5 California opinions name it 1 courts 1955–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kurinij v. Hanna & Mortongreen2 sentences2006(Kurinij v. Hanna & Morton (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 853, 865 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 324 ].) CertainTeed argues that the rule on appeal requiring claims of error to be supported by reasoned argument and legal citations extends to the trial court, and that a party forfeits a claim presented to the trial court unless the claim is supported by argumentation and citations to authority. 2006(Kurinij v. Hanna & Morton (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 853, 865 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 324 ].) CertainTeed argues that the rule on appeal requiring claims of error to be supported by reasoned argument and legal citations extends to the trial court, and that a party forfeits a claim presented to the trial court unless the claim is supported by argumentation and citations to authority. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Wrightgreen2 sentences1984(People v. Wright (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 811, 813-814 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 926 ]; People v. McClelland (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 503, 506-508 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 365 ].) We agree with the holdings in these cases, stated by the Wright court in this way: “The unless clause simply extinguishes any applicability at all of subdivision [(g)], and this is the only reasonable interpretation it can have.” (People v. Wright, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 814 .) We conclude that appellant’s 16-year term was not impermissibly long. 1984(People v. Wright (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 811, 813-814 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 926 ]; People v. McClelland (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 503, 506-508 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 365 ].) We agree with the holdings in these cases, stated by the Wright court in this way: “The unless clause simply extinguishes any applicability at all of subdivision [(g)], and this is the only reasonable interpretation it can have.” (People v. Wright, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 814 .) We conclude that appellant’s 16-year term was not impermissibly long. | 1 | 1 |
People v. McClellandgreen2 sentences1984(People v. Wright (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 811, 813-814 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 926 ]; People v. McClelland (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 503, 506-508 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 365 ].) We agree with the holdings in these cases, stated by the Wright court in this way: “The unless clause simply extinguishes any applicability at all of subdivision [(g)], and this is the only reasonable interpretation it can have.” (People v. Wright, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 814 .) We conclude that appellant’s 16-year term was not impermissibly long. 1984(People v. Wright (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 811, 813-814 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 926 ]; People v. McClelland (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 503, 506-508 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 365 ].) We agree with the holdings in these cases, stated by the Wright court in this way: “The unless clause simply extinguishes any applicability at all of subdivision [(g)], and this is the only reasonable interpretation it can have.” (People v. Wright, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 814 .) We conclude that appellant’s 16-year term was not impermissibly long. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Martingreen2 sentences1977Here, in contrast to People v. Fowler, supra [ 1 Cal.3d 335 ( 82 Cal.Rptr. 363 , 461 P.2d 643 )], and People v. Banks, supra, ante, page 127 [ 2 Cal.3d 127 ( 84 Cal.Rptr. 367 , 465 P.2d 263 )], evidence of the improper pretrial confrontation was not placed before the jury by the prosecution; the matter was raised for the first time by the defense in its cross-examination of the victim.” (People v. Martin (1970) 2 Cal.3d 822, 830 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 709 , 471 P.2d 29 ].) We set forth the matter pertaining to the pre-preliminary hearing courtroom identification of defendant by the robbeiy victims as 1977Here, in contrast to People v. Fowler, supra [ 1 Cal.3d 335 ( 82 Cal.Rptr. 363 , 461 P.2d 643 )], and People v. Banks, supra, ante, page 127 [ 2 Cal.3d 127 ( 84 Cal.Rptr. 367 , 465 P.2d 263 )], evidence of the improper pretrial confrontation was not placed before the jury by the prosecution; the matter was raised for the first time by the defense in its cross-examination of the victim.” (People v. Martin (1970) 2 Cal.3d 822, 830 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 709 , 471 P.2d 29 ].) We set forth the matter pertaining to the pre-preliminary hearing courtroom identification of defendant by the robbeiy victims as | 1 | 1 |
Lockard v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences1955On the part of the Union Oil Company this could have been no more than an agreement not to drill for oil so long as the property remained in Zone R-A unless permitted by an exception. “ Since the zoning ordinance, recognizing that one can drill for oil only where, or at least near, where the oil is (Wheeler v. Gregg, supra, 90 Cal.App.2d 348 at 365 ; Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.2d 453 at 467 [ 202 P.2d 38 , 7 A.L.R.2d 990 ], (certiorari denied, 337 U.S. 939 [ 69 S.Ct. 1516 , 93 L.Ed. 1744 ])), expressly provides for the granting of an exception permitting drilling for oil . . ., nei 1955On the part of the Union Oil Company this could have been no more than an agreement not to drill for oil so long as the property remained in Zone R-A unless permitted by an exception. “ Since the zoning ordinance, recognizing that one can drill for oil only where, or at least near, where the oil is (Wheeler v. Gregg, supra, 90 Cal.App.2d 348 at 365 ; Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.2d 453 at 467 [ 202 P.2d 38 , 7 A.L.R.2d 990 ], (certiorari denied, 337 U.S. 939 [ 69 S.Ct. 1516 , 93 L.Ed. 1744 ])), expressly provides for the granting of an exception permitting drilling for oil . . ., nei | 1 | 1 |
Metcalf v. County of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences1955On the part of the Union Oil Company this could have been no more than an agreement not to drill for oil so long as the property remained in Zone R-A unless permitted by an exception. “ Since the zoning ordinance, recognizing that one can drill for oil only where, or at least near, where the oil is (Wheeler v. Gregg, supra, 90 Cal.App.2d 348 at 365 ; Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.2d 453 at 467 [ 202 P.2d 38 , 7 A.L.R.2d 990 ], (certiorari denied, 337 U.S. 939 [ 69 S.Ct. 1516 , 93 L.Ed. 1744 ])), expressly provides for the granting of an exception permitting drilling for oil . . ., nei 1955On the part of the Union Oil Company this could have been no more than an agreement not to drill for oil so long as the property remained in Zone R-A unless permitted by an exception. “ Since the zoning ordinance, recognizing that one can drill for oil only where, or at least near, where the oil is (Wheeler v. Gregg, supra, 90 Cal.App.2d 348 at 365 ; Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.2d 453 at 467 [ 202 P.2d 38 , 7 A.L.R.2d 990 ], (certiorari denied, 337 U.S. 939 [ 69 S.Ct. 1516 , 93 L.Ed. 1744 ])), expressly provides for the granting of an exception permitting drilling for oil . . ., nei | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
F.People v. Monier
green
1 sentence2022He also argued that under F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099 (Monier), any procedural error arising from Judge Hayes’s unavailability did not require a new trial unless the error was prejudicial, and there was no such prejudice because Judge Hayes’s tentative decision provided a complete and adequate basis for appellate review. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Fowler
green
2 sentences1977Here, in contrast to People v. Fowler, supra [ 1 Cal.3d 335 ( 82 Cal.Rptr. 363 , 461 P.2d 643 )], and People v. Banks, supra, ante, page 127 [ 2 Cal.3d 127 ( 84 Cal.Rptr. 367 , 465 P.2d 263 )], evidence of the improper pretrial confrontation was not placed before the jury by the prosecution; the matter was raised for the first time by the defense in its cross-examination of the victim.” (People v. Martin (1970) 2 Cal.3d 822, 830 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 709 , 471 P.2d 29 ].) We set forth the matter pertaining to the pre-preliminary hearing courtroom identification of defendant by the robbeiy victims as 1977Here, in contrast to People v. Fowler, supra [ 1 Cal.3d 335 ( 82 Cal.Rptr. 363 , 461 P.2d 643 )], and People v. Banks, supra, ante, page 127 [ 2 Cal.3d 127 ( 84 Cal.Rptr. 367 , 465 P.2d 263 )], evidence of the improper pretrial confrontation was not placed before the jury by the prosecution; the matter was raised for the first time by the defense in its cross-examination of the victim.” (People v. Martin (1970) 2 Cal.3d 822, 830 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 709 , 471 P.2d 29 ].) We set forth the matter pertaining to the pre-preliminary hearing courtroom identification of defendant by the robbeiy victims as | 1 | 1977–1977 |
People v. Banks
green
2 sentences1977Here, in contrast to People v. Fowler, supra [ 1 Cal.3d 335 ( 82 Cal.Rptr. 363 , 461 P.2d 643 )], and People v. Banks, supra, ante, page 127 [ 2 Cal.3d 127 ( 84 Cal.Rptr. 367 , 465 P.2d 263 )], evidence of the improper pretrial confrontation was not placed before the jury by the prosecution; the matter was raised for the first time by the defense in its cross-examination of the victim.” (People v. Martin (1970) 2 Cal.3d 822, 830 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 709 , 471 P.2d 29 ].) We set forth the matter pertaining to the pre-preliminary hearing courtroom identification of defendant by the robbeiy victims as 1977Here, in contrast to People v. Fowler, supra [ 1 Cal.3d 335 ( 82 Cal.Rptr. 363 , 461 P.2d 643 )], and People v. Banks, supra, ante, page 127 [ 2 Cal.3d 127 ( 84 Cal.Rptr. 367 , 465 P.2d 263 )], evidence of the improper pretrial confrontation was not placed before the jury by the prosecution; the matter was raised for the first time by the defense in its cross-examination of the victim.” (People v. Martin (1970) 2 Cal.3d 822, 830 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 709 , 471 P.2d 29 ].) We set forth the matter pertaining to the pre-preliminary hearing courtroom identification of defendant by the robbeiy victims as | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Wheeler v. Gregg
green
1 sentence1955On the part of the Union Oil Company this could have been no more than an agreement not to drill for oil so long as the property remained in Zone R-A unless permitted by an exception. “ Since the zoning ordinance, recognizing that one can drill for oil only where, or at least near, where the oil is (Wheeler v. Gregg, supra, 90 Cal.App.2d 348 at 365 ; Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.2d 453 at 467 [ 202 P.2d 38 , 7 A.L.R.2d 990 ], (certiorari denied, 337 U.S. 939 [ 69 S.Ct. 1516 , 93 L.Ed. 1744 ])), expressly provides for the granting of an exception permitting drilling for oil . . ., nei | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Thomas v. Board of Standards & Appeals
green
2 sentences1955As stated in Thomas v. Board of Standards and Appeals, 263 App.Div. 352 [ 33 N.Y.S.2d 219, 230 ], ‘the variances permitted by the Zoning Resolution are in the nature of safety valves to prevent the oppressive operation of the Zoning Regulations in particular instances. . . . 1955As stated in Thomas v. Board of Standards and Appeals, 263 App.Div. 352 [ 33 N.Y.S.2d 219, 230 ], ‘the variances permitted by the Zoning Resolution are in the nature of safety valves to prevent the oppressive operation of the Zoning Regulations in particular instances. . . . | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Noland v. Westover
neutral
1 sentence1955On the part of the Union Oil Company this could have been no more than an agreement not to drill for oil so long as the property remained in Zone R-A unless permitted by an exception. “ Since the zoning ordinance, recognizing that one can drill for oil only where, or at least near, where the oil is (Wheeler v. Gregg, supra, 90 Cal.App.2d 348 at 365 ; Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.2d 453 at 467 [ 202 P.2d 38 , 7 A.L.R.2d 990 ], (certiorari denied, 337 U.S. 939 [ 69 S.Ct. 1516 , 93 L.Ed. 1744 ])), expressly provides for the granting of an exception permitting drilling for oil . . ., nei | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Lockard v. Los Angeles
neutral
1 sentence1955On the part of the Union Oil Company this could have been no more than an agreement not to drill for oil so long as the property remained in Zone R-A unless permitted by an exception. “ Since the zoning ordinance, recognizing that one can drill for oil only where, or at least near, where the oil is (Wheeler v. Gregg, supra, 90 Cal.App.2d 348 at 365 ; Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.2d 453 at 467 [ 202 P.2d 38 , 7 A.L.R.2d 990 ], (certiorari denied, 337 U.S. 939 [ 69 S.Ct. 1516 , 93 L.Ed. 1744 ])), expressly provides for the granting of an exception permitting drilling for oil . . ., nei | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Sales Affiliates, Inc. v. National Mineral Co.
neutral
1 sentence1955On the part of the Union Oil Company this could have been no more than an agreement not to drill for oil so long as the property remained in Zone R-A unless permitted by an exception. “ Since the zoning ordinance, recognizing that one can drill for oil only where, or at least near, where the oil is (Wheeler v. Gregg, supra, 90 Cal.App.2d 348 at 365 ; Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.2d 453 at 467 [ 202 P.2d 38 , 7 A.L.R.2d 990 ], (certiorari denied, 337 U.S. 939 [ 69 S.Ct. 1516 , 93 L.Ed. 1744 ])), expressly provides for the granting of an exception permitting drilling for oil . . ., nei | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.