parents claim in Texas

2009We note Wal-Mart also argues the Parents waived this issue by failing to provide this Court with an adequate brief. [15] We also note the Parents claim Wal-Mart waived this issue by not raising it in the trial court. [16] A design defect exists when a condition of the product renders it "`unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking into consideration the utility of the product and the risk involved in its use.'" Hernandez v. Tokai Corp., 2 S.W.3d 251, 258 (Tex. 1999) (quoting jury instruction contained in Turner v. Gen.

2009We note Wal-Mart also argues the Parents waived this issue by failing to provide this Court with an adequate brief. [15] We also note the Parents claim Wal-Mart waived this issue by not raising it in the trial court. [16] A design defect exists when a condition of the product renders it "`unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking into consideration the utility of the product and the risk involved in its use.'" Hernandez v. Tokai Corp., 2 S.W.3d 251, 258 (Tex. 1999) (quoting jury instruction contained in Turner v. Gen.

2009Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 , 847 n. 1 (Tex.1979)). "`The inference of defect may not be drawn ... from the mere fact of a product-related accident.'" Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d at 602 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 3 reporters' note to cmt. d (1998)); see Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W.3d 797, 807 (Tex.2006). *134 We note a design defect also requires proof of a safer alternative design.

2009Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 , 847 n. 1 (Tex.1979)). "`The inference of defect may not be drawn ... from the mere fact of a product-related accident.'" Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d at 602 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 3 reporters' note to cmt. d (1998)); see Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W.3d 797, 807 (Tex.2006). *134 We note a design defect also requires proof of a safer alternative design.

2026Once we overrule a parents challenge to an order terminating her parental rights, the trial court’s appointment of DFPS as sole managing conservator is a “consequence of the termination.” In re J.D.G., 570 S.W.3d at 856 ; In re A.S., 261 S.W.3d 76, 92 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).

2025Once we overrule a parents challenge to an order terminating her parental rights, the trial court’s appointment of DFPS as sole managing conservator is a “consequence of the termination.” In re J.D.G., 570 S.W.3d at 856; In re A.S., 261 S.W.3d 76, 92 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).

1991In a case decided before written guidelines were promulgated, one court of appeals observed that "the Court would be justified in requiring the parents to provide a standard of living for their children commensurate with that which they have and will continue to enjoy for themselves." Cooper v. Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229, 234 (Tex. Civ.

1987Krempp, 590 S.W.2d at 230 ; Cooper v. Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229, 234 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, no writ).

2024We address each in turn. 8 Best interest finding In Mother’s first issue and Father’s sole issue, the parents challenge the trial court’s finding that termination of each of their rights was in Child’s best interest. “[T]here is a strong presumption that the best interest of a child is served by keeping the child with a parent.” In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam).

2022See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 369–70.

2021See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28 .

2020See Yeo, 171 S.W.3d at 868 (noting that the “United States Supreme Court [Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 , 96 S. Ct. 1155 , 1160–61 (1976)] has held that reputation alone is not a protected liberty or property interest”).

2020See Yeo, 171 S.W.3d at 868 (noting that the “United States Supreme Court [Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 , 96 S. Ct. 1155 , 1160–61 (1976)] has held that reputation alone is not a protected liberty or property interest”).

2020See Yeo, 171 S.W.3d at 868 (noting that the “United States Supreme Court [Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 , 96 S. Ct. 1155 , 1160–61 (1976)] has held that reputation alone is not a protected liberty or property interest”).

2016In other words, the parents would have no claim if the minor had no claim: “The parent’s cause of action for loss of services and earnings of the minor and for medical expenses is derivative in the sense [that] the tortfeasor’s liability to the child must be established before the parent may recover.” Washam v. Hughes, 638 S.W.2d 646, 648 (Tex. App.—Austin 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., 148 S.W.3d at 98 (“If the child has no cause of action, neither do the parents.”).

2016While we will consider each ground in this case, we note that “[o]nly one statutory ground is necessary to support a judgment in a parental-rights-termination case.” Spurck v. Texas Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 396 S.W.3d 205, 221 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.).

2016In other words, the parents would have no claim if the minor had no claim: “The parent’s cause of action for loss of services and earnings of the minor and for medical expenses is derivative in the sense [that] the tortfeasor’s liability to the child must be established before the parent may recover.” Washam v. Hughes, 638 S.W.2d 646, 648 (Tex. App.—Austin 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., 148 S.W.3d at 98 (“If the child has no cause of action, neither do the parents.”).

2013Because we hold that there is some evidence to support this finding, it is binding. 28 Thus, the record provides evidence of the complexity of the case and evidence of Grandmother’s trial counsel’s preparation, and the trial court’s 28 See McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986); Inimitable Grp., L.P. v. Westwood Grp.

1993Currey v. Lone Star Steel Co., 676 S.W.2d 205, 209 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1984, no writ).

1991Anderson v. Anderson, 770 S.W.2d 92, 96 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989, no writ); Sohocki, 730 S.W.2d at 32 .