working principle in California

1970(Crosswhite v. Municipal Court (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 428, 431 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 216 ].) “What finally emerges from the ‘clear and present danger’ cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished.” (Bridges v. California (1941) 314 U.S. 252, 263 [ 86 L.Ed. 192, 203 , 62 S.Ct. 190 , 159 A.L.R. 1346 ].) “[Whatever occasion would restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at appropriate time and place, must have clear support in public danger, actual or impending.

1970(Crosswhite v. Municipal Court (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 428, 431 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 216 ].) “What finally emerges from the ‘clear and present danger’ cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished.” (Bridges v. California (1941) 314 U.S. 252, 263 [ 86 L.Ed. 192, 203 , 62 S.Ct. 190 , 159 A.L.R. 1346 ].) “[Whatever occasion would restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at appropriate time and place, must have clear support in public danger, actual or impending.

1970(Crosswhite v. Municipal Court (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 428, 431 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 216 ].) “What finally emerges from the ‘clear and present danger’ cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished.” (Bridges v. California (1941) 314 U.S. 252, 263 [ 86 L.Ed. 192, 203 , 62 S.Ct. 190 , 159 A.L.R. 1346 ].) “[Whatever occasion would restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at appropriate time and place, must have clear support in public danger, actual or impending.

1970(Crosswhite v. Municipal Court (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 428, 431 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 216 ].) “What finally emerges from the ‘clear and present danger’ cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished.” (Bridges v. California (1941) 314 U.S. 252, 263 [ 86 L.Ed. 192, 203 , 62 S.Ct. 190 , 159 A.L.R. 1346 ].) “[Whatever occasion would restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at appropriate time and place, must have clear support in public danger, actual or impending.

1969(See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 [ 63 L.Ed. 470, 473 , 39 S.Ct. 247 ]; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 [ 89 L.Ed. 430 , 65 S.Ct. 315 ] ; Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal.2d 235, 243 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 411 P.2d 289 ].) In Bridges (p. 263 [86 L.Ed. p. 203]) the court said: “What finally emerges from the ‘clear and present danger’ eases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremly high before utterances can be punished.” Here, the evil the trial court sought to prevent by its order was the denial of a fair trial to all par

1969(See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 [ 63 L.Ed. 470, 473 , 39 S.Ct. 247 ]; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 [ 89 L.Ed. 430 , 65 S.Ct. 315 ] ; Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal.2d 235, 243 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 411 P.2d 289 ].) In Bridges (p. 263 [86 L.Ed. p. 203]) the court said: “What finally emerges from the ‘clear and present danger’ eases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremly high before utterances can be punished.” Here, the evil the trial court sought to prevent by its order was the denial of a fair trial to all par

1969(See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 [ 63 L.Ed. 470, 473 , 39 S.Ct. 247 ]; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 [ 89 L.Ed. 430 , 65 S.Ct. 315 ] ; Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal.2d 235, 243 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 411 P.2d 289 ].) In Bridges (p. 263 [86 L.Ed. p. 203]) the court said: “What finally emerges from the ‘clear and present danger’ eases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremly high before utterances can be punished.” Here, the evil the trial court sought to prevent by its order was the denial of a fair trial to all par

1969(See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 [ 63 L.Ed. 470, 473 , 39 S.Ct. 247 ]; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 [ 89 L.Ed. 430 , 65 S.Ct. 315 ] ; Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal.2d 235, 243 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 411 P.2d 289 ].) In Bridges (p. 263 [86 L.Ed. p. 203]) the court said: “What finally emerges from the ‘clear and present danger’ eases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremly high before utterances can be punished.” Here, the evil the trial court sought to prevent by its order was the denial of a fair trial to all par

1968What finally emerges from the many decisions on the subject, states Bridges v. California, supra, 314 U.S. 252, 263 [ 86 L.Ed. 192, 202 ], “is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances cam be punished.” (Italics added.) Bridges further held at page 262 [ 86 L.Ed. at p. 202 ] that “the likelihood, however great, that a substantive evil will result cannot alone justify a restriction upon freedom of speech or the press.” In each case the court must ask “ ‘whether the gravity of the ‘ ‘ evil, ’ ’ discounted

1968What finally emerges from the many decisions on the subject, states Bridges v. California, supra, 314 U.S. 252, 263 [ 86 L.Ed. 192, 202 ], “is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances cam be punished.” (Italics added.) Bridges further held at page 262 [ 86 L.Ed. at p. 202 ] that “the likelihood, however great, that a substantive evil will result cannot alone justify a restriction upon freedom of speech or the press.” In each case the court must ask “ ‘whether the gravity of the ‘ ‘ evil, ’ ’ discounted

1965By an unbroken line of decision in this state since the date of the original enactment of section 437c, the principle has become well established that issue finding rather than issue determination is the pivot upon which the summary judgment law turns.” (See: Wilson v. Bittick, 63 Cal.2d 30, 34 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 31 , 403 P.2d 159 ]; Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 62 Cal.2d 412, 417 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 449 , 398 P.2d 785 ]; Towne Development Co. v. Lee, 63 Cal.2d 147, 148 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 316 , 403 P.2d 724 ].) It is a working rule on motions of this kind that the affidavits for the moving p

1965By an unbroken line of decision in this state since the date of the original enactment of section 437c, the principle has become well established that issue finding rather than issue determination is the pivot upon which the summary judgment law turns.” (See: Wilson v. Bittick, 63 Cal.2d 30, 34 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 31 , 403 P.2d 159 ]; Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 62 Cal.2d 412, 417 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 449 , 398 P.2d 785 ]; Towne Development Co. v. Lee, 63 Cal.2d 147, 148 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 316 , 403 P.2d 724 ].) It is a working rule on motions of this kind that the affidavits for the moving p

1965By an unbroken line of decision in this state since the date of the original enactment of section 437c, the principle has become well established that issue finding rather than issue determination is the pivot upon which the summary judgment law turns.” (See: Wilson v. Bittick, 63 Cal.2d 30, 34 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 31 , 403 P.2d 159 ]; Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 62 Cal.2d 412, 417 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 449 , 398 P.2d 785 ]; Towne Development Co. v. Lee, 63 Cal.2d 147, 148 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 316 , 403 P.2d 724 ].) It is a working rule on motions of this kind that the affidavits for the moving p

1965By an unbroken line of decision in this state since the date of the original enactment of section 437c, the principle has become well established that issue finding rather than issue determination is the pivot upon which the summary judgment law turns.” (See: Wilson v. Bittick, 63 Cal.2d 30, 34 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 31 , 403 P.2d 159 ]; Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 62 Cal.2d 412, 417 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 449 , 398 P.2d 785 ]; Towne Development Co. v. Lee, 63 Cal.2d 147, 148 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 316 , 403 P.2d 724 ].) It is a working rule on motions of this kind that the affidavits for the moving p

1965By an unbroken line of decision in this state since the date of the original enactment of section 437c, the principle has become well established that issue finding rather than issue determination is the pivot upon which the summary judgment law turns.” (See: Wilson v. Bittick, 63 Cal.2d 30, 34 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 31 , 403 P.2d 159 ]; Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 62 Cal.2d 412, 417 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 449 , 398 P.2d 785 ]; Towne Development Co. v. Lee, 63 Cal.2d 147, 148 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 316 , 403 P.2d 724 ].) It is a working rule on motions of this kind that the affidavits for the moving p

1965By an unbroken line of decision in this state since the date of the original enactment of section 437c, the principle has become well established that issue finding rather than issue determination is the pivot upon which the summary judgment law turns.” (See: Wilson v. Bittick, 63 Cal.2d 30, 34 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 31 , 403 P.2d 159 ]; Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 62 Cal.2d 412, 417 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 449 , 398 P.2d 785 ]; Towne Development Co. v. Lee, 63 Cal.2d 147, 148 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 316 , 403 P.2d 724 ].) It is a working rule on motions of this kind that the affidavits for the moving p

1946What finally emerges from the 'clear and present danger' cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished."" When the United States Supreme Court held in Bridges v. California, supra, that the suppression of freedom of speech in the absence of a clear and present danger of substantive evils is a violation of the constitutional guaranty of free speech, it adopted the views of Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis in their minority opinions in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 [

1946What finally emerges from the 'clear and present danger' cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished."" When the United States Supreme Court held in Bridges v. California, supra, that the suppression of freedom of speech in the absence of a clear and present danger of substantive evils is a violation of the constitutional guaranty of free speech, it adopted the views of Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis in their minority opinions in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 [

1946What finally emerges from the 'clear and present danger' cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished."" When the United States Supreme Court held in Bridges v. California, supra, that the suppression of freedom of speech in the absence of a clear and present danger of substantive evils is a violation of the constitutional guaranty of free speech, it adopted the views of Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis in their minority opinions in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 [

1946What finally emerges from the 'clear and present danger' cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished."" When the United States Supreme Court held in Bridges v. California, supra, that the suppression of freedom of speech in the absence of a clear and present danger of substantive evils is a violation of the constitutional guaranty of free speech, it adopted the views of Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis in their minority opinions in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 [