “The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an 2008Co. v. Watts Industries, Inc. (7th Cir. 2005) 417 F.3d 682 , 688 (Zurich); see Comer, supra, 436 F.3d at p. 1101 [estoppel compels arbitration when “nonsignatory ‘knowingly exploits’ ” the contract containing the arbitration clause].) “But [case law] consistently requires a direct benefit under the contract containing an arbitration clause before a reluctant party can be forced into arbitration. [Citations.]” (Zurich, supra, 417 F.3d at p. 688.) For example, a nonsignatory to a contract was compelled to arbitrate where it received the direct benefits under the contract of a lower insurance rat | 2 | 3 |
Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital v. Blue Crossgreen2 sentences2018At most, the requirement is that the dispute must arise out of the contract." ' " ( Rice v. Downs (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 175 , 186, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 555 ( Rice ); accord Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital v. Blue Cross of California (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 677 , 684-686, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 809 [arbitration required where hospital's complaint was based on insurer's refusal to renegotiate reimbursement rates provided for in contract].) Put another way, "[f]or a party's claims to come within the scope of such a clause, the factual allegations of the complaint 'need only "touch matters" covered by the contract 2018At most, the requirement is that the dispute must arise out of the contract." ' " ( Rice v. Downs (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 175 , 186, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 555 ( Rice ); accord Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital v. Blue Cross of California (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 677 , 684-686, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 809 [arbitration required where hospital's complaint was based on insurer's refusal to renegotiate reimbursement rates provided for in contract].) Put another way, "[f]or a party's claims to come within the scope of such a clause, the factual allegations of the complaint 'need only "touch matters" covered by the contract | 2 | 3 |
Berman v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc.green2 sentences2018At most, the requirement is that the dispute must arise out of the contract." ' " ( Rice v. Downs (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 175 , 186, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 555 ( Rice ); accord Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital v. Blue Cross of California (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 677 , 684-686, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 809 [arbitration required where hospital's complaint was based on insurer's refusal to renegotiate reimbursement rates provided for in contract].) Put another way, "[f]or a party's claims to come within the scope of such a clause, the factual allegations of the complaint 'need only "touch matters" covered by the contract 2018At most, the requirement is that the dispute must arise out of the contract." ' " ( Rice v. Downs (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 175 , 186, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 555 ( Rice ); accord Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital v. Blue Cross of California (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 677 , 684-686, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 809 [arbitration required where hospital's complaint was based on insurer's refusal to renegotiate reimbursement rates provided for in contract].) Put another way, "[f]or a party's claims to come within the scope of such a clause, the factual allegations of the complaint 'need only "touch matters" covered by the contract | 2 | 2 |
Rice v. Downsgreen2 sentences2018At most, the requirement is that the dispute must arise out of the contract." ' " ( Rice v. Downs (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 175 , 186, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 555 ( Rice ); accord Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital v. Blue Cross of California (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 677 , 684-686, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 809 [arbitration required where hospital's complaint was based on insurer's refusal to renegotiate reimbursement rates provided for in contract].) Put another way, "[f]or a party's claims to come within the scope of such a clause, the factual allegations of the complaint 'need only "touch matters" covered by the contract 2018At most, the requirement is that the dispute must arise out of the contract." ' " ( Rice v. Downs (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 175 , 186, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 555 ( Rice ); accord Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital v. Blue Cross of California (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 677 , 684-686, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 809 [arbitration required where hospital's complaint was based on insurer's refusal to renegotiate reimbursement rates provided for in contract].) Put another way, "[f]or a party's claims to come within the scope of such a clause, the factual allegations of the complaint 'need only "touch matters" covered by the contract | 2 | 2 |
Khalatian v. Prime Time Shuttle CA2/8green2 sentences2018At most, the requirement is that the dispute must arise out of the contract." ' " ( Rice v. Downs (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 175 , 186, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 555 ( Rice ); accord Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital v. Blue Cross of California (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 677 , 684-686, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 809 [arbitration required where hospital's complaint was based on insurer's refusal to renegotiate reimbursement rates provided for in contract].) Put another way, "[f]or a party's claims to come within the scope of such a clause, the factual allegations of the complaint 'need only "touch matters" covered by the contract 2018At most, the requirement is that the dispute must arise out of the contract." ' " ( Rice v. Downs (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 175 , 186, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 555 ( Rice ); accord Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital v. Blue Cross of California (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 677 , 684-686, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 809 [arbitration required where hospital's complaint was based on insurer's refusal to renegotiate reimbursement rates provided for in contract].) Put another way, "[f]or a party's claims to come within the scope of such a clause, the factual allegations of the complaint 'need only "touch matters" covered by the contract | 2 | 2 |
Zurich American Insurance Company v. Watts Industriesgreen2 sentences2008Co. v. Watts Industries, Inc. (7th Cir. 2005) 417 F.3d 682 , 688 (Zurich); see Comer, supra, 436 F.3d at p. 1101 [estoppel compels arbitration when “nonsignatory ‘knowingly exploits’ ” the contract containing the arbitration clause].) “But [case law] consistently requires a direct benefit under the contract containing an arbitration clause before a reluctant party can be forced into arbitration. [Citations.]” (Zurich, supra, 417 F.3d at p. 688.) For example, a nonsignatory to a contract was compelled to arbitrate where it received the direct benefits under the contract of a lower insurance rat 2008Co. v. Watts Industries, Inc. (7th Cir. 2005) 417 F.3d 682 , 688 (Zurich); see Comer, supra, 436 F.3d at p. 1101 [estoppel compels arbitration when “nonsignatory ‘knowingly exploits’ ” the contract containing the arbitration clause].) “But [case law] consistently requires a direct benefit under the contract containing an arbitration clause before a reluctant party can be forced into arbitration. [Citations.]” (Zurich, supra, 417 F.3d at p. 688.) For example, a nonsignatory to a contract was compelled to arbitrate where it received the direct benefits under the contract of a lower insurance rat | 2 | 2 |
Crowley Maritime v. Boston Old Colony Ins.green2 sentences2022Co., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1070 [“a nonsignatory ‘is estopped from avoiding arbitration if it knowingly seeks the benefits of the contract containing the arbitration clause’”].) Summers did not knowingly seek the benefits of the asset purchase agreement—at least not in his individual capacity. 2020(Epitech, Inc. v. Kann (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1365 , 1371–1372.) Under the equitable estoppel theory, a nonsignatory “ ‘is estopped from avoiding arbitration if it knowingly seeks the benefits of the contract containing the arbitration clause.’” (Crowley, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1070 .) Equitable estoppel, thus, “ ‘precludes a party from claiming the benefits of a contract while simultaneously attempting to avoid the burdens that contract imposes.’ ” (Comer v. Micor, Inc. (9th Cir. 2006) 436 F.3d 1098, 1101 .) “The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an | 1 | 4 |
MS Dealer Service Corp. v. Franklingreen2 sentences2009Co. (5th Cir. 2006) 462 F.3d 384, 398 (Brown); but see MS Dealer, supra, 177 F.3d at p. 946 [de novo review of district court’s decision denying petition to compel arbitration on ground MS Dealer was not a signatory to the arbitration agreement].) In California, absent conflicting evidence, we review the issue de novo (Boucher, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 267 ), as the question is whether the undisputed facts constitute a sufficient legal basis for the application of equitable estoppel. 10 Claims of tortious interference with contract are particularly well suited for imposing equitable estopp 2005Id. at 758 .” (MS Dealer, supra, 177 F.3d at p. 947.) In MS Dealer, the Court of Appeals found each cause of action against the nonsignatory defendant referred to and presumed the existence of the contract containing the arbitration clause. | 1 | 2 |
Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Borden Co.green2 sentences2008Co. v. Watts Industries, Inc. (7th Cir.2005) 417 F.3d 682, 688 (Zurich); see Comer, supra, 436 F.3d at p. 1101 [estoppel compels arbitration when "nonsignatory `knowingly exploits'" the contract containing the arbitration clause].) "But [case law] consistently requires a direct benefit under the contract containing an arbitration clause before a reluctant party can be forced into arbitration. [Citations.]" ( Zurich, supra, 417 F.3d at p. 688 .) For example, a nonsignatory to a contract was compelled to arbitrate where it received the direct benefits under the contract of a lower insurance rate 2008(American Bureau Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard S.P.A. (2nd Cir. 1999) 170 F.3d 349, 353 .) In their opening brief, appellants argued that respondents are equitably estopped from refusing arbitration because they “stand in the shoes” of Crowley and “are attempting to obtain benefits potentially payable to the signatory under the insurance contract containing the agreement to arbitrate.” Appellants relied on a number of cases which involved either subrogation (Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Borden Co. (S.D.N.Y. 1967) 268 F.Supp. 303, 314 ) or various types of direct action to seek the benefits | 1 | 2 |
American Bureau Of Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard S.P.A.green2 sentences2008Co. v. Watts Industries, Inc. (7th Cir.2005) 417 F.3d 682, 688 (Zurich); see Comer, supra, 436 F.3d at p. 1101 [estoppel compels arbitration when "nonsignatory `knowingly exploits'" the contract containing the arbitration clause].) "But [case law] consistently requires a direct benefit under the contract containing an arbitration clause before a reluctant party can be forced into arbitration. [Citations.]" ( Zurich, supra, 417 F.3d at p. 688 .) For example, a nonsignatory to a contract was compelled to arbitrate where it received the direct benefits under the contract of a lower insurance rate 2008(American Bureau Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard S.P.A. (2nd Cir. 1999) 170 F.3d 349, 353 .) In their opening brief, appellants argued that respondents are equitably estopped from refusing arbitration because they “stand in the shoes” of Crowley and “are attempting to obtain benefits potentially payable to the signatory under the insurance contract containing the agreement to arbitrate.” Appellants relied on a number of cases which involved either subrogation (Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Borden Co. (S.D.N.Y. 1967) 268 F.Supp. 303, 314 ) or various types of direct action to seek the benefits | 1 | 2 |
Brinkley v. Monterey Fin. Servs., Inc.green1 sentence2021(See Brinkley v. Monterey Financial Services, Inc. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 314, 332 [“Stated differently, ‘[t]o require arbitration, [a party’s] factual allegations need only “touch matters” covered by the contract containing the arbitration clause and all doubts are to be resolved in favor of arbitrability.’”].) The superior court erred in denying Davis’s motion to compel arbitration of her tort claims.8 8 The parties disagree about where the arbitration should occur, who should be the arbitrator, and what rules should apply. | 1 | 1 |
Howard v. Goldbloomgreen1 sentence2021“There is no requirement that the cause of action arising out of a contractual dispute must be itself contractual.”’” (Ibid.; see Howard v. Goldbloom (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 659, 663-664 .) “For a party’s claims to come within the scope of such a clause, the factual allegations of the complaint ‘need only “touch matters” covered by the contract containing the arbitration clause.’” (Ramos v. Superior Court (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1042, 1052 .) “Broad arbitration clauses are interpreted to apply to extracontractual disputes between the contracting parties, ‘“so long as they have their roots in the r | 1 | 1 |
Aanderud v. Superior Court of Kern Cnty.green2 sentences2018At most, the requirement is that the dispute must arise out of the contract." ' " ( Rice v. Downs (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 175 , 186, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 555 ( Rice ); accord Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital v. Blue Cross of California (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 677 , 684-686, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 809 [arbitration required where hospital's complaint was based on insurer's refusal to renegotiate reimbursement rates provided for in contract].) Put another way, "[f]or a party's claims to come within the scope of such a clause, the factual allegations of the complaint 'need only "touch matters" covered by the contract 2018At most, the requirement is that the dispute must arise out of the contract." ' " ( Rice v. Downs (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 175 , 186, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 555 ( Rice ); accord Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital v. Blue Cross of California (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 677 , 684-686, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 809 [arbitration required where hospital's complaint was based on insurer's refusal to renegotiate reimbursement rates provided for in contract].) Put another way, "[f]or a party's claims to come within the scope of such a clause, the factual allegations of the complaint 'need only "touch matters" covered by the contract | 1 | 1 |
| Cape Flattery Limited v. Titan Maritime, LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tracer Research Corp. v. National Environmental Services Company, Doing Business as Nesco Lab One Analytical, Inc. Eddy Paterson Albert McCutchangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hersman, Inc. v. Fleming Companies, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| DMS Services, LLC v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| ALLIANCE TITLE COMPANY, INC. v. Bouchergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. Pacific Life Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Merrick v. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Thompson v. Jespersengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
MS Dealer Service Corp. v. Franklingreen2 sentences2009Co. (5th Cir. 2006) 462 F.3d 384, 398 (Brown); but see MS Dealer, supra, 177 F.3d at p. 946 [de novo review of district court’s decision denying petition to compel arbitration on ground MS Dealer was not a signatory to the arbitration agreement].) In California, absent conflicting evidence, we review the issue de novo (Boucher, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 267 ), as the question is whether the undisputed facts constitute a sufficient legal basis for the application of equitable estoppel. 10 Claims of tortious interference with contract are particularly well suited for imposing equitable estopp 2005Id. at 758 .” (MS Dealer, supra, 177 F.3d at p. 947.) In MS Dealer, the Court of Appeals found each cause of action against the nonsignatory defendant referred to and presumed the existence of the contract containing the arbitration clause. | 1 | 2 |
| ALLIANCE TITLE COMPANY, INC. v. Bouchergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mediterranean Enterprises, Inc. v. Ssangyong Corporation
green
2 sentences2016(See Mediterranean Enterprises v. Ssangyong Corp. (9th Cir. 1983) 708 F.2d 1458 , 1461, 1464 (Mediterranean); Tracer Research Corp. v. National Environmental Services Co. (9th Cir. 1994) 42 F.3d 1292, 1295 (Tracer); Cape Flattery Ltd. v. Titan Maritime, LLC (9th Cir. 2011) 647 F.3d 914, 921, 924 (Cape Flattery).) 2. 2016(Mediterranean Enterprises v. Ssangyong (9th Cir. 1983) 708 F.2d 1458 , 1461, 1464 (Mediterranean); Tracer Research v. Nat. | 3 | 2016–2016 |
Fuentes v. TMCSF, Inc.
green
2 sentences2025As a preliminary matter, “the question is not whether [each director] is a third-party beneficiary of the contract containing the arbitration clause, but whether [the director] is a third-party beneficiary of the arbitration clause itself.” (Soltero, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 898.) “To invoke the third-party beneficiary exception, the [movant] ‘ “ha[s] to show that the arbitration clause ... was ‘made expressly 10 for [the director’s] benefit.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid., quoting Fuentes v. TMCSF, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 541, 552 .) “Thus, even assuming that [the directors] could be considered [] thir 2024As a third-party beneficiary of the employment agreement, Precise contends that it has standing to enforce the arbitration agreement between Soltero and Real Time that is part of their employment agreement. 12 In this context, however, the question is not whether the party seeking to compel arbitration is a third-party beneficiary of the contract containing the arbitration clause, but whether it is a third-party beneficiary of the arbitration clause itself. ( Fuentes, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at pp. 551–552.) To invoke the third-party beneficiary exception, the nonsignatory “ ‘ha[s] to show that | 2 | 2024–2025 |
Jensen v. U-Haul Co. of Cal.
green
2 sentences2023As with signatory plaintiffs, when nonsignatory plaintiffs are pursuing such claims, they should be bound by the arbitration clause in the contract which is integral to their claims.” (Ibid.) “ ‘The fundamental point’ is that a party is ‘not entitled to make use of [a contract containing an arbitration clause] as long as it work[s] to [his or] her advantage, then attempt to avoid its application in defining the forum in which [his or] her dispute . . . should be resolved.’ (NORCAL Mutual, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th 64, 84 .)”10 (Jensen, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 306 .) The Regents maintains it ca 2023As with signatory plaintiffs, when nonsignatory plaintiffs are pursuing such claims, they should be bound by the arbitration clause in the contract which is integral to their claims.” (Ibid.) “ ‘The fundamental point’ is that a party is ‘not entitled to make use of [a contract containing an arbitration clause] as long as it work[s] to [his or] her advantage, then attempt to avoid its application in defining the forum in which [his or] her dispute . . . should be resolved.’ (NORCAL Mutual, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th 64, 84 .)”10 (Jensen, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 306 .) The Regents maintains it ca | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Norcal Mutual Insurance Company v. Newton
green
2 sentences2023As with signatory plaintiffs, when nonsignatory plaintiffs are pursuing such claims, they should be bound by the arbitration clause in the contract which is integral to their claims.” (Ibid.) “ ‘The fundamental point’ is that a party is ‘not entitled to make use of [a contract containing an arbitration clause] as long as it work[s] to [his or] her advantage, then attempt to avoid its application in defining the forum in which [his or] her dispute . . . should be resolved.’ (NORCAL Mutual, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th 64, 84 .)”10 (Jensen, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 306 .) The Regents maintains it ca 2023As with signatory plaintiffs, when nonsignatory plaintiffs are pursuing such claims, they should be bound by the arbitration clause in the contract which is integral to their claims.” (Ibid.) “ ‘The fundamental point’ is that a party is ‘not entitled to make use of [a contract containing an arbitration clause] as long as it work[s] to [his or] her advantage, then attempt to avoid its application in defining the forum in which [his or] her dispute . . . should be resolved.’ (NORCAL Mutual, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th 64, 84 .)”10 (Jensen, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 306 .) The Regents maintains it ca | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Mahram v. The Kroger Co.
green
1 sentence2025(Cf. Mahram v. The Kroger Co. (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 303 , 312 [nonsignatory lacked standing as third-party beneficiary to enforce 9 If, as Ford contends, a nonsignatory manufacturer may enforce an arbitration provision in a contract between a buyer of the manufacturer’s product and a third party because the manufacturer’s warranties must be deemed obligations of that contract, then the buyer should be able to enforce that provision against the manufacturer as well. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Ronay Family Limited Partnership v. Tweed
green
1 sentence2024As a third-party beneficiary of the employment agreement, Precise contends that it has standing to enforce the arbitration agreement between Soltero and Real Time that is part of their employment agreement. 12 In this context, however, the question is not whether the party seeking to compel arbitration is a third-party beneficiary of the contract containing the arbitration clause, but whether it is a third-party beneficiary of the arbitration clause itself. ( Fuentes, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at pp. 551–552.) To invoke the third-party beneficiary exception, the nonsignatory “ ‘ha[s] to show that | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Goldman v. KPMG, LLP
green
2 sentences2024(Fuentes, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 552 ; Goldman, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 231 .) If so, the plaintiff cannot avoid the arbitration clause. 2024(Fuentes, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 552 ; Goldman, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 231 .) If so, the plaintiff cannot avoid the arbitration clause. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Bonshire v. Thompson
green
1 sentence2024In O’Flaherty v. Belgum (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1044 , the arbitrator declared a forfeiture of the withdrawing partners’ capital accounts, even though the partnership agreement containing the arbitration provision did not provide for forfeiture, and the arbitration provision expressly precluded the arbitrator from granting a remedy “ ‘not available in a court of law.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1057, 1061.) The Second District concluded the arbitrator exceeded his powers by declaring forfeiture because it was “contrary to partnership law, the partnership agreement and decisional law.” (Id. at pp. 1056–1059. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
O'FLAHERTY v. Belgum
green
1 sentence2024In O’Flaherty v. Belgum (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1044 , the arbitrator declared a forfeiture of the withdrawing partners’ capital accounts, even though the partnership agreement containing the arbitration provision did not provide for forfeiture, and the arbitration provision expressly precluded the arbitrator from granting a remedy “ ‘not available in a court of law.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1057, 1061.) The Second District concluded the arbitrator exceeded his powers by declaring forfeiture because it was “contrary to partnership law, the partnership agreement and decisional law.” (Id. at pp. 1056–1059. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Young Seok Suh v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2020(Suh v. Superior Court, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1511 ; Pinnacle at p. 236.) B. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Pinnacle Museum Tower Ass'n v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC
green
1 sentence2020(Epitech, Inc. v. Kann (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1365 , 1371–1372.) Under the equitable estoppel theory, a nonsignatory “ ‘is estopped from avoiding arbitration if it knowingly seeks the benefits of the contract containing the arbitration clause.’” (Crowley, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1070 .) Equitable estoppel, thus, “ ‘precludes a party from claiming the benefits of a contract while simultaneously attempting to avoid the burdens that contract imposes.’ ” (Comer v. Micor, Inc. (9th Cir. 2006) 436 F.3d 1098, 1101 .) “The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Epitech, Inc. v. Kann
green
1 sentence2020(Epitech, Inc. v. Kann (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1365 , 1371–1372.) Under the equitable estoppel theory, a nonsignatory “ ‘is estopped from avoiding arbitration if it knowingly seeks the benefits of the contract containing the arbitration clause.’” (Crowley, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1070 .) Equitable estoppel, thus, “ ‘precludes a party from claiming the benefits of a contract while simultaneously attempting to avoid the burdens that contract imposes.’ ” (Comer v. Micor, Inc. (9th Cir. 2006) 436 F.3d 1098, 1101 .) “The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Molecular Analytical Systems v. Ciphergen Biosystems, Inc. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Seifert v. US Home Corp. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company v. Trailer Train Company green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Metalclad Corp. v. Ventana Environmental Organizational Partnership green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Victoria v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| AJIDA TECHNOLOGIES v. Roos Instruments green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| In Re Merrill Lynch Trust Co. FSB green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc., Del Monte Corporation, Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Charles J. Rounds Co. v. Joint Council of Teamsters No. 42 green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Creative Plastering, Inc. v. Hedley Builders, Inc. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.