libel claim in New York

2018Johnson's use of words such as "inappropriate," "disrespect," and "intimidation" to characterize petitioner's conduct is an expression of his opinion of her performance and its effect on SSSA's relationship with NYCTA, and, considered in the context of the entire email, including its tone and purpose, is not actionable ( see Rinaldi v Holt, Rinehart & Winston , 42 NY2d 369, 380 [1977], cert denied 434 US 969 [1977]; Frechtman v Gutterman , 115 AD3d 102, 105 [1st Dept 2014]).

1994Once a libel claim has been asserted by a private-figure plaintiff on a matter of public concern, such as is the case here, the burden is on the plaintiff to plead and prove that the words in suit are substantially false (see, Philadelphia Newspapers v Hepps, 475 US 767, 776 ; Immuno AG. v Moor-Jankowski, 77 NY2d 235 , cert denied 500 US 954 ; Steinhilber v Alphonse, 68 NY2d 283 ; Silsdorf v Levine, 59 NY2d 8 , cert denied 464 US 831 ; Rinaldi v Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 42 NY2d 369, 379-380 , cert denied 434 US 969 ).

2026Ltd. v Google, Inc. , 86 AD3d 32, 38 [1st Dept 2011].) Since falsity is a sine qua non of a libel claim and since only assertions of fact are capable of being true, a defamation claim cannot be maintained unless it is premised on published assertion of fact rather than on assertions of opinion. ( Id .; Davis v Boeheim , 24 NY3d 262, 268 [2014].) To determine whether a reasonable reader would consider a statement as factual in nature as opposed to a protected opinion, courts apply a three-part test, assessing: (1) whether the statement has a precise meaning which is readily understood, (2) whet

2026Ltd. v Google, Inc. , 86 AD3d 32, 38 [1st Dept 2011].) Since falsity is a sine qua non of a libel claim and since only assertions of fact are capable of being true, a defamation claim cannot be maintained unless it is premised on published assertion of fact rather than on assertions of opinion. ( Id .; Davis v Boeheim , 24 NY3d 262, 268 [2014].) To determine whether a reasonable reader would consider a statement as factual in nature as opposed to a protected opinion, courts apply a three-part test, assessing: (1) whether the statement has a precise meaning which is readily understood, (2) whet

2026Ltd. v Google, Inc. , 86 AD3d 32, 38 [1st Dept 2011].) Since falsity is a sine qua non of a libel claim and since only assertions of fact are capable of being true, a defamation claim cannot be maintained unless it is premised on published assertion of fact rather than on assertions of opinion. ( Id .; Davis v Boeheim , 24 NY3d 262, 268 [2014].) To determine whether a reasonable reader would consider a statement as factual in nature as opposed to a protected opinion, courts apply a three-part test, assessing: (1) whether the statement has a precise meaning which is readily understood, (2) whet

2026Ltd. v Google, Inc. , 86 AD3d 32, 38 [1st Dept 2011].) Since falsity is a sine qua non of a libel claim and since only assertions of fact are capable of being true, a defamation claim cannot be maintained unless it is premised on published assertion of fact rather than on assertions of opinion. ( Id .; Davis v Boeheim , 24 NY3d 262, 268 [2014].) To determine whether a reasonable reader would consider a statement as factual in nature as opposed to a protected opinion, courts apply a three-part test, assessing: (1) whether the statement has a precise meaning which is readily understood, (2) whet

2022The libel claim was correctly dismissed because the challenged statements in the allegedly defamatory letter were substantially true ( see generally Franklin v Daily Holdings, Inc. , 135 AD3d 87, 94 [1st Dept 2015]).

2022The libel claim was correctly dismissed because the challenged statements in the allegedly defamatory letter were substantially true ( see generally Franklin v Daily Holdings, Inc. , 135 AD3d 87, 94 [1st Dept 2015]).

2026Ltd. v Google, Inc. , 86 AD3d 32, 38 [1st Dept 2011].) Since falsity is a sine qua non of a libel claim and since only assertions of fact are capable of being true, a defamation claim cannot be maintained unless it is premised on published assertion of fact rather than on assertions of opinion. ( Id .; Davis v Boeheim , 24 NY3d 262, 268 [2014].) To determine whether a reasonable reader would consider a statement as factual in nature as opposed to a protected opinion, courts apply a three-part test, assessing: (1) whether the statement has a precise meaning which is readily understood, (2) whet

2026Ltd. v Google, Inc. , 86 AD3d 32, 38 [1st Dept 2011].) Since falsity is a sine qua non of a libel claim and since only assertions of fact are capable of being true, a defamation claim cannot be maintained unless it is premised on published assertion of fact rather than on assertions of opinion. ( Id .; Davis v Boeheim , 24 NY3d 262, 268 [2014].) To determine whether a reasonable reader would consider a statement as factual in nature as opposed to a protected opinion, courts apply a three-part test, assessing: (1) whether the statement has a precise meaning which is readily understood, (2) whet

2024The statute of limitations for a libel claim is measured one year from the date of publication, not discovery ( see CPLR 215[3]; Gregoire v Putnam's Sons, 298 NY 119, 123 [1948]; Casa de Meadows Inc. [Cayman Islands] v Zaman , 76 AD3d 917 , 920 [1st Dept 2010]).

2024The statute of limitations for a libel claim is measured one year from the date of publication, not discovery ( see CPLR 215[3]; Gregoire v Putnam's Sons, 298 NY 119, 123 [1948]; Casa de Meadows Inc. [Cayman Islands] v Zaman , 76 AD3d 917 , 920 [1st Dept 2010]).

2023The statement falls well within the category of "communication[*2][s] made by one person to another upon a subject in which both have an interest" (Liberman v Gelstein, 80 NY2d 429, 437 [1992] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2023The statement falls well within the category of "communication[*2][s] made by one person to another upon a subject in which both have an interest" (Liberman v Gelstein, 80 NY2d 429, 437 [1992] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2021To the extent asserted by plaintiff Cayuga Nation, their claims were correctly dismissed on the ground that a governmental entity cannot maintain a libel claim ( see New York Times Co. v Sullivan , 376 US 254, 291-292 [1964]; see e.g.

2021To the extent asserted by plaintiff Cayuga Nation, their claims were correctly dismissed on the ground that a governmental entity cannot maintain a libel claim ( see New York Times Co. v Sullivan , 376 US 254, 291-292 [1964]; see e.g.

1997Since falsity is a sine qua non of a libel claim and since only assertions of fact are capable of being proven false, we have consistently held that a libel action cannot be maintained unless it is premised on published assertions of fact (Gross v New York Times Co., supra, at 152-153; Immuno AG. v MoorJankowski, supra; see also, Milkovich v Lorain Journal Co., 497 US 1, 17-21 ).” (Brian v Richardson, supra, at 50-51.) Assuming a falsehood, what then is the scope of the right to publish on an issue of legitimate public concern?

1995Since falsity is a sine qua non of a libel claim and since only assertions of fact are capable of being proven false, we have consistently held that a libel action cannot be maintained unless it is premised on published assertions of fact (Gross v New York Times Co., supra, at 152-153; Immuno AG. v Moor-Jankowski, supra; see also, Milkovich v Lorain Journal Co., 497 US 1, 17-21 ).

2011“Since falsity is a sine qua non of a libel claim and since only assertions of fact are capable of being proven false, ... a libel action cannot be maintained unless it is premised on published assertions of fact,” rather than on assertions of opinion (Brian v Richardson, 87 NY2d 46, 51 [1995]).

2004Since falsity is a necessary element of a libel claim, and only “facts” are capable of being proven false, it follows that “a libel action cannot be maintained unless it is premised on published assertions of fact” (Brian v Richardson, 87 NY2d at 51 ).

2026Ltd. v Google, Inc. , 86 AD3d 32, 38 [1st Dept 2011].) Since falsity is a sine qua non of a libel claim and since only assertions of fact are capable of being true, a defamation claim cannot be maintained unless it is premised on published assertion of fact rather than on assertions of opinion. ( Id .; Davis v Boeheim , 24 NY3d 262, 268 [2014].) To determine whether a reasonable reader would consider a statement as factual in nature as opposed to a protected opinion, courts apply a three-part test, assessing: (1) whether the statement has a precise meaning which is readily understood, (2) whet

2026Ltd. v Google, Inc. , 86 AD3d 32, 38 [1st Dept 2011].) Since falsity is a sine qua non of a libel claim and since only assertions of fact are capable of being true, a defamation claim cannot be maintained unless it is premised on published assertion of fact rather than on assertions of opinion. ( Id .; Davis v Boeheim , 24 NY3d 262, 268 [2014].) To determine whether a reasonable reader would consider a statement as factual in nature as opposed to a protected opinion, courts apply a three-part test, assessing: (1) whether the statement has a precise meaning which is readily understood, (2) whet

2026Ltd. v Google, Inc. , 86 AD3d 32, 38 [1st Dept 2011].) Since falsity is a sine qua non of a libel claim and since only assertions of fact are capable of being true, a defamation claim cannot be maintained unless it is premised on published assertion of fact rather than on assertions of opinion. ( Id .; Davis v Boeheim , 24 NY3d 262, 268 [2014].) To determine whether a reasonable reader would consider a statement as factual in nature as opposed to a protected opinion, courts apply a three-part test, assessing: (1) whether the statement has a precise meaning which is readily understood, (2) whet

2026Ltd. v Google, Inc. , 86 AD3d 32, 38 [1st Dept 2011].) Since falsity is a sine qua non of a libel claim and since only assertions of fact are capable of being true, a defamation claim cannot be maintained unless it is premised on published assertion of fact rather than on assertions of opinion. ( Id .; Davis v Boeheim , 24 NY3d 262, 268 [2014].) To determine whether a reasonable reader would consider a statement as factual in nature as opposed to a protected opinion, courts apply a three-part test, assessing: (1) whether the statement has a precise meaning which is readily understood, (2) whet

2026Ltd. v Google, Inc. , 86 AD3d 32, 38 [1st Dept 2011].) Since falsity is a sine qua non of a libel claim and since only assertions of fact are capable of being true, a defamation claim cannot be maintained unless it is premised on published assertion of fact rather than on assertions of opinion. ( Id .; Davis v Boeheim , 24 NY3d 262, 268 [2014].) To determine whether a reasonable reader would consider a statement as factual in nature as opposed to a protected opinion, courts apply a three-part test, assessing: (1) whether the statement has a precise meaning which is readily understood, (2) whet

2026Ltd. v Google, Inc. , 86 AD3d 32, 38 [1st Dept 2011].) Since falsity is a sine qua non of a libel claim and since only assertions of fact are capable of being true, a defamation claim cannot be maintained unless it is premised on published assertion of fact rather than on assertions of opinion. ( Id .; Davis v Boeheim , 24 NY3d 262, 268 [2014].) To determine whether a reasonable reader would consider a statement as factual in nature as opposed to a protected opinion, courts apply a three-part test, assessing: (1) whether the statement has a precise meaning which is readily understood, (2) whet

2024A libel claim will fail if "the defamatory material on which the action is based is substantially true" ( Love v Morrow & Co. , 193 AD2d 586, 587 [2d Dept 1993]; see Hope v Hadley-Luzerne Pub.

2018The libel claim against SSSA was correctly dismissed since absolute immunity from liability for libel attaches to the trial committee's charges initiating the quasi-judicial proceedings against petitioner ( Wiener v Weintraub , 22 NY2d 330 [1968]; Sullivan v Board of Educ. of Eastchester Union Free School Dist. , 131 AD2d 836, 839 [2d Dept 1987]) and to the hearing officer's decision ( Harms v Riordan-Bellizi , 223 AD2d 624, 625 [2d Dept 1996]).

2018Johnson's use of words such as "inappropriate," "disrespect," and "intimidation" to characterize petitioner's conduct is an expression of his opinion of her performance and its effect on SSSA's relationship with NYCTA, and, considered in the context of the entire email, including its tone and purpose, is not actionable ( see Rinaldi v Holt, Rinehart & Winston , 42 NY2d 369, 380 [1977], cert denied 434 US 969 [1977]; Frechtman v Gutterman , 115 AD3d 102, 105 [1st Dept 2014]).

2018The libel claim against SSSA was correctly dismissed since absolute immunity from liability for libel attaches to the trial committee's charges initiating the quasi-judicial proceedings against petitioner ( Wiener v Weintraub , 22 NY2d 330 [1968]; Sullivan v Board of Educ. of Eastchester Union Free School Dist. , 131 AD2d 836, 839 [2d Dept 1987]) and to the hearing officer's decision ( Harms v Riordan-Bellizi , 223 AD2d 624, 625 [2d Dept 1996]).

2009Defamation, the making of a false statement about a person that “tends to expose the p[erson] to public contempt, ridicule, aversion or disgrace, or induce an evil opinion of him [or her] in the minds of right-thinking persons, and to deprive him [or her] of their friendly intercourse in society” (Rinaldi v Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 42 NY2d 369, 379 [1977], cert denied 434 US 969 [1977]; see Golub v Enquirer/Star Group, 89 NY2d 1074 [1997]), can take one of two forms—slander or libel.

2008Co., Inc., 5 NY3d 742, 743 [2005].) I believe that, at best, the plaintiffs merely have demonstrated that they believed that they could successfully defend against the former tenants’ libel claim.

2004Conversely, expressions of opinion are cloaked with the privilege of speech afforded by the First Amendment (Jaszai v Christie’s, 279 AD2d 186, 188 [2001], citing Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US 323 [1974]), and “false or not, libelous or not, are constitutionally protected and may not be the subject of private damage actions” (Rinaldi v Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 42 NY2d 369, 380 [1977], cert denied 434 US 969 [1977]).