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5 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1983–1994 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Mascarenasgreen1 sentence1984See also People v. Mascarenas, 666 P.2d 101 (Colo.1983) (instruction implying culpable mental state only applicable to one element of aggravated robbery is defective). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Martinezgreen1 sentence1984See People v. Martinez, 634 P.2d 26 (Colo.1981). *1176 In this ease the jury instruction defining the offense of second degree kidnapping omitted the statutory culpable mental state, “knowingly.” 7 A separate joint operation instruction stated that, in order for a crime to have been committed, the proscribed act must have occurred in conjunction with a culpable mental state. 8 This instruction further specified the pertinent culpable mental states as “intentionally” and “knowingly” and defined those terms. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Frysiggreen1 sentence1984See also People v. Frysig, 628 P.2d 1004 (Colo.1981) (jury adequately instructed when proper culpable mental state linked to sexual assault through definition of one of the specified elements of the crime, even though missing from elemental instruction). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Mattas
green
2 sentences1984The joint operation instruction for first degree sexual assault included a definition of “intentionally.” We concluded that the elemental instruction for first degree sexual assault was so closely linked to its companion joint operation instruction as to “adequately [apprise] the jury that it must find that the defendant possessed the requisite mental state for each charge.” Matias, 645 P.2d at 258 . 1983The defendant’s argument is answered by our decision in People v. Mattas, supra. The joint operation instruction given in this case left no doubt but that a culpable mental state was required for conviction under each charge. | 3 | 1983–1984 |
State v. Morris
green
2 sentences1994Nevertheless, the court in People v. Hart, supra, concluded that omission of a culpable mental state in the elemental instruction was not plain error because the joint operation instruction given to the jury there defined *247 “knowingly” and “intentionally,” leaving no doubt that the minimum culpable mental state of “knowingly” was required for conviction under each charge. 1994Defendant argues that People v. Hart, supra, is inapposite here because the joint operation instruction included the culpable mental state “recklessly,” which was the mental state required for conviction under a theory of third degree assault. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Smith
green
1 sentence1985Chambers, supra. Here, as in Smith, supra, a joint operation instruction concerning the act committed and the culpable mental state was given erroneously specifying that specific intent, a more culpable mental state than is required, is the culpable mental state to be applied to elements of aggravated robbery. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Chambers v. People
green
1 sentence1985Chambers, supra. Here, as in Smith, supra, a joint operation instruction concerning the act committed and the culpable mental state was given erroneously specifying that specific intent, a more culpable mental state than is required, is the culpable mental state to be applied to elements of aggravated robbery. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
People v. Hart
green
1 sentence1984In People v. Hart, 658 P.2d 857 (Colo.1983), we found no plain error in an elemental instruction omitting the culpable mental state of “knowingly” where only two crimes were charged, the jury instruction regarding the elements of the second crime included “specific intent,” and a joint operation instruction was given defining both “knowingly” and “specific intent.” There, the definition of “knowingly,” to have any relevance, must have been applicable to the crime defined without reference to a culpable mental state, and in any event, should the jury have mistakenly applied the more stringent m | 1 | 1984–1984 |
People v. Hardin
green
2 sentences1984People v. Bridges, 620 P.2d 1 (Colo.1980) (the only mental states defined in the joint operation instruction were impliedly limited in applicability to crimes other than engaging in a riot; the elemental instruction for that offense omitted mention of any culpa *1178 ble mental state); People v. Hardin, 199 Colo. 229 , 607 P.2d 1291 (Colo.1980) (conviction for first degree assault, second degree assault, attempted criminally negligent homicide, and crime of violence; first degree assault instruction omitted culpable mental state of “knowingly”; single joint operation instruction defined severa 1984People v. Bridges, 620 P.2d 1 (Colo.1980) (the only mental states defined in the joint operation instruction were impliedly limited in applicability to crimes other than engaging in a riot; the elemental instruction for that offense omitted mention of any culpa *1178 ble mental state); People v. Hardin, 199 Colo. 229 , 607 P.2d 1291 (Colo.1980) (conviction for first degree assault, second degree assault, attempted criminally negligent homicide, and crime of violence; first degree assault instruction omitted culpable mental state of “knowingly”; single joint operation instruction defined severa | 1 | 1984–1984 |
People v. Bridges
green
1 sentence1984People v. Bridges, 620 P.2d 1 (Colo.1980) (the only mental states defined in the joint operation instruction were impliedly limited in applicability to crimes other than engaging in a riot; the elemental instruction for that offense omitted mention of any culpa *1178 ble mental state); People v. Hardin, 199 Colo. 229 , 607 P.2d 1291 (Colo.1980) (conviction for first degree assault, second degree assault, attempted criminally negligent homicide, and crime of violence; first degree assault instruction omitted culpable mental state of “knowingly”; single joint operation instruction defined severa | 1 | 1984–1984 |