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5 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 2007–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Landgraf v. USI Film Productsgreen2 sentences2008The Garcia court also cited Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 291 , 114 S.Ct. 1483 in which he stated, “[m]ost statutes are meant to regulate primary conduct, and hence will not be applied in trials involving conduct that occurred before their effective date.” In that same passage, however, Justice Sealia also stated “other statutes have a different purpose and therefore a different relevant retroactivity event,” noting that “[t]he critical issue ... is not whether the rule affects ‘vested rights,’ or governs substance or procedure, but rather what is the relevant ac 2008The Garcia court also cited Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 291 , 114 S.Ct. 1483 in which he stated, “[m]ost statutes are meant to regulate primary conduct, and hence will not be applied in trials involving conduct that occurred before their effective date.” In that same passage, however, Justice Sealia also stated “other statutes have a different purpose and therefore a different relevant retroactivity event,” noting that “[t]he critical issue ... is not whether the rule affects ‘vested rights,’ or governs substance or procedure, but rather what is the relevant ac | 2 | 3 |
Garcia v. Browninggreen2 sentences2011See id. ¶¶ 12-14; see generally State v. Aguilar, 218 Ariz. 25, ¶¶ 27-33 , 178 P.3d 497, 504-06 (App.2008) (distinguishing primary from secondary conduct for purposes of retroactivity analysis); see also San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 193 Ariz. 195, ¶ 15 , 972 P.2d 179, 189 (1999) (“[Legislation may not disturb vested substantive rights by retroactively changing the law that applies to completed events.”). ¶ 10 As the court observed in Garcia , “the date of the offense is the operative event for retroactivity analysis when a new statute regulates primary conduct.” 214 Ariz. 250 , ¶ 2007“Arizona eases have consistently held that the date of the offense is the operative event for retroactivity analysis when a new statute regulates primary conduct.” Garcia, 214 Ariz. at 253, ¶ 14 , 151 P.3d at 536 (citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
State v. MacHadogreen2 sentences2011See id. ¶¶ 12-14; see generally State v. Aguilar, 218 Ariz. 25, ¶¶ 27-33 , 178 P.3d 497, 504-06 (App.2008) (distinguishing primary from secondary conduct for purposes of retroactivity analysis); see also San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 193 Ariz. 195, ¶ 15 , 972 P.2d 179, 189 (1999) (“[Legislation may not disturb vested substantive rights by retroactively changing the law that applies to completed events.”). ¶ 10 As the court observed in Garcia , “the date of the offense is the operative event for retroactivity analysis when a new statute regulates primary conduct.” 214 Ariz. 250 , ¶ 2007“Arizona eases have consistently held that the date of the offense is the operative event for retroactivity analysis when a new statute regulates primary conduct.” Garcia, 214 Ariz. at 253, ¶ 14 , 151 P.3d at 536 (citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
In Re Shane B.green2 sentences2008And, the court further stated, “Arizona cases have consistently held that the date of the offense is the operative event for retroactivity analysis when a new statute regulates primary conduct.” Id. ¶ 14. ¶ 30 The two Arizona cases the Garcia court cited for that proposition, however, did not expressly use or define the phrase “primary conduct.” See In re Shane B., 198 Ariz. 85, ¶ 7 , 7 P.3d at 96 ; Mauro, 139 Ariz. at 427 , 678 P.2d at 1391 . 2008And, the court further stated, “Arizona cases have consistently held that the date of the offense is the operative event for retroactivity analysis when a new statute regulates primary conduct.” Id. ¶ 14. ¶ 30 The two Arizona cases the Garcia court cited for that proposition, however, did not expressly use or define the phrase “primary conduct.” See In re Shane B., 198 Ariz. 85, ¶ 7 , 7 P.3d at 96 ; Mauro, 139 Ariz. at 427 , 678 P.2d at 1391 . | 1 | 3 |
State v. Coconino Cty. Superior Ct., Div. IIgreen2 sentences2008And, the court further stated, “Arizona cases have consistently held that the date of the offense is the operative event for retroactivity analysis when a new statute regulates primary conduct.” Id. ¶ 14. ¶ 30 The two Arizona cases the Garcia court cited for that proposition, however, did not expressly use or define the phrase “primary conduct.” See In re Shane B., 198 Ariz. 85, ¶ 7 , 7 P.3d at 96 ; Mauro, 139 Ariz. at 427 , 678 P.2d at 1391 . 2008And, the court further stated, “Arizona cases have consistently held that the date of the offense is the operative event for retroactivity analysis when a new statute regulates primary conduct.” Id. ¶ 14. ¶ 30 The two Arizona cases the Garcia court cited for that proposition, however, did not expressly use or define the phrase “primary conduct.” See In re Shane B., 198 Ariz. 85, ¶ 7 , 7 P.3d at 96 ; Mauro, 139 Ariz. at 427 , 678 P.2d at 1391 . | 1 | 3 |
San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2011See id. ¶¶ 12-14; see generally State v. Aguilar, 218 Ariz. 25, ¶¶ 27-33 , 178 P.3d 497, 504-06 (App.2008) (distinguishing primary from secondary conduct for purposes of retroactivity analysis); see also San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 193 Ariz. 195, ¶ 15 , 972 P.2d 179, 189 (1999) (“[Legislation may not disturb vested substantive rights by retroactively changing the law that applies to completed events.”). ¶ 10 As the court observed in Garcia , “the date of the offense is the operative event for retroactivity analysis when a new statute regulates primary conduct.” 214 Ariz. 250 , ¶ 2011See id. ¶¶ 12-14; see generally State v. Aguilar, 218 Ariz. 25, ¶¶ 27-33 , 178 P.3d 497, 504-06 (App.2008) (distinguishing primary from secondary conduct for purposes of retroactivity analysis); see also San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 193 Ariz. 195, ¶ 15 , 972 P.2d 179, 189 (1999) (“[Legislation may not disturb vested substantive rights by retroactively changing the law that applies to completed events.”). ¶ 10 As the court observed in Garcia , “the date of the offense is the operative event for retroactivity analysis when a new statute regulates primary conduct.” 214 Ariz. 250 , ¶ | 1 | 1 |
State v. Aguilargreen2 sentences2011See id. ¶¶ 12-14; see generally State v. Aguilar, 218 Ariz. 25, ¶¶ 27-33 , 178 P.3d 497, 504-06 (App.2008) (distinguishing primary from secondary conduct for purposes of retroactivity analysis); see also San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 193 Ariz. 195, ¶ 15 , 972 P.2d 179, 189 (1999) (“[Legislation may not disturb vested substantive rights by retroactively changing the law that applies to completed events.”). ¶ 10 As the court observed in Garcia , “the date of the offense is the operative event for retroactivity analysis when a new statute regulates primary conduct.” 214 Ariz. 250 , ¶ 2011See id. ¶¶ 12-14; see generally State v. Aguilar, 218 Ariz. 25, ¶¶ 27-33 , 178 P.3d 497, 504-06 (App.2008) (distinguishing primary from secondary conduct for purposes of retroactivity analysis); see also San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 193 Ariz. 195, ¶ 15 , 972 P.2d 179, 189 (1999) (“[Legislation may not disturb vested substantive rights by retroactively changing the law that applies to completed events.”). ¶ 10 As the court observed in Garcia , “the date of the offense is the operative event for retroactivity analysis when a new statute regulates primary conduct.” 214 Ariz. 250 , ¶ | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.