Watson standard in California

2026We review the failure to instruct on a lesser included offense for prejudice under the Watson standard (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 ; People v. 10 He also notes the prosecution presented evidence that he was born on October 9, 1990. 26 Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 178 (Breverman), disapproved on other grounds in People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237 , 256–257.) Thus, reversal is required only if, after “ ‘an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence’ . . . it appears ‘reasonably probable’ the defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the err

2026We review the failure to instruct on a lesser included offense for prejudice under the Watson standard (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 ; People v. 10 He also notes the prosecution presented evidence that he was born on October 9, 1990. 26 Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 178 (Breverman), disapproved on other grounds in People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237 , 256–257.) Thus, reversal is required only if, after “ ‘an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence’ . . . it appears ‘reasonably probable’ the defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the err

2026Under the unique circumstances of this case, we cannot find the People have met their burden of showing “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman, 386 U.S. at p. 24 .)19 19 For the same reasons we find the error was not harmless under the Chapman standard, we also would find the error was not harmless under the Watson standard.

2026Under the unique circumstances of this case, we cannot find the People have met their burden of showing “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman, 386 U.S. at p. 24 .)19 19 For the same reasons we find the error was not harmless under the Chapman standard, we also would find the error was not harmless under the Watson standard.

2026We review the failure to instruct on a lesser included offense for prejudice under the Watson standard (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 ; People v. 10 He also notes the prosecution presented evidence that he was born on October 9, 1990. 26 Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 178 (Breverman), disapproved on other grounds in People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237 , 256–257.) Thus, reversal is required only if, after “ ‘an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence’ . . . it appears ‘reasonably probable’ the defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the err

2026We review the failure to instruct on a lesser included offense for prejudice under the Watson standard (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 ; People v. 10 He also notes the prosecution presented evidence that he was born on October 9, 1990. 26 Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 178 (Breverman), disapproved on other grounds in People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237 , 256–257.) Thus, reversal is required only if, after “ ‘an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence’ . . . it appears ‘reasonably probable’ the defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the err

2025Generally, “error in failing sua sponte to instruct, or to instruct fully, on all lesser included offenses and theories thereof which are supported by the evidence must be reviewed for prejudice exclusively under [People v.] Watson [(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 ].” (People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 178 .) Under the Watson test for prejudice, “a defendant must show it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have been obtained absent the error.’” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955 .) “[T]he Watson test for harmless error ‘focuses not on what a reasonable jury cou

2025Generally, “error in failing sua sponte to instruct, or to instruct fully, on all lesser included offenses and theories thereof which are supported by the evidence must be reviewed for prejudice exclusively under [People v.] Watson [(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 ].” (People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 178 .) Under the Watson test for prejudice, “a defendant must show it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have been obtained absent the error.’” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955 .) “[T]he Watson test for harmless error ‘focuses not on what a reasonable jury cou

2026(People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439 .) Under the Watson test, “[t]he reviewing court must ask whether it is reasonably probable the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant absent the error.” (Partida, at p. 439.) C.

2026(People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439 .) Under the Watson test, “[t]he reviewing court must ask whether it is reasonably probable the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant absent the error.” (Partida, at p. 439.) C.

2025(People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 247 [erroneous admission of expert evidence is state law error subject to Watson standard].) 25.

2023(See People v. Lapenias (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162 , 180 [relying on Watson standard to analyze prejudice for erroneous admission of CSAAS expert testimony]; see also People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 247 [applying Watson standard where expert testimony was erroneously admitted]; People v. Bledsoe (1984) 36 16.

2026(People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 612-613 ; People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129-1130 .) Under the Watson standard, “we deem an error harmless unless it is ‘reasonably probable’ the outcome would have been different in the absence of the error.” (Hendrix, at p. 942.) “ ‘ “ ‘[A] “probability” in this context does not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 944.) Applying the Watson standard here, we conclude that Perez has not shown a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different if the

2026(People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 612-613 ; People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129-1130 .) Under the Watson standard, “we deem an error harmless unless it is ‘reasonably probable’ the outcome would have been different in the absence of the error.” (Hendrix, at p. 942.) “ ‘ “ ‘[A] “probability” in this context does not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 944.) Applying the Watson standard here, we conclude that Perez has not shown a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different if the

2023In making that evaluation, an appellate court may consider, among other things, whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability the error of which the defendant complains affected the result.’ ” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 956 .) “The Supreme Court has emphasized ‘that a “probability” in this context does not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.’ ” (People v. Soojian (2010) 190 Cal

2023In making that evaluation, an appellate court may consider, among other things, whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability the error of which the defendant complains affected the result.’ ” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 956 .) “The Supreme Court has emphasized ‘that a “probability” in this context does not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.’ ” (People v. Soojian (2010) 190 Cal

2024Even where the superior court relies on improper evidence when 20 denying a petition under section 1172.6, “reversal is not required unless it is reasonably probable the defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the evidence been excluded.” (People v. Myles, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 706; see People v. Vance, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th, at p. 714 [harmless error standard in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 applies to claim that superior court improperly considered an appellate opinion at the evidentiary hearing]; see also People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 29 [“the Watson

2024Even where the superior court relies on improper evidence when 20 denying a petition under section 1172.6, “reversal is not required unless it is reasonably probable the defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the evidence been excluded.” (People v. Myles, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 706; see People v. Vance, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th, at p. 714 [harmless error standard in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 applies to claim that superior court improperly considered an appellate opinion at the evidentiary hearing]; see also People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 29 [“the Watson

2025(See Gonzalez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 201 [“Because we are addressing state law error, defendants must show that a different result was reasonably probable under the Watson standard.”].) 4.

2025(People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 195-196 ; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) “[T]he Watson test for harmless error ‘focuses not on what a reasonable jury could do, but what such a jury 6 is likely to have done in the absence of the error under consideration.

2025(People v. Ocegueda (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1407 [Watson standard applies to claim of error by failing to instruct the jury it could consider evidence of defendant’s mental 13 disabilities in deciding whether defendant had the state of mind required for imperfect self-defense]; see People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186 , 195–198 [failure to instruct on lesser included offenses of voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter are subject to Watson harmless error standard].) The challenged instructions do not amount to a constitutional violation, such as misdescribing of an element

2025Additionally, Chavez contends that his defense counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial, seeming to argue that the Chapman standard applies and, regardless, that he has shown prejudice under Strickland and Watson.6 6 The “Watson standard is substantially the same as the prejudice prong of Strickland.” (People v. Ocegueda (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1407, fn. 4 .) 19 The Attorney General counters that Chavez has failed to demonstrate deficient performance because “he cannot show that the evidence and argument was improper, and he cannot show that counsel did not have a reasonable tactic

2024Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 801 [“the so-called Watson standard applies generally to all manner of trial errors occurring under California law, precluding reversal unless the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice”].) Here, it is not probable that the alleged defect in the jury instructions or special verdict forms prejudicially affected the verdict.

2024Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 801 [“the so-called Watson standard applies generally to all manner of trial errors occurring under California law, precluding reversal unless the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice”].) Here, it is not probable that the alleged defect in the jury instructions or special verdict forms prejudicially affected the verdict.

2026Our Supreme Court has stated “the admission of evidence, 14. even if erroneous under state law, results in a due process violation only if it makes the trial fundamentally unfair.” (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439 .) “Absent fundamental unfairness, state law error in admitting evidence is subject to the traditional Watson test .…” (Ibid.; see generally People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075 , 1103–1104 [evaluating trial court’s ruling on hearsay objection under Watson]; People v. McDaniel (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 986 , 1005–1006 [evaluating the erroneous admission of text messages und

2026Under the Watson harmless error standard, it is the burden of appellants to show that it is reasonably probable that they would have received a more favorable result at trial had the error not occurred.’ ” (Mountain View Police Dept. v. Krepchin (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 480 , 506 (Mountain View); see also People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075 , 1102–1103 [Watson standard of prejudice applies to erroneous exclusion of only some defense evidence in a criminal case, as opposed to exclusion of all evidence of a defense].) We conclude that even assuming any error, defendants have demonstrated no disc

2024(Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 925 [Watson standard applies to uncharged crimes evidence].) CALCRIM No. 852A informs the jury that it may only consider evidence of uncharged domestic violence to prove the defendant’s propensity to commit such 22 offenses, domestic violence, if the prosecution proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the described domestic violence took place.23 Like in Jennings, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1318 , instructing the jury here with CALCRIM No. 852A “would have added virtually nothing to the reasonable doubt and other instructions actually given by the t

2023(People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1104, 1130 (Moore) [applying Watson harmless error standard to instructional error; People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903 , 924– 925 [applying Watson standard to claim error in instructing jury on proper use of propensity evidence].) Pelen testified that after appellant returned to the truck with Freddy’s phone, he and appellant drove away.

2026(People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197 , 226–227.) The Watson standard requires reversal only if “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 .) “‘[P]robability’ in this context does not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.” (Richardson v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1050 .) The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice.

2026(People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197 , 226–227.) The Watson standard requires reversal only if “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 .) “‘[P]robability’ in this context does not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.” (Richardson v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1050 .) The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice.

2022(People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810, 830 .) “[T]he Watson test for harmless error ‘focuses not on what a reasonable jury could do, but what such a jury is likely to have done in the absence of the error under consideration.

2022(People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810, 830 .) “[T]he Watson test for harmless error ‘focuses not on what a reasonable jury could do, but what such a jury is likely to have done in the absence of the error under consideration.

2024(People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 618-619 .) Under that standard, reversal is not warranted unless “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to [defendant] would have been reached in the absence of the error.” ( Watson, supra, at p. 836 .) “[T]he Watson test for harmless error ‘focuses not on what a reasonable jury could do, but what such a jury is likely to have done in the absence of the error under consideration.’ ” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 956 .) The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice under this standard.

2023(See Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 613, 619–620 [applying the Watson standard where exculpatory statements were erroneously admitted].) Ceja argues a more stringent standard of harmlessness applies because the challenged evidence was unreliable.

2026(See Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 691-692 [to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires the claimant to show both deficient performance and prejudice]; People v. Xiong (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 1046 , 1068, fn. 11 [court’s finding of harmless error under Watson precluded ineffective assistance claim because the Strickland prejudice standard “is essentially the same” as the Watson standard].) II Sufficient Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Imposed Disabilities H.D. contends that insufficient evidence supports three of the trial court’s imposed disabilities: th

2026(See Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 691-692 [to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires the claimant to show both deficient performance and prejudice]; People v. Xiong (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 1046 , 1068, fn. 11 [court’s finding of harmless error under Watson precluded ineffective assistance claim because the Strickland prejudice standard “is essentially the same” as the Watson standard].) II Sufficient Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Imposed Disabilities H.D. contends that insufficient evidence supports three of the trial court’s imposed disabilities: th

2022(See People v. Hernandez (2013) 15 217 Cal.App.4th 559, 576 , and cases cited therein.) A minority applies the Watson standard, based on the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court had “ ‘never held jury unanimity to be a requisite of due process.’ ” (People v. Vargas (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 506, 562 .) That is no longer true.

2022(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ; People v. Hernandez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 559, 576 [“There is a split of opinion in the appellate courts as to whether the Chapman standard or Watson standard for harmless error applies in a unanimity instruction case”; court held alleged error was harmless under either standard].) C.

2025Accordingly, we will apply the Watson standard here and assess whether it is “ ‘ “reasonably probable” ’ 8 that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of error.” (People v. Jandres (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 340, 360 .) As we explained above, the evidence of Dolce’s guilt was substantial, and the evidence that he sold marijuana played only a minor role at trial.

2025Accordingly, we will apply the Watson standard here and assess whether it is “ ‘ “reasonably probable” ’ 8 that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of error.” (People v. Jandres (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 340, 360 .) As we explained above, the evidence of Dolce’s guilt was substantial, and the evidence that he sold marijuana played only a minor role at trial.

2026(People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197 , 226–227.) The Watson standard requires reversal only if “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 .) “‘[P]robability’ in this context does not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.” (Richardson v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1050 .) The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice.

2026(People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197 , 226–227.) The Watson standard requires reversal only if “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 .) “‘[P]robability’ in this context does not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.” (Richardson v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1050 .) The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice.

2024Even then, the evidence must “be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.” [Citations.] Only under such circumstances can it be inferred that the jury must have used the evidence for an improper purpose.’ [Citation.]” (Albarran, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 229 .) We need not decide whether this case is a “rare and unusual occasion[ ]” (Albarran, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 232 ) in which the admission of evidence has violated federal due process, as even under Watson’s standard, the errors are not harmless.

2024Even then, the evidence must “be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.” [Citations.] Only under such circumstances can it be inferred that the jury must have used the evidence for an improper purpose.’ [Citation.]” (Albarran, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 229 .) We need not decide whether this case is a “rare and unusual occasion[ ]” (Albarran, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 232 ) in which the admission of evidence has violated federal due process, as even under Watson’s standard, the errors are not harmless.

2025“In applying the Watson standard, we may look to the other instructions given, as well as 6 whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability that the error affected the result.” (People v. Watt (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1220 .) People v. Russell, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1430-1433 , does not assist Cordova.

2025“In applying the Watson standard, we may look to the other instructions given, as well as 6 whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability that the error affected the result.” (People v. Watt (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1220 .) People v. Russell, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1430-1433 , does not assist Cordova.

2025Applicable Standard of Review Defendant acknowledges that, in considering prejudice resulting from the erroneous admission of DNA analysis following a Kelly hearing, the California Supreme 16 Court in People v. Venegas (1998) 18 Cal.4th 47 employed the Watson test for prejudice (see People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 ).

2025When the court erroneously admits expert testimony, reversal is only warranted if “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson); see also People v. Venegas (1998) 18 Cal.4th 47, 93 , [applying Watson standard to the erroneous admission of expert testimony].) 18.

2023As with heat of passion manslaughter, the prosecution must prove that the defendant was not unconscious beyond a reasonable doubt to overcome a defense argument that the 13In People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537 , the Supreme Court applied the Watson standard to evaluate prejudice from the trial court’s failure to give a requested instruction on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter.

2023As with heat of passion manslaughter, the prosecution must prove that the defendant was not unconscious beyond a reasonable doubt to overcome a defense argument that the 13In People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537 , the Supreme Court applied the Watson standard to evaluate prejudice from the trial court’s failure to give a requested instruction on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter.