curative admissibility doctrine in Texas

1998So far as we can tell, the first use by a Texas appellate court of the term “curative admissibility” was in Thomas v. State, 572 S.W.2d 507, 513 (Tex.Cr.App.1978): It has long been the rule of this state that the admission of improper evidence cannot be urged as grounds for reversal where the defendant gives testimony on direct examination which establishes the same facts as those objected to. [Citations omitted.] This principle is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of curative admissibility. 5A C.J.S.

1998This Court held: The rule relied on by the State is the doctrine of curative admissibility, which provides that “the admission of improper evidence cannot be urged as grounds for reversal where the defendant gives testimony on direct examination which establishes the same facts as those objected to.” Thomas v. State, 572 S.W.2d 507 .

2015Appellant contends that the doctrine of curative admissibility, as discussed in Sweeten v. State, 693 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Crim.

1998Id., 632 S.W.2d at 606 . 2 In Sweeten v. State, 693 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Cr.App.1985), Judge Teague explained: Notwithstanding that we agree with the district attorney that the facts of Harrison v. United States, supra, are obviously distinguishable from either Thomas v. State, supra, or this cause, we find that the principles of law stated in Harrison, which we find fall under the rationale of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, see Wong Sun v. United States, supra, which principles this Court held in Thomas v. State, supra, were but a corollary to the doctrine of curative admissibility,

2018See Maynard v. State, 685 S.W.2d 60, 65 (Tex. Crim.

2013“This principle is better known as the doctrine of curative admissibility.” Id.

2018App. 1976) (“It has long been the rule . . . that the admission of improper evidence cannot be urged as grounds for reversal where the defendant gives testimony on direct examination which establishes the same facts as those objected to.”); see also Severs v. State, 87 S.W.3d 752 , 754–55 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.) (defendant waived any error by admitting into evidence very evidence he objected to and sought to preclude from trial); Smith, 957 S.W.2d at 883 (defendant waived error by admitting “that everything said . . . was true”); Rodriguez v. State, 919 S.W.2d 136, 139 (Tex. App.—S

2003See Rodriguez v. State , 919 S.W.2d 136, 138 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, no pet.) (citing Thomas v. State , 572 S.W.2d 507, 513 (Tex. Crim.

1999The doctrine of curative admissibility, therefore, does not apply in this case. [14] See also People in Interest of R.A., 937 P.2d 731, 737 (Colo.1997) (en banc). [15] The 1997 amendments to section 262.104 of the Family Code do not apply in this case.

1999See also People in Interest of R.A., 937 P.2d 731, 737 (Colo.1997) (en banc). .

1998E.g., Sweeten v. State, 693 S.W.2d 464 , 456 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Bush v. State, 697 S.W.2d 397, 404 (Tex.Crim.App.1985).

1990See Brown v. State, 757 S.W.2d 739, 741 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Bush v. State, 697 S.W.2d 397, 403-404 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Sweeten v. State, 693 S.W.2d 454, 456-459 (Tex.Crim.App.1985).

1999See McGlothlin v. State, 896 SW.2d 183 , 189 n. 9 (Tex.Crim.App.1995).

1995The DeGarmo doctrine is a doctrine of waiver “akin to the doctrine of curative admissibility.” McGlothlin, 896 S.W.2d at 186 .

2020App. 1985) (noting that under doctrine of curative admissibility, “when the defendant offers the same evidence to which he earlier objected, he is not in a position to complain on appeal”); Aguilar v. State, 980 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (“Under the doctrine of curative admissibility, the admission of improper evidence cannot be asserted as grounds for reversal on appeal if the defendant offers evidence of substantially the same facts.”).

2002See Aguilar v. State , 980 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.).

2010App. 1998) (distinguishing the rule of harmless error, waiver, and the common-law doctrine of curative admissibility); Jones v. State, 843 S.W.2d 487, 493 (Tex. Crim.

2003See Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 715-18 (Tex.Cr.App.l998)(distinguish-ing the rule of harmless error, waiver, and the common-law doctrine of curative admissibility); Jones v. State, 843 S.W.2d 487, 493 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), cert. den’d, 507 U.S. 1035 , 113 S.Ct. 1858 , 123 L.Ed.2d 479 (1993).

2008Todd’s added testimony in this respect is an important component of the Court’s own conclusion that the evidence is legally sufficient to establish that all eight of the discrete offenses the appellant was tried for actually occurred.7 Indeed, the trial court expressly invoked the prior-consistent-statement evidence 5 Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 715-17 (Tex. Crim.

2003See Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 715-18 (Tex.Cr.App.l998)(distinguish-ing the rule of harmless error, waiver, and the common-law doctrine of curative admissibility); Jones v. State, 843 S.W.2d 487, 493 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), cert. den’d, 507 U.S. 1035 , 113 S.Ct. 1858 , 123 L.Ed.2d 479 (1993).

1998Id., 632 S.W.2d at 606 . 2 In Sweeten v. State, 693 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Cr.App.1985), Judge Teague explained: Notwithstanding that we agree with the district attorney that the facts of Harrison v. United States, supra, are obviously distinguishable from either Thomas v. State, supra, or this cause, we find that the principles of law stated in Harrison, which we find fall under the rationale of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, see Wong Sun v. United States, supra, which principles this Court held in Thomas v. State, supra, were but a corollary to the doctrine of curative admissibility,

1998Id., 632 S.W.2d at 606 . 2 In Sweeten v. State, 693 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Cr.App.1985), Judge Teague explained: Notwithstanding that we agree with the district attorney that the facts of Harrison v. United States, supra, are obviously distinguishable from either Thomas v. State, supra, or this cause, we find that the principles of law stated in Harrison, which we find fall under the rationale of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, see Wong Sun v. United States, supra, which principles this Court held in Thomas v. State, supra, were but a corollary to the doctrine of curative admissibility,

1986Cameron v. State, 530 S.W.2d 841 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Palmer v. State, 475 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).

1986Cameron v. State, 530 S.W.2d 841 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Palmer v. State, 475 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).

1978See also Judge Morrison’s concurring opinion in Alvarez v. State, 511 S.W.2d 493 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) suggesting that Harrison, supra, might alter the doctrine of curative admissibility. 3 .

1976The dissimilarity of Harrison and the instant case is demonstrated by the fact that Harrison’s trial testimony more nearly fits the corollary to the curative admissibility doctrine announced in cases such as Alvarez v. State, 511 S.W.2d 493 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) than it does the doctrine itself.

2018App. 1976) (“It has long been the rule . . . that the admission of improper evidence cannot be urged as grounds for reversal where the defendant gives testimony on direct examination which establishes the same facts as those objected to.”); see also Severs v. State, 87 S.W.3d 752 , 754–55 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.) (defendant waived any error by admitting into evidence very evidence he objected to and sought to preclude from trial); Smith, 957 S.W.2d at 883 (defendant waived error by admitting “that everything said . . . was true”); Rodriguez v. State, 919 S.W.2d 136, 139 (Tex. App.—S

2018App. 1976) (“It has long been the rule . . . that the admission of improper evidence cannot be urged as grounds for reversal where the defendant gives testimony on direct examination which establishes the same facts as those objected to.”); see also Severs v. State, 87 S.W.3d 752 , 754–55 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.) (defendant waived any error by admitting into evidence very evidence he objected to and sought to preclude from trial); Smith, 957 S.W.2d at 883 (defendant waived error by admitting “that everything said . . . was true”); Rodriguez v. State, 919 S.W.2d 136, 139 (Tex. App.—S

2015App. 1999) (where the Court would not permit the appellant to complain of an omission from the court’s charge that he requested, noting “the law of invited error estops a party from making an appellate error of an action it induced”); see also In re R.J.R., 281 S.W.3d 43, 47 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.) (under the doctrine of curative admissibility, “a defendant may waive a prior objection to evidence by offering the same evidence or evidence establishing the same facts as trial”).

1998Edwards v. State, 813 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd); Verell v. State, 749 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1988, pet. ref'd). 17 .

1998Howard v. State, 599 S.W.2d 597, 605 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (Opinion on State’s Motion for Rehearing); Thomas v. State, supra; Nicholas v. State, supra. In Thomas v. State, supra, this Court altered the Texas rule on curative admissibility in light of Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 , 88 S.Ct. 2008 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968). [[Image here]] “We find that Harrison does in fact add a corollary to the doctrine of curative admissibility, i.e., the harmful effect of improperly admitted evidence which is obtained by illegal police practices is not cured when a defendant gives testimony on direct ex

1998Edwards v. State, 813 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd); Verell v. State, 749 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1988, pet. ref'd). 17 .

1990See Brown v. State, 757 S.W.2d 739, 741 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Bush v. State, 697 S.W.2d 397, 403-404 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Sweeten v. State, 693 S.W.2d 454, 456-459 (Tex.Crim.App.1985).

1986See Preston v. State, 481 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Tex. Crim.App.1972).

1986See Preston v. State, 481 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Tex. Crim.App.1972).