libel claim in Texas

2009Grotti , 188 S.W.3d at 774 (citing McIlvain v. Jacobs , 794 S.W.2d 14 , 15–16 (Tex. 1990)).

2003McIlvain v. Jacobs , 794 S.W.2d 14, 15 (Tex. 1990); Ardmore , 82 S.W.3d at 611 .

2009Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 73.001; Pisharodi v. Barrash, 116 S.W.3d 858, 861 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied) (listing the "concerning” requirement among the elements of a libel claim). 28 .

2009Code Ann. § 73.001 ; Pisharodi v. Barrash , 116 S.W.3d 858, 861 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied) (listing the “concerning” requirement among the elements of a libel claim). 28: Again, the flyer globally included all DFW mosques and Islamic centers as the event’s sponsors. 29: Appellees represent in their brief that most of the visitors to Six Flags on the day of the event were not Muslims. 30: In fact, portions of the article would signal to a reasonable reader that there were no other sponsors of the event.

2001See, e.g., Brueggemeyer v. Associated Press, 609 F.2d 825, 826 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that accurate reporting of newsworthy events does not fall within the tort of invasion of privacy); cf. KTRK Television, Inc. v. Fowkes, 981 S.W.2d 779, 790-91 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (“When a nonlibel claim is based on the same speech giving rise to a libel claim, a plaintiff must prove the falsity of the alleged libelous speech.

2001See, e.g., Brueggemeyer v. Associated Press , 609 F.2d 825, 826 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that accurate reporting of newsworthy events does not fall within the tort of invasion of privacy); cf. KTRK Television, Inc. v. Fowkes , 981 S.W.2d 779, 790-91 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) ("When a nonlibel claim is based on the same speech giving rise to a libel claim, a plaintiff must prove the falsity of the alleged libelous speech.

2001See, e.g., Brueggemeyer v. Associated Press, 609 F.2d 825, 826 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that accurate reporting of newsworthy events does not fall within the tort of invasion of privacy); cf. KTRK Television, Inc. v. Fowkes, 981 S.W.2d 779, 790-91 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (“When a nonlibel claim is based on the same speech giving rise to a libel claim, a plaintiff must prove the falsity of the alleged libelous speech.

2001See, e.g., Brueggemeyer v. Associated Press , 609 F.2d 825, 826 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that accurate reporting of newsworthy events does not fall within the tort of invasion of privacy); cf. KTRK Television, Inc. v. Fowkes , 981 S.W.2d 779, 790-91 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) ("When a nonlibel claim is based on the same speech giving rise to a libel claim, a plaintiff must prove the falsity of the alleged libelous speech.

2021However, “[t]he scope of free speech protection does not depend on the legal theory asserted by an inventive plaintiff,” 27 Rehak Creative Servs., Inc. v. Witt, 404 S.W.3d 716, 733 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied), disapproved on other grounds by Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579 (cleaned up), and, therefore, “[w]hen a non-libel claim is grounded on the same speech giving rise to a libel claim, a plaintiff must prove the falsity of the alleged libelous speech,” Evans v. Dolcefino, 986 S.W.2d 69, 79 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.), disapproved on other grounds by Turner, 38

2021“To hold otherwise would permit litigants to circumvent constitutional defenses against the tort of libel by pleading torts that do not require falsity or actual malice.” Id.

2019See James, 446 S.W.3d at 145-46 .

2016See San Antonio Credit Union v. O’Connor, 115 S.W.3d 82, 92 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, pet. denied) (“[a] chain of inferences . . . can only be stretched so far before it snaps” (citation omitted)). 13 See James v. Calkins, 446 S.W.3d 135, 147 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (court “examine[s] the pleadings and the evidence in a light favorable to the nonmovant to determine whether it marshaled ‘clear and specific’ evidence to support each element of its causes of action”). 13 Conclusion Having sustained Vander-Plas’s first issue, we reverse the trial court’s order denying

2015Compare id. with WFAA–TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex.1998) (outlining same elements of conventional libel claim pleaded by Tatums).

2015See WFFA TV Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1998).

2007Ellert v. Lutz , 930 S.W.2d 152, 156-57 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1996, no writ).

1998Int’l, Inc. v. Altai Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453 ; to an embezzlement claim because the plaintiff could have discovered the embezzlement with slight diligence, Sunwest Bank of El Paso v. Basil Smith Eng’g Co., 939 S.W.2d 671, 674-75 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1996, writ denied); to a libel claim where the plaintiff had ready access to her personnel file containing the libelous memo, Ellert v. Lutz, 930 S.W.2d 152, 156-157 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1996, no writ); to a malicious prosecution claim where the plaintiff had access to court records that would have informed the plaintiff of the negligence, Lang v. City of Na

2003See Lathem v. Richey , 772 S.W.2d 249, 255 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1989, writ denied).

2003See Lathem v. Richey, 772 S.W.2d 249, 255 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).

1999See Felder, 950 S.W.2d at 108 ; see also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 , 108 S.Ct. 876, 882 , 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988); Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 680 F.Supp. 863 , 866 n. 3 (S.D.Tex.1988).

1998KTRK v. Felder, 950 S.W.2d 100, 108 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ); see also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 , 108 S.Ct. 876, 882 , 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988); Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 680 F.Supp. 863 , 866 n. 3 (S.D.Tex.1988), rev’d on other grounds, 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir.1989).

1999See Felder, 950 S.W.2d at 108 ; see also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 , 108 S.Ct. 876, 882 , 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988); Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 680 F.Supp. 863 , 866 n. 3 (S.D.Tex.1988).

1999See Felder, 950 S.W.2d at 108 ; see also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 , 108 S.Ct. 876, 882 , 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988); Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 680 F.Supp. 863 , 866 n. 3 (S.D.Tex.1988).

2021However, “[t]he scope of free speech protection does not depend on the legal theory asserted by an inventive plaintiff,” 27 Rehak Creative Servs., Inc. v. Witt, 404 S.W.3d 716, 733 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied), disapproved on other grounds by Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579 (cleaned up), and, therefore, “[w]hen a non-libel claim is grounded on the same speech giving rise to a libel claim, a plaintiff must prove the falsity of the alleged libelous speech,” Evans v. Dolcefino, 986 S.W.2d 69, 79 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.), disapproved on other grounds by Turner, 38

2016Code Ann. § 73.001 (defining libel as a defamatory statement made, in writing); Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 593 . (recognizing that damages constitute an essential element of a libel claim).

2016See Hancock, 400 S.W.3d at 68 (reversing defamation judgment for plaintiff because statements were not defamatory per se and because no evidence of damages existed to support award for defamation per quod).

2016S ee Hancock, 400 S.W.3d at 68 (reversing defamation judgment for plaintiff because statements were not defamatory per se and because no evidence of damages existed to support award for defamation per quod).

2009Code Ann. § 73.001 ; Pisharodi v. Barrash, 116 S.W.3d 858, 861 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied) (listing the “concerning” requirement among the elements of a libel claim). 27 In other words, “[i]n order to entitle one to maintain an action for an alleged defamatory statement, it must appear that he is the person with reference to whom the statement was made.” Newspapers, Inc. v. Matthews, 161 Tex. 284, 289 , 339 S.W.2d 890, 893 (1960) (holding “as a matter of law that [the plaintiff could not] recover for libel to his person . . . for the reason that the articles refer[red] to no p

2009Code Ann. § 73.001 ; Pisharodi v. Barrash, 116 S.W.3d 858, 861 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied) (listing the “concerning” requirement among the elements of a libel claim). 27 In other words, “[i]n order to entitle one to maintain an action for an alleged defamatory statement, it must appear that he is the person with reference to whom the statement was made.” Newspapers, Inc. v. Matthews, 161 Tex. 284, 289 , 339 S.W.2d 890, 893 (1960) (holding “as a matter of law that [the plaintiff could not] recover for libel to his person . . . for the reason that the articles refer[red] to no p

2003Although we are willing to assume for present purposes that the right to speak freely can be waived, we reject the position that Texas courts will find waiver by implication. 3 The United States *110 Supreme Court has not articulated a settled standard for determining whether a civil litigant has waived his or her free speech rights, but in a case where the Court refused to find that a defendant had waived his right to make a First Amendment defense to a libel claim, it stated that “where the ultimate effect of sustaining a claim of waiver might be an imposition on that valued freedom, we are

2003Although we are willing to assume for present purposes that the right to speak freely can be waived, we reject the position that Texas courts will find waiver by implication. 3 The United States *110 Supreme Court has not articulated a settled standard for determining whether a civil litigant has waived his or her free speech rights, but in a case where the Court refused to find that a defendant had waived his right to make a First Amendment defense to a libel claim, it stated that “where the ultimate effect of sustaining a claim of waiver might be an imposition on that valued freedom, we are

2003In Fuentes v. Shevin, the Court said that “a waiver of constitutional rights in any context must, at the very least, be clear.” 407 U.S. 67, 95 , 92 S.Ct. 1983 , 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972).

2003In Fuentes v. Shevin, the Court said that “a waiver of constitutional rights in any context must, at the very least, be clear.” 407 U.S. 67, 95 , 92 S.Ct. 1983 , 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972).

2021However, “[t]he scope of free speech protection does not depend on the legal theory asserted by an inventive plaintiff,” 27 Rehak Creative Servs., Inc. v. Witt, 404 S.W.3d 716, 733 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied), disapproved on other grounds by Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579 (cleaned up), and, therefore, “[w]hen a non-libel claim is grounded on the same speech giving rise to a libel claim, a plaintiff must prove the falsity of the alleged libelous speech,” Evans v. Dolcefino, 986 S.W.2d 69, 79 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.), disapproved on other grounds by Turner, 38

2021However, “[t]he scope of free speech protection does not depend on the legal theory asserted by an inventive plaintiff,” 27 Rehak Creative Servs., Inc. v. Witt, 404 S.W.3d 716, 733 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied), disapproved on other grounds by Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579 (cleaned up), and, therefore, “[w]hen a non-libel claim is grounded on the same speech giving rise to a libel claim, a plaintiff must prove the falsity of the alleged libelous speech,” Evans v. Dolcefino, 986 S.W.2d 69, 79 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.), disapproved on other grounds by Turner, 38

2021See Bedford, 520 S.W.3d at 906 (reversing judgment as to the libel claim and remanding to the trial court with instructions to dismiss the libel claim and award attorney’s fees under the TCPA); Schimmel v. McGregor, 438 S.W.3d 847, 862 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 3 Moreover, accusing someone of doing that which they had the right to do is not defamatory.

2021See Bedford, 520 S.W.3d at 906 (reversing judgment as to the libel claim and remanding to the trial court with instructions to dismiss the libel claim and award attorney’s fees under the TCPA); Schimmel v. McGregor, 438 S.W.3d 847, 862 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 3 Moreover, accusing someone of doing that which they had the right to do is not defamatory.

2017Ferguson was, in fact, sued for misappropriation of funds.63 Ghrist also has attorney immunity, which is an unqualified defense even to 62 Jenevein v. Friedman, 114 S.W.3d 743, 747 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003); Bell v. Lee, 49 S.W.3d 8, 10-11 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001); Gaither v. Davis, 582 S.W.2d 913, 913 (Tex. Civ.

2017One justice dissented “from the majori-ty’s failure to reverse the trial court’s judgment denying [Bedford’s] motion [to] dismiss the libel claim.” Id. at 650 (Walker, J., dissenting).

2017Ferguson was, in fact, sued for misappropriation of funds.63 Ghrist also has attorney immunity, which is an unqualified defense even to 62 Jenevein v. Friedman, 114 S.W.3d 743, 747 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003); Bell v. Lee, 49 S.W.3d 8, 10-11 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001); Gaither v. Davis, 582 S.W.2d 913, 913 (Tex. Civ.