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5 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2005 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Illinois v. Gates
green
2 sentences1997“Articulating precisely what ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘probable cause’ mean is not possible, they are common sense, nontechnical conceptions that deal with ‘ “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” ’ Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 , 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 , 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)).” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). 1997“Articulating precisely what ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘probable cause’ mean is not possible, they are common sense, nontechnical conceptions that deal with ‘ “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” ’ Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 , 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 , 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)).” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Brinegar v. United States
green
2 sentences1997“Articulating precisely what ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘probable cause’ mean is not possible, they are common sense, nontechnical conceptions that deal with ‘ “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” ’ Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 , 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 , 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)).” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). 1997“Articulating precisely what ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘probable cause’ mean is not possible, they are common sense, nontechnical conceptions that deal with ‘ “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” ’ Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 , 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 , 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)).” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Ornelas v. United States
green
2 sentences1997“Articulating precisely what ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘probable cause’ mean is not possible, they are common sense, nontechnical conceptions that deal with ‘ “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” ’ Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 , 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 , 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)).” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). 1997“Articulating precisely what ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘probable cause’ mean is not possible, they are common sense, nontechnical conceptions that deal with ‘ “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” ’ Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 , 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 , 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)).” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Ex Parte Anderson
green
1 sentence2005In Ex parte Anderson, 434 So.2d 737 -38 (Ala.1983), the Alabama Supreme Court held that, without an allocution or a waiver of allocution, a defendant’s sentence is erroneous and the ease must be remanded. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Bragg v. State
green
2 sentences2002For this holding, the Court of Criminal Appeals relied on § 12-15-120(d), Ala. Code 1975, and Bragg v. State, 453 So.2d 756 (Ala.Crim.App.1984) (hereinafter " Bragg II "). 2002For this holding, the Court of Criminal Appeals relied on § 12-15-120 (d), Ala. Code 1975, and Bragg v. State , 453 So.2d 756 (Ala.Crim.App. 1984) (hereinafter " Bragg II "). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Whitfield v. Sanders
green
1 sentence1983McDonald v. First Savings Association of Wisconsin, supra; Wynn v. Smith , 357 So.2d 973 (Ala. 1978); cf. Whitfield v. Sanders , 366 So.2d 258 (Ala. 1978) (where failure to inquire about defendant's address would not support service by publication.) Likewise, we do not think the facts of record are so extraordinary as to require the trial court to set aside the default judgment on the grounds specified in the 60 (b)(6) motion. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Wynn v. Smith
neutral
1 sentence1983McDonald v. First Savings Association of Wisconsin, supra; Wynn v. Smith , 357 So.2d 973 (Ala. 1978); cf. Whitfield v. Sanders , 366 So.2d 258 (Ala. 1978) (where failure to inquire about defendant's address would not support service by publication.) Likewise, we do not think the facts of record are so extraordinary as to require the trial court to set aside the default judgment on the grounds specified in the 60 (b)(6) motion. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
McDonald v. First Savings Ass'n of Wisconsin
neutral
1 sentence1983McDonald v. First Savings Association of Wisconsin, supra; Wynn v. Smith , 357 So.2d 973 (Ala. 1978); cf. Whitfield v. Sanders , 366 So.2d 258 (Ala. 1978) (where failure to inquire about defendant's address would not support service by publication.) Likewise, we do not think the facts of record are so extraordinary as to require the trial court to set aside the default judgment on the grounds specified in the 60 (b)(6) motion. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.