unless error in Oklahoma

1957Washington v. State, 73 Okl.Cr. 81 , 118 P.2d 267 .

1957Washington v. State, 73 Okl.Cr. 81 , 118 P.2d 267 .

1952In Poynter v. Beacon Falls Rubber Co., 115 Okla. 245 , 242 P. 563 , it is said: “It is true that the granting of a new trial in a case is largely within the reasonable judicial discretion of the trial court, and this court will not reverse an order granting a new trial unless error is clearly established in respect to some pure,' simple and unmixed question of law. . .

1952In Poynter v. Beacon Falls Rubber Co., 115 Okla. 245 , 242 P. 563 , it is said: “It is true that the granting of a new trial in a case is largely within the reasonable judicial discretion of the trial court, and this court will not reverse an order granting a new trial unless error is clearly established in respect to some pure,' simple and unmixed question of law. . .

1963Co., 139 Okl. 123 , 281 P. 586 ); that the position occupied by the trial judge in the trial of a case places him in a better position than any other person to know whether substantial justice had been done (Avery, Adm’x. v. Goodrich, 138 Okl. 123 , 280 P. 586 ); that the granting of a new *250 trial only places the parties in a position to have the issues between them again submitted to a jury or the court, thereby lessening any complaints of final or irreparable injustice to either side from the granting of a new trial (Nale v. Herstein, 94 Okl. 263 , 222 P. 248 ); and that in view of these

1963Co., 139 Okl. 123 , 281 P. 586 ); that the position occupied by the trial judge in the trial of a case places him in a better position than any other person to know whether substantial justice had been done (Avery, Adm’x. v. Goodrich, 138 Okl. 123 , 280 P. 586 ); that the granting of a new *250 trial only places the parties in a position to have the issues between them again submitted to a jury or the court, thereby lessening any complaints of final or irreparable injustice to either side from the granting of a new trial (Nale v. Herstein, 94 Okl. 263 , 222 P. 248 ); and that in view of these

1963Co., 139 Okl. 123 , 281 P. 586 ); that the position occupied by the trial judge in the trial of a case places him in a better position than any other person to know whether substantial justice had been done (Avery, Adm’x. v. Goodrich, 138 Okl. 123 , 280 P. 586 ); that the granting of a new *250 trial only places the parties in a position to have the issues between them again submitted to a jury or the court, thereby lessening any complaints of final or irreparable injustice to either side from the granting of a new trial (Nale v. Herstein, 94 Okl. 263 , 222 P. 248 ); and that in view of these

1963Co., 139 Okl. 123 , 281 P. 586 ); that the position occupied by the trial judge in the trial of a case places him in a better position than any other person to know whether substantial justice had been done (Avery, Adm’x. v. Goodrich, 138 Okl. 123 , 280 P. 586 ); that the granting of a new *250 trial only places the parties in a position to have the issues between them again submitted to a jury or the court, thereby lessening any complaints of final or irreparable injustice to either side from the granting of a new trial (Nale v. Herstein, 94 Okl. 263 , 222 P. 248 ); and that in view of these

1963Co., 139 Okl. 123 , 281 P. 586 ); that the position occupied by the trial judge in the trial of a case places him in a better position than any other person to know whether substantial justice had been done (Avery, Adm’x. v. Goodrich, 138 Okl. 123 , 280 P. 586 ); that the granting of a new *250 trial only places the parties in a position to have the issues between them again submitted to a jury or the court, thereby lessening any complaints of final or irreparable injustice to either side from the granting of a new trial (Nale v. Herstein, 94 Okl. 263 , 222 P. 248 ); and that in view of these

1963Co., 139 Okl. 123 , 281 P. 586 ); that the position occupied by the trial judge in the trial of a case places him in a better position than any other person to know whether substantial justice had been done (Avery, Adm’x. v. Goodrich, 138 Okl. 123 , 280 P. 586 ); that the granting of a new *250 trial only places the parties in a position to have the issues between them again submitted to a jury or the court, thereby lessening any complaints of final or irreparable injustice to either side from the granting of a new trial (Nale v. Herstein, 94 Okl. 263 , 222 P. 248 ); and that in view of these

1943Co., 139 Okla. 123 , 281 P. 586 ); that the position occupied by the trial judge in the trial of a case places him in a better position than any other person to know whether substantial justice had been done (Avery, Adm’x, v. Goodrich, 138 Okla. 123 , 280 P. 586 ); that the granting of a new trial only places the parties in a position to have the issues between them again submitted to a jury or the court, thereby lessening any complaints of final or irreparable injustice to either side from the granting of a new trial (Nale v Herstein, 94 Okla. 263 , 222 P. 248 ); and that in view of these and

1943Co., 139 Okla. 123 , 281 P. 586 ); that the position occupied by the trial judge in the trial of a case places him in a better position than any other person to know whether substantial justice had been done (Avery, Adm’x, v. Goodrich, 138 Okla. 123 , 280 P. 586 ); that the granting of a new trial only places the parties in a position to have the issues between them again submitted to a jury or the court, thereby lessening any complaints of final or irreparable injustice to either side from the granting of a new trial (Nale v Herstein, 94 Okla. 263 , 222 P. 248 ); and that in view of these and

2007"This Court will not reverse based on an error of the trial court unless that error has resulted in a miscarriage of justice or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right." Mayes, 1994 OK CR 44, ¶ 10 , 887 P.2d at 1297 ; 20 O.S.2001, § 3001.1. ¶ 8 Thus, Appellant's assertion that it is unconstitutional to remove prospective jurors based solely upon their moral reservations about the death penalty is correct.

2007"This Court will not reverse based on an error of the trial court unless that error has resulted in a miscarriage of justice or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right." Mayes, 1994 OK CR 44, ¶ 10 , 887 P.2d at 1297 ; 20 O.S.2001, § 3001.1. ¶ 8 Thus, Appellant's assertion that it is unconstitutional to remove prospective jurors based solely upon their moral reservations about the death penalty is correct.

1981In Skinner v. State, 439 P.2d 962 (Okl.Cr.1968), we stated that: If the counsel is dissatisfied with instructions given, or desires court to give particular instruction, or more definitely or sufficiently state any propositions embraced in instructions, it is counsel’s duty to prepare and present to the court such desired instruction and request that it be given.

1981In Skinner v. State, 439 P.2d 962 (Okl.Cr. 1968), we stated that: If the counsel is dissatisfied with instructions given, or desires court to give particular instruction, or more definitely or sufficiently state any propositions embraced in instructions, it is counsel's duty to prepare and present to the court such desired instruction and request that it be given.

1967In Pulliam v. State of Oklahoma, Okl., 369 P.2d 646 , we held that this Court will not review an alleged error of the trial court unless error complained of has been set up and presented in motion for new trial as well as assigned for review by petition in error.

1962State Insurance Fund v. Trieschmann, 206 Okl. 533 , 244 P.2d 1128, 1132 , and Maxfield v. Maxfield, Okl., 258 P.2d 915 .

1962State Insurance Fund v. Trieschmann, 206 Okl. 533 , 244 P.2d 1128, 1132 , and Maxfield v. Maxfield, Okl., 258 P.2d 915 .

1962State Insurance Fund v. Trieschmann, 206 Okl. 533 , 244 P.2d 1128, 1132 , and Maxfield v. Maxfield, Okl., 258 P.2d 915 .

1952City of Altus v. Tinsley, 185 Okla. 602 , 95 P. 2d 635 ; House v. Mullendore, 166 Okla. 36 , 26 P. 2d 749 ; Eggleston v. Williams, 30 Okla. 129 , 120 P. 944 .

1952On the other hand, where it appears from the record there was no sufficient ground for a new trial alleged by the complaining party, and the record shows no legal ground for ordering a new trial, this court will presume that none existed, and that the trial court abused its discretion in making the order, and will reverse the same.” Also, in Russell v. Margo, 180 Okla. 24 , 67 P. 2d 22 , it is said: “While we recognize the rule that the trial court has a very broad discretion in the granting of new trials, we likewise declare the rule to be that if in granting a new trial the trial court acts

1952On the other hand, where it appears from the record there was no sufficient ground for a new trial alleged by the complaining party, and the record shows no legal ground for ordering a new trial, this court will presume that none existed, and that the trial court abused its discretion in making the order, and will reverse the same.” Also, in Russell v. Margo, 180 Okla. 24 , 67 P. 2d 22 , it is said: “While we recognize the rule that the trial court has a very broad discretion in the granting of new trials, we likewise declare the rule to be that if in granting a new trial the trial court acts

1952City of Altus v. Tinsley, 185 Okla. 602 , 95 P. 2d 635 ; House v. Mullendore, 166 Okla. 36 , 26 P. 2d 749 ; Eggleston v. Williams, 30 Okla. 129 , 120 P. 944 .

1952City of Altus v. Tinsley, 185 Okla. 602 , 95 P. 2d 635 ; House v. Mullendore, 166 Okla. 36 , 26 P. 2d 749 ; Eggleston v. Williams, 30 Okla. 129 , 120 P. 944 .

1952City of Altus v. Tinsley, 185 Okla. 602 , 95 P. 2d 635 ; House v. Mullendore, 166 Okla. 36 , 26 P. 2d 749 ; Eggleston v. Williams, 30 Okla. 129 , 120 P. 944 .

1952City of Altus v. Tinsley, 185 Okla. 602 , 95 P. 2d 635 ; House v. Mullendore, 166 Okla. 36 , 26 P. 2d 749 ; Eggleston v. Williams, 30 Okla. 129 , 120 P. 944 .

1952City of Altus v. Tinsley, 185 Okla. 602 , 95 P. 2d 635 ; House v. Mullendore, 166 Okla. 36 , 26 P. 2d 749 ; Eggleston v. Williams, 30 Okla. 129 , 120 P. 944 .

1934In the case of Graham v. Yates et al., 36 Okla. 148 , 128 P. 119 , this court had under consideration said question, and held, in substance, that the court will not review an alleged error of the trial court unless the error complained of is assigned for review by the petition in error as well as by motion for new trial, and that the question of the amount of recovery cannot be considered unless such error is alleged in the motion for new trial.

1934In the case of Graham v. Yates et al., 36 Okla. 148 , 128 P. 119 , this court had under consideration said question, and held, in substance, that the court will not review an alleged error of the trial court unless the error complained of is assigned for review by the petition in error as well as by motion for new trial, and that the question of the amount of recovery cannot be considered unless such error is alleged in the motion for new trial.

1932And that, as in the case of Johnston v. Shaffer, 74 Okla. 25 , 176 P. 901 , “Where written portion of an oil and gas lease is at variance with the printed part, the former should control and govern in the construction thereof as best indicative of the intent of the parties.” However, the unless clause of this lease was not without purpose, nor was its existence within the lease contract an oversight, for Barrett, lessor, who drew the lease, testified that he filled in that clause the date, by use of typewriter, just as he had written into the 88 form of lease the above-mentioned termination cl

1932And that, as in the case of Johnston v. Shaffer, 74 Okla. 25 , 176 P. 901 , “Where written portion of an oil and gas lease is at variance with the printed part, the former should control and govern in the construction thereof as best indicative of the intent of the parties.” However, the unless clause of this lease was not without purpose, nor was its existence within the lease contract an oversight, for Barrett, lessor, who drew the lease, testified that he filled in that clause the date, by use of typewriter, just as he had written into the 88 form of lease the above-mentioned termination cl

1929We are therefore required to determine the' merits of such defense as defendant may have under his evidence, ahd in so doing, under an elementary rule (Murnan v. Isbell, 133 Okla. 160 , 271 Pac. 649 ; Munn v. Mid-Continent Motor Securities Co., 100 Okla. 105 , 228 Pac. 150 ; Fahey v. Mitchell, 116 Okla. 296 , 244 Pac. 761 ), we must proceed on the theory of its complete verity as to every fact actually and inferentially in legal contemplation thereby established.

1929We are therefore required to determine the' merits of such defense as defendant may have under his evidence, ahd in so doing, under an elementary rule (Murnan v. Isbell, 133 Okla. 160 , 271 Pac. 649 ; Munn v. Mid-Continent Motor Securities Co., 100 Okla. 105 , 228 Pac. 150 ; Fahey v. Mitchell, 116 Okla. 296 , 244 Pac. 761 ), we must proceed on the theory of its complete verity as to every fact actually and inferentially in legal contemplation thereby established.

1929We are therefore required to determine the' merits of such defense as defendant may have under his evidence, ahd in so doing, under an elementary rule (Murnan v. Isbell, 133 Okla. 160 , 271 Pac. 649 ; Munn v. Mid-Continent Motor Securities Co., 100 Okla. 105 , 228 Pac. 150 ; Fahey v. Mitchell, 116 Okla. 296 , 244 Pac. 761 ), we must proceed on the theory of its complete verity as to every fact actually and inferentially in legal contemplation thereby established.

1929We are therefore required to determine the' merits of such defense as defendant may have under his evidence, ahd in so doing, under an elementary rule (Murnan v. Isbell, 133 Okla. 160 , 271 Pac. 649 ; Munn v. Mid-Continent Motor Securities Co., 100 Okla. 105 , 228 Pac. 150 ; Fahey v. Mitchell, 116 Okla. 296 , 244 Pac. 761 ), we must proceed on the theory of its complete verity as to every fact actually and inferentially in legal contemplation thereby established.

1929We are therefore required to determine the' merits of such defense as defendant may have under his evidence, ahd in so doing, under an elementary rule (Murnan v. Isbell, 133 Okla. 160 , 271 Pac. 649 ; Munn v. Mid-Continent Motor Securities Co., 100 Okla. 105 , 228 Pac. 150 ; Fahey v. Mitchell, 116 Okla. 296 , 244 Pac. 761 ), we must proceed on the theory of its complete verity as to every fact actually and inferentially in legal contemplation thereby established.

1929We are therefore required to determine the' merits of such defense as defendant may have under his evidence, ahd in so doing, under an elementary rule (Murnan v. Isbell, 133 Okla. 160 , 271 Pac. 649 ; Munn v. Mid-Continent Motor Securities Co., 100 Okla. 105 , 228 Pac. 150 ; Fahey v. Mitchell, 116 Okla. 296 , 244 Pac. 761 ), we must proceed on the theory of its complete verity as to every fact actually and inferentially in legal contemplation thereby established.

1925Firebaugh v. Dubois, 70 Okla. 269 , 173 Pac. 1126 ; Fisher v. Woolery, 94 Okla. 110 , 221 Pac. 45 .

1925Firebaugh v. Dubois, 70 Okla. 269 , 173 Pac. 1126 ; Fisher v. Woolery, 94 Okla. 110 , 221 Pac. 45 .

1925Firebaugh v. Dubois, 70 Okla. 269 , 173 Pac. 1126 ; Fisher v. Woolery, 94 Okla. 110 , 221 Pac. 45 .

1925Firebaugh v. Dubois, 70 Okla. 269 , 173 Pac. 1126 ; Fisher v. Woolery, 94 Okla. 110 , 221 Pac. 45 .