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5 Arizona opinions name it 1 courts 2009–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Zamoragreen2 sentences2024“Police are free to ask questions of a person who is not in custody without having to give the person any warnings under Miranda.” State v. Zamora, 220 Ariz. 63 , 67 ¶ 9 (App. 2009) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 , 434–35 (1991); State v. Pettit, 194 Ariz. 192 , 195 ¶ 15 (App. 1998)). 2020We disagree. ¶10 “Police are free to ask questions of a person who is not in custody without having to give the person any warnings under Miranda.” State v. Zamora, 220 Ariz. 63, 67, ¶ 9 (App. 2009). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Pettitgreen2 sentences2024“Police are free to ask questions of a person who is not in custody without having to give the person any warnings under Miranda.” State v. Zamora, 220 Ariz. 63 , 67 ¶ 9 (App. 2009) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 , 434–35 (1991); State v. Pettit, 194 Ariz. 192 , 195 ¶ 15 (App. 1998)). 2009Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-35 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991); State v. Pettit, 194 Ariz. 192, 195, ¶ 15 , 979 P.2d 5, 8 (App.1998). ¶ 10 Once the person is in custody, however, Miranda requires that if the State wants to admit statements the person may make in response to questioning, the police must first inform him of certain constitutional rights. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Turnergreen2 sentences2014Therefore, he contends he could not be barred from such use as a condition of probation. 4 REED-KALIHER v. HOGGATT Opinion of the Court ¶10 We review a trial court’s imposition of conditions of probation for an abuse of discretion and generally will not reverse its imposition of conditions unless the terms “violate fundamental rights or bear no reasonable relationship whatever to the purpose of probation over incarceration.” State v. Turner, 142 Ariz. 138, 144 , 688 P.2d 1030, 1036 (App. 1984). 2014Therefore, he contends he could not be barred from such use as a condition of probation. 4 REED-KALIHER v. HOGGATT Opinion of the Court ¶10 We review a trial court’s imposition of conditions of probation for an abuse of discretion and generally will not reverse its imposition of conditions unless the terms “violate fundamental rights or bear no reasonable relationship whatever to the purpose of probation over incarceration.” State v. Turner, 142 Ariz. 138, 144 , 688 P.2d 1030, 1036 (App. 1984). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2014Miranda’s protections, however, “apply only to custodial interrogation.” State v. Smith, 193 Ariz. 452, ¶ 18 , 974 P.2d 431, 436 (1999); State v. Zamora, 220 Ariz. 63, ¶ 9 , 202 P.3d 528, 532 (App.2009) (“Police are free to ask questions of a person who is not in custody without having to give the person any warnings under Miranda.”). 2014Miranda’s protections, however, “apply only to custodial interrogation.” State v. Smith, 193 Ariz. 452, ¶ 18 , 974 P.2d 431, 436 (1999); State v. Zamora, 220 Ariz. 63, ¶ 9 , 202 P.3d 528, 532 (App.2009) (“Police are free to ask questions of a person who is not in custody without having to give the person any warnings under Miranda.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Howes v. Fields
green
2 sentences2024“Custodial interrogation” is “[q]uestioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 . ¶13 “‘Custody’ for Miranda purposes ‘is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion.’” State v. Maciel, 240 Ariz. 46 , 49 ¶ 12 (2016) (quoting Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499 , 508–09 (2012)). 2014“Custody” as used in Miranda “is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion.” Howes v. Fields, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1189 , 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012). ¶ 10 In determining whether an interrogation is custodial, we look to “the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not ... the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994). | 2 | 2014–2024 |
Florida v. Bostick
green
2 sentences2024“Police are free to ask questions of a person who is not in custody without having to give the person any warnings under Miranda.” State v. Zamora, 220 Ariz. 63 , 67 ¶ 9 (App. 2009) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 , 434–35 (1991); State v. Pettit, 194 Ariz. 192 , 195 ¶ 15 (App. 1998)). 2009Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-35 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991); State v. Pettit, 194 Ariz. 192, 195, ¶ 15 , 979 P.2d 5, 8 (App.1998). ¶ 10 Once the person is in custody, however, Miranda requires that if the State wants to admit statements the person may make in response to questioning, the police must first inform him of certain constitutional rights. | 2 | 2009–2024 |
State v. Maciel
green
1 sentence2024“Custodial interrogation” is “[q]uestioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 . ¶13 “‘Custody’ for Miranda purposes ‘is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion.’” State v. Maciel, 240 Ariz. 46 , 49 ¶ 12 (2016) (quoting Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499 , 508–09 (2012)). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
1 sentence2024“Custodial interrogation” is “[q]uestioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 . ¶13 “‘Custody’ for Miranda purposes ‘is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion.’” State v. Maciel, 240 Ariz. 46 , 49 ¶ 12 (2016) (quoting Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499 , 508–09 (2012)). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Stansbury v. California
green
2 sentences2014“Custody” as used in Miranda “is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion.” Howes v. Fields, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1189 , 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012). ¶ 10 In determining whether an interrogation is custodial, we look to “the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not ... the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994). 2014“Custody” as used in Miranda “is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion.” Howes v. Fields, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1189 , 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012). ¶ 10 In determining whether an interrogation is custodial, we look to “the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not ... the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994). | 1 | 2014–2014 |