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9 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1970–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Babers v. City of Shreveportgreen2 sentences2024In determining the start of the plaintiff firefighter’s working test period in Babers v. City of Shreveport, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal (“Second Circuit”) disagreed with the plaintiff’s contention that his “working test period began immediately upon the date of his employment on August 16, 1990.” 621 So.2d 88, 90 (La. 2024Id. | 1 | 1 |
Terry v. Department of Policegreen1 sentence2017“A ‘regular’ employee is distinguished from a ‘probational’ employee based on whether the working test period is completed.” Terry , 08-1436, p. 4, 23 So.3d at 976 (citation omitted). | ^Pursuant to Civil Service Rule I, § 1(64), a “regular employee” is one who has completed the working test period and has been appointed to the position in accordance with the Civil Service laws and rules. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mariani v. Police Dept.
neutral
2 sentences2007Id. at p. 3, 829 So.2d at 513-14 . |/The Banks court recognized that a “regular” employee is distinguished from a “probational” employee based on whether the working test period is completed, Id. at pp. 3-4, 829 So.2d at 514 , citing Mariani v. Police Dept., 96-0871 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/27/96) , 686 So.2d 1012 , writ denied, 97-0276 (La.3/14/97), 689 So.2d 1389 . 2002A "regular" employee is distinguished from a "probational" employee based on whether the working test period is completed; Mariani v. Police Dept., 96-0871 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/27/96) , 686 So.2d 1012 , writ denied, 97-0276 (La.3/14/97), 689 So.2d 1389 . | 4 | 2002–2009 |
Mariani v. Police Dept.
green
2 sentences2007Id. at p. 3, 829 So.2d at 513-14 . |/The Banks court recognized that a “regular” employee is distinguished from a “probational” employee based on whether the working test period is completed, Id. at pp. 3-4, 829 So.2d at 514 , citing Mariani v. Police Dept., 96-0871 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/27/96) , 686 So.2d 1012 , writ denied, 97-0276 (La.3/14/97), 689 So.2d 1389 . 2002A "regular" employee is distinguished from a "probational" employee based on whether the working test period is completed; Mariani v. Police Dept., 96-0871 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/27/96) , 686 So.2d 1012 , writ denied, 97-0276 (La.3/14/97), 689 So.2d 1389 . | 4 | 2002–2009 |
Banks v. New Orleans Police Dept.
green
2 sentences2009“The working test period does not take place until the police officer is working on the job rather than when he is a recruit at the Police Academy.” Id. 2007Id. at p. 3, 829 So.2d at 513-14 . |/The Banks court recognized that a “regular” employee is distinguished from a “probational” employee based on whether the working test period is completed, Id. at pp. 3-4, 829 So.2d at 514 , citing Mariani v. Police Dept., 96-0871 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/27/96) , 686 So.2d 1012 , writ denied, 97-0276 (La.3/14/97), 689 So.2d 1389 . | 2 | 2007–2009 |
Brown v. Housing Authority
green
2 sentences2007In its Written Reasons for Judgment, the district court, citing as authority in a footnote Brown v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, 590 So.2d 1258 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991), declared, in pertinent part: This court need not reach a determination of whether she [Middleton] was a working test employee or had acquired permanent status. 2007In its Written Reasons for Judgment, the district court, citing as authority in a footnote Brown v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, 590 So.2d 1258 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991), declared, in pertinent part: This court need not reach a determination of whether she [Middleton] was a working test employee or had acquired permanent status. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Bridges v. California
green
1 sentence1976Thus clarifying the exercise of this judicial power in the context of the protections assured by the First Amendment, the Court held that out-of-court publications were to be governed by the clear and present danger standard, described as `a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished.' Id. [314 U.S.] at 263, 62 S.Ct. [190] at 194. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Pennekamp v. Florida
green
2 sentences1976Subsequently, in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 , 66 S.Ct. 1029 , 90 L.Ed. 1295 , after noting that `[f]ree discussion of the problems of society is a cardinal principle of Americanisma principle which all are zealous to preserve' (id., [328 U.S.] at 346, 66 S.Ct. [1029] at 1037), the Court reaffirmed its belief that the `essential right of the courts to be free of intimidation and coercion . . . [is] consonant with a recognition that freedom of the press must be allowed in the broadest scope compatible with the supremacy of order.' Id. [328 U.S.] at 334, 66 S.Ct. [1029] at 1031. 1976Subsequently, in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 , 66 S.Ct. 1029 , 90 L.Ed. 1295 , after noting that `[f]ree discussion of the problems of society is a cardinal principle of Americanisma principle which all are zealous to preserve' (id., [328 U.S.] at 346, 66 S.Ct. [1029] at 1037), the Court reaffirmed its belief that the `essential right of the courts to be free of intimidation and coercion . . . [is] consonant with a recognition that freedom of the press must be allowed in the broadest scope compatible with the supremacy of order.' Id. [328 U.S.] at 334, 66 S.Ct. [1029] at 1031. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Creighton v. Karlin
green
1 sentence1970To the contrary, our recent decision in Creighton v. Karlin, La.App., 225 So.2d 288 (4th Cir. 1969), should clearly permit an action of that nature. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.