curative admissibility doctrine in District of Columbia

2022Id. (cleaned up); see, e.g., Lampkins v. United States, 515 A.2d 428 , 431 15 (D.C. 1986) (explaining that the curative admissibility doctrine “operates to prevent an accused from successfully gaining exclusion of inadmissible prosecution evidence and then extracting selected pieces of this evidence for his own advantage, without the Government’s being able to place them in their proper context” (quoting United States v. Winston, 447 F.2d 1236, 1240-41 (D.C.

2006The purpose of the doctrine of curative admissibility is to “remove any unfair prejudice which might otherwise have ensued from the original evidence.” United States v. Winston, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 67, 71 , 447 F.2d 1236, 1240 (1971) (citation omitted), quoted with approval in Mercer, 724 A.2d at 1192 .

2022Id. (cleaned up); see, e.g., Lampkins v. United States, 515 A.2d 428 , 431 15 (D.C. 1986) (explaining that the curative admissibility doctrine “operates to prevent an accused from successfully gaining exclusion of inadmissible prosecution evidence and then extracting selected pieces of this evidence for his own advantage, without the Government’s being able to place them in their proper context” (quoting United States v. Winston, 447 F.2d 1236, 1240-41 (D.C.

2000“Under the doctrine of curative admissibility, the introduction of incompetent or irrelevant evidence by a party opens the door to the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence only to the extent necessary to remove any unfair prejudice which might otherwise have ensued from the original evidence.” Lampkins v. United States, 515 A.2d 428, 430 (D.C.1986) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2000The doctrine is based upon, and limited by, “the necessity of removing prejudice in the interest of fairness.” Crawford v. United States, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 234 , 237, 198 F.2d 976, 979 (1952).

1986The doctrine is based upon, and is limited by, “the necessity of removing prejudice in the interest of fairness.” Crawford v. United States, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 234 , 237, 198 F.2d 976, 979 (1952) (citations omitted).

1977The circuit court wisely has cautioned that the doctrine of curative admissibility is "dangerously prone to overuse," United States v. McClain, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 213 , 216, 440 F.2d 241, 244 (1971), and that it should be applied "only to the extent necessary to remove any unfair prejudice which might otherwise have ensued from the original evidence." United States v. Winston, supra, 145 U.S.App.D.C. at 71 , 447 F.2d at 1240 , quoting California Insurance Co. v. Allen, 235 F.2d 178, 180 (5th Cir. 1956).

1977The circuit court wisely has cautioned that the doctrine of curative admissibility is “dangerously prone to overuse,” United States v. McClain, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 213 , 216, 440 F.2d 241, 244 (1971), and that it should be applied “only to the extent necessary to remove any unfair prejudice which might otherwise have ensued from the original evidence.” United States v. Winston, supra, 145 U.S.App.D.C. at 71 , 447 F.2d at 1240 , quoting California Insurance Co. v. Allen, 235 F.2d 178, 180 (5th Cir. 1956).

1979We are mindful that the circuit court has cautioned that the doctrine of curative admissibility is “dangerously prone to overuse” [United States v. McClain, 142 U.S. App.D.C. 213, 216, 440 F.2d 241, 244 (1971)], and agree with its assessment that the principle should be applied “ ‘only to the extent necessary to remove any unfair prejudice which might otherwise have ensued from the original evidence.’ ” United States v. Winston, supra, 145 U.S.App.D.C., at 71 , 447 F.2d at 1240 , quoting California Ins.

1977The circuit court wisely has cautioned that the doctrine of curative admissibility is “dangerously prone to overuse,” United States v. McClain, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 213 , 216, 440 F.2d 241, 244 (1971), and that it should be applied “only to the extent necessary to remove any unfair prejudice which might otherwise have ensued from the original evidence.” United States v. Winston, supra, 145 U.S.App.D.C. at 71 , 447 F.2d at 1240 , quoting California Insurance Co. v. Allen, 235 F.2d 178, 180 (5th Cir. 1956).

2022Id. (cleaned up); see, e.g., Lampkins v. United States, 515 A.2d 428 , 431 15 (D.C. 1986) (explaining that the curative admissibility doctrine “operates to prevent an accused from successfully gaining exclusion of inadmissible prosecution evidence and then extracting selected pieces of this evidence for his own advantage, without the Government’s being able to place them in their proper context” (quoting United States v. Winston, 447 F.2d 1236, 1240-41 (D.C.

2006The purpose of the doctrine of curative admissibility is to “remove any unfair prejudice which might otherwise have ensued from the original evidence.” United States v. Winston, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 67, 71 , 447 F.2d 1236, 1240 (1971) (citation omitted), quoted with approval in Mercer, 724 A.2d at 1192 .

2022Everything cannot come through the door.” 16 Before allowing otherwise inadmissible evidence to be heard under the curative admissibility doctrine, trial courts are “required to determine if its probative value [is] substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 13 (William) Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1095 (D.C. 1996) (en banc).

2022Furr v. United States, 157 A.3d 1245, 1252 (D.C. 2017) (quoting Mercer 14 v. United States, 724 A.2d 1176, 1192 (D.C. 1999)).

2017But what comes 14 See, e.g., Howard v. United States, 978 A.2d 1202, 1211 (D.C. 2009).

2009See Goines v. United States, 905 A.2d 795, 800 (D.C.2006).

1999States, 374 A.2d 581, 586 (D.C.1977) (quoting United States v. Winston, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 67, 71 , 447 F.2d 1236, 1240 (1971)).

1986Under the doctrine of curative admissibility, “the introduction of incompetent or irrelevant evidence by a party opens the door to admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence ‘only to the extent necessary to remove any unfair prejudice which might otherwise have ensued from the original evidence.’ ” Dyson v. United States, 450 A.2d 432, 442 (D.C.1982) (citations omitted).