restrictive alternative analysis in Alaska

2025Constitutionally, we have categorized “involuntary commitment for a mental illness as a ‘massive curtailment of liberty’ that demands due process of law.”7 “Constitutional rights extend equally to mentally ill persons so that the mentally ill are not treated as persons of lesser status or dignity because of their 6 In re Hospitalization of Carter K., 557 P.3d 755 , 761-62 (Alaska 2024) (holding plain error standard applies where no party objects to master’s recommendations prior to superior court determination); see also In re Hospitalization of Connor J., 440 P.3d 159, 163 (Alaska 2019) (“We

2023In In re Connor J. we expressly considered the gravely disabled respondent’s ability to be treated without hospitalization and concluded that “there was no evidence” the “treatment objectives could be achieved anywhere else” but the proposed psychiatric hospital and that the superior court could rely on expert testimony that outpatient services “were not a 21 In re Mark V., 375 P.3d at 58 . 22 440 P.3d 159, 166 (Alaska 2019) (quoting In re Hospitalization of Stephen O., 314 P.3d 1185, 1195 (Alaska 2013)). 23 See id. at n.19 (referencing statutory definitions of “gravely disabled” identifying c

2023Sergio responds that the superior court’s omission of a least restrictive alternative analysis was not harmless and that there was not clear and convincing evidence to support a finding that no less restrictive alternative was available. 16 In re Naomi B., 435 P.3d at 933 (quoting In re Mark V., 375 P.3d at 59 ). 17 In re Mark V., 375 P.3d at 58 . 18 In re Naomi B., 435 P.3d at 934 . 19 Id. at 932 ; AS 47.30.735(d). 20 In re Hospitalization of Danielle B., 453 P.3d 200, 204 (Alaska 2019) (quoting In re Hospitalization of Jacob S., 384 P.3d 758, 768 (Alaska 2016)). -9- 7654 The lack of specific

2023Sergio responds that the superior court’s omission of a least restrictive alternative analysis was not harmless and that there was not clear and convincing evidence to support a finding that no less restrictive alternative was available. 16 In re Naomi B., 435 P.3d at 933 (quoting In re Mark V., 375 P.3d at 59 ). 17 In re Mark V., 375 P.3d at 58 . 18 In re Naomi B., 435 P.3d at 934 . 19 Id. at 932 ; AS 47.30.735(d). 20 In re Hospitalization of Danielle B., 453 P.3d 200, 204 (Alaska 2019) (quoting In re Hospitalization of Jacob S., 384 P.3d 758, 768 (Alaska 2016)). -9- 7654 The lack of specific

2023Sergio responds that the superior court’s omission of a least restrictive alternative analysis was not harmless and that there was not clear and convincing evidence to support a finding that no less restrictive alternative was available. 16 In re Naomi B., 435 P.3d at 933 (quoting In re Mark V., 375 P.3d at 59 ). 17 In re Mark V., 375 P.3d at 58 . 18 In re Naomi B., 435 P.3d at 934 . 19 Id. at 932 ; AS 47.30.735(d). 20 In re Hospitalization of Danielle B., 453 P.3d 200, 204 (Alaska 2019) (quoting In re Hospitalization of Jacob S., 384 P.3d 758, 768 (Alaska 2016)). -9- 7654 The lack of specific

2023In In re Connor J. we expressly considered the gravely disabled respondent’s ability to be treated without hospitalization and concluded that “there was no evidence” the “treatment objectives could be achieved anywhere else” but the proposed psychiatric hospital and that the superior court could rely on expert testimony that outpatient services “were not a 21 In re Mark V., 375 P.3d at 58 . 22 440 P.3d 159, 166 (Alaska 2019) (quoting In re Hospitalization of Stephen O., 314 P.3d 1185, 1195 (Alaska 2013)). 23 See id. at n.19 (referencing statutory definitions of “gravely disabled” identifying c

2023Sergio responds that the superior court’s omission of a least restrictive alternative analysis was not harmless and that there was not clear and convincing evidence to support a finding that no less restrictive alternative was available. 16 In re Naomi B., 435 P.3d at 933 (quoting In re Mark V., 375 P.3d at 59 ). 17 In re Mark V., 375 P.3d at 58 . 18 In re Naomi B., 435 P.3d at 934 . 19 Id. at 932 ; AS 47.30.735(d). 20 In re Hospitalization of Danielle B., 453 P.3d 200, 204 (Alaska 2019) (quoting In re Hospitalization of Jacob S., 384 P.3d 758, 768 (Alaska 2016)). -9- 7654 The lack of specific

2021The court’s failure to consider federal antidiscrimination law would therefore not have been prejudicial.18 15 Id. 16 In re Hospitalization of Gabriel C., 324 P.3d 835, 838 (Alaska 2014) (quoting State, Dep’t of Revenue, Child Support Enf’t Div. ex rel.

2016Id. (listing the least restrictive alternative requirement among statutory protections against unconstitutional commitment and noting that "[als further protection, the statute directs the court to make its findings by 'clear and convincing' evidence"). 29 . 273 P.3d 594, 601-02 (Alaska 2012). 30 .

1991This rule, commonly known as the least restrictive alternative rule, was followed by the court of appeals as recently as the case of In The Matter of J.H., 758 P.2d 1287 (Alaska App.1988).

1991In J.H., a case in which the facts supporting institutionalization are far more compelling that those in K.L.H.’s circumstances, an order institutionalizing J.H. was disapproved, the court noting the “strong presumption against institutionalization [that] attaches in all but extreme cases.” Id. at 1291.