parents claim in California

2025As we have already explained, the juvenile court’s well-supported finding under subdivision (b)(5) of section 361.5 was sufficient on its own to require the court to bypass reunification services. (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(3); see In re Madison S. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 308, 324 [“only one valid ground is necessary to support a juvenile court’s decision to bypass a parent for reunification services”].) Third, Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by denying reunification services because it was in K.G.’s best interest for the court to order reunification services.

2025As we have already explained, the juvenile court’s well-supported finding under subdivision (b)(5) of section 361.5 was sufficient on its own to require the court to bypass reunification services. (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(3); see In re Madison S. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 308, 324 [“only one valid ground is necessary to support a juvenile court’s decision to bypass a parent for reunification services”].) Third, Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by denying reunification services because it was in K.G.’s best interest for the court to order reunification services.

2008Dependents claim “the clock on [the] 18-month limitation period for services began to run in April 2006, when the minors were detained and taken into protective custody.” The parents claim the time limitations set in section 361.5 began only following SSA’s section 387 amended petition and dependents’ removal from their father’s custody, and any services received before November 2007 were not section 361.5 “reunification services.” “ ‘[T]he words the Legislature chooses are the best expression of its intent and we are bound by their plain meaning.’ ” (In re Silvia R. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 337

2008Dependents claim “the clock on [the] 18-month limitation period for services began to run in April 2006, when the minors were detained and taken into protective custody.” The parents claim the time limitations set in section 361.5 began only following SSA’s section 387 amended petition and dependents’ removal from their father’s custody, and any services received before November 2007 were not section 361.5 “reunification services.” “ ‘[T]he words the Legislature chooses are the best expression of its intent and we are bound by their plain meaning.’ ” (In re Silvia R. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 337

2006However, the argument that a judgment is not supported by substantial evidence is an “obvious exception to the rule.” (Tahoe National Bank v. Phillips (1971) 4 Cal.3d 11, 23, fn. 17 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 704 , 480 P.2d 320 ].) Here, the parties litigated the applicability of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(D).

2006However, the argument that a judgment is not supported by substantial evidence is an “obvious exception to the rule.” (Tahoe National Bank v. Phillips (1971) 4 Cal.3d 11, 23, fn. 17 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 704 , 480 P.2d 320 ].) Here, the parties litigated the applicability of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(D).

1987VI, § 13; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) Finally, the parents claim that the referee misconstrued the quantum of risk necessary for continuance of the dependency.

1987VI, § 13; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) Finally, the parents claim that the referee misconstrued the quantum of risk necessary for continuance of the dependency.

1987VI, § 13; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) Finally, the parents claim that the referee misconstrued the quantum of risk necessary for continuance of the dependency.

1987VI, § 13; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) Finally, the parents claim that the referee misconstrued the quantum of risk necessary for continuance of the dependency.

2015(In re Athena P. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 617, 627 [challenge to jurisdictional allegations reviewed for harmless error].) Parents challenge the allegation in both petitions that Mother “repeatedly violated Court orders by permitting the father to have access to the child without Agency supervision.”5 Mother argues there were no court orders directing her to prohibit Father from access to the children because the visitation order was directed only at Father.

2013As explained above, relief from the waiver rule is a function of due process 5 Rule 5.590(b) provides, in part: “When the court orders a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, the court must advise all parties and, if present, the child’s parent, guardian, or adult relative, that if the party wishes to preserve any right to review on appeal of the order setting the hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, the party is required to seek an extraordinary writ by filing a Notice of Intent to File Writ Petition and Request for Record (California Rules of Cour

2015(In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 166 .) Insofar as Parents ask us to reverse the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction under the original section 300 petition, we conclude any alleged error in that finding was rendered moot by the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings under the subsequent section 342 petition.5 Here, the juvenile court sustained the section 342 petition, and thus 5 Although the parties do not discuss the issue, Parents’ challenge to the findings under the section 300 petition may be barred for another reason.

2011“After the juvenile court finds a child to be within its jurisdiction, the court must conduct a dispositional hearing. [Citation.] At the dispositional hearing, the court must decide where the child will live while under the court’s supervision.” (In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 169 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 424 ].) “A removal order is proper if based on proof of parental inability to provide proper care for the child and proof of a potential detriment to the child if he or she remains with the parent. [Citation.] ‘The parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been actually harme

2014The Courts of Appeal have held, “The court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child’s interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accord with this discretion.” (In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006 ; see In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 770 [same].) Further, those courts explained: “We cannot reverse the court’s determination 12 in this regard absent a clear abuse of discretion. [Citation.] [¶] The reunification plan ‘“must be appropriate for each family and be based on the unique facts relating to that family.”’ [Citation.]

2014The parents appear to contend the juvenile court abused its discretion when it ordered as part of father’s case plan that he obtain “verification from a doctor that the use of medical marijuana is appropriately indicated to treat mental health issues,” and that he 16 undergo a “mental health assessment” as to whether treatment of those issues is “a legitimate use of medical marijuana.” Reprising their previous argument, the parents claim their mere use of marijuana or other drugs is “not the concern of the juvenile court.” (Citing In re Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 754 ; In re Destiny S.,

2023(See In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“One cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge.”].) Second, the parents argue that drug use is not enough by itself to justify dependency jurisdiction; that a showing of risk of harm to the child is needed; and that that showing of risk is missing here.

2023(In re A.G. 9 (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 994, 1005 (A.G.); accord, T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1256 (T.J.).) For a child over the age of three, the statutory minimum period of reunification services is 12 months. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).) Because the parents do not challenge the reasonableness of the Department’s efforts during the first six-month period and the 12- to 18-month period, mother and father have already obtained the relief they would obtain if we determined that the Department’s efforts during the midpoint six- to 12-month period were less than reasonable—that

2023(In re A.G. 9 (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 994, 1005 (A.G.); accord, T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1256 (T.J.).) For a child over the age of three, the statutory minimum period of reunification services is 12 months. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).) Because the parents do not challenge the reasonableness of the Department’s efforts during the first six-month period and the 12- to 18-month period, mother and father have already obtained the relief they would obtain if we determined that the Department’s efforts during the midpoint six- to 12-month period were less than reasonable—that

2022(In re Julien H. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1088, fn. 7 .) B.

2021(REO Broadcasting Consultants v. Martin (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 489, 500 [appellate courts won’t consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief because it deprives opposing counsel of the opportunity to respond].) 9 In a footnote in their opening brief, the Parents claim the court “erroneously denied” their request for judicial notice of a so- called “White Paper,” a document drafted by an association of the State’s police chiefs outlining the potential risks marijuana dispensaries pose to their surrounding communities and citing specific examples of violence targeting marijuana disp

2021(REO Broadcasting Consultants v. Martin (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 489, 500 [appellate courts won’t consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief because it deprives opposing counsel of the opportunity to respond].) 9 In a footnote in their opening brief, the Parents claim the court “erroneously denied” their request for judicial notice of a so- called “White Paper,” a document drafted by an association of the State’s police chiefs outlining the potential risks marijuana dispensaries pose to their surrounding communities and citing specific examples of violence targeting marijuana disp

2021(In re Justin S. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1432 , 1435–1436; accord In re Z.W. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 54 , 63–64.) On remand, the juvenile court must appoint counsel for the parents with respect to all five children and provide notice to the parents and their attorneys of any new ICWA hearing.

2021(See In re Michael G. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 700, 712 [both the federal and state statutes are aimed at ensuring the provision of reasonable reunification services and preserving the family whenever possible, thus the “clear and convincing standard is also consistent with the ICWA’s goals” and application of that standard to a 25 U.S.C. section 1912 (d) analysis is proper]; accord C.F. v. Superior Court (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 227, 238-239 .) Further, the parents provide no authority, and we are not aware of any, that requires that the juvenile court use the phrase “active efforts” rather than “