clear and obvious error in Georgia

2024See, e.g., Doyle v. State, 307 Ga. 609, 612- 613 (2) (a) (837 SE2d 833) (2020) (alleged accomplice drove defend- ant and his co-defendant to a business after listening to them dis- cuss hurting someone and getting payback, saw the defendant hold- ing a gun while in the car and the co-defendant “rack[ing]” a gun, drove them from the scene after hearing gunshots and stopping to 17 let the defendant back in the car, did not report the crime to the police, and initially denied he knew anything about the shooting). (b) Applying the proper standard here, the trial court did not make a clear and obvi

2024See, e.g., Doyle v. State, 307 Ga. 609, 612- 613 (2) (a) (837 SE2d 833) (2020) (alleged accomplice drove defend- ant and his co-defendant to a business after listening to them dis- cuss hurting someone and getting payback, saw the defendant hold- ing a gun while in the car and the co-defendant “rack[ing]” a gun, drove them from the scene after hearing gunshots and stopping to 17 let the defendant back in the car, did not report the crime to the police, and initially denied he knew anything about the shooting). (b) Applying the proper standard here, the trial court did not make a clear and obvi

2026See Mohamed v. State, 276 Ga. 706, 708 (2003) (holding that a statute charged to the jury constituted “an impermissible shifting of the burden of proof” where the statute stated that “such possession shall be prima-facie evidence” that a criminal violation had occurred); Fleming v. State, 138 Ga. App. 97, 97 (1976) (holding that it was error to charge that the State only needs to make out a “prima facie case” and that the defendant has the burden to introduce evidence to overcome the State’s prima facie case); Bush v. State, 129 Ga. App. 160, 160 (1973) (same).

2026See Mohamed v. State, 276 Ga. 706, 708 (2003) (holding that a statute charged to the jury constituted “an impermissible shifting of the burden of proof” where the statute stated that “such possession shall be prima-facie evidence” that a criminal violation had occurred); Fleming v. State, 138 Ga. App. 97, 97 (1976) (holding that it was error to charge that the State only needs to make out a “prima facie case” and that the defendant has the burden to introduce evidence to overcome the State’s prima facie case); Bush v. State, 129 Ga. App. 160, 160 (1973) (same).

2026See Mohamed v. State, 276 Ga. 706, 708 (2003) (holding that a statute charged to the jury constituted “an impermissible shifting of the burden of proof” where the statute stated that “such possession shall be prima-facie evidence” that a criminal violation had occurred); Fleming v. State, 138 Ga. App. 97, 97 (1976) (holding that it was error to charge that the State only needs to make out a “prima facie case” and that the defendant has the burden to introduce evidence to overcome the State’s prima facie case); Bush v. State, 129 Ga. App. 160, 160 (1973) (same).

2026See Mohamed v. State, 276 Ga. 706, 708 (2003) (holding that a statute charged to the jury constituted “an impermissible shifting of the burden of proof” where the statute stated that “such possession shall be prima-facie evidence” that a criminal violation had occurred); Fleming v. State, 138 Ga. App. 97, 97 (1976) (holding that it was error to charge that the State only needs to make out a “prima facie case” and that the defendant has the burden to introduce evidence to overcome the State’s prima facie case); Bush v. State, 129 Ga. App. 160, 160 (1973) (same).

2026See Mohamed v. State, 276 Ga. 706, 708 (2003) (holding that a statute charged to the jury constituted “an impermissible shifting of the burden of proof” where the statute stated that “such possession shall be prima-facie evidence” that a criminal violation had occurred); Fleming v. State, 138 Ga. App. 97, 97 (1976) (holding that it was error to charge that the State only needs to make out a “prima facie case” and that the defendant has the burden to introduce evidence to overcome the State’s prima facie case); Bush v. State, 129 Ga. App. 160, 160 (1973) (same).

2026See Mohamed v. State, 276 Ga. 706, 708 (2003) (holding that a statute charged to the jury constituted “an impermissible shifting of the burden of proof” where the statute stated that “such possession shall be prima-facie evidence” that a criminal violation had occurred); Fleming v. State, 138 Ga. App. 97, 97 (1976) (holding that it was error to charge that the State only needs to make out a “prima facie case” and that the defendant has the burden to introduce evidence to overcome the State’s prima facie case); Bush v. State, 129 Ga. App. 160, 160 (1973) (same).

2026See Henderson, 317 Ga. at 78 .

2026See Henderson, 317 Ga. at 78 .

2025See also Sauder, 318 Ga. at 804 (“[W]hen evaluated in the context of the jury charge as a whole, the trial court’s failure to expressly instruct” using this language “was not a clear and obvious error beyond reasonable dispute.”).

2025See also Sauder, 318 Ga. at 804 (5) (b) (“[W]hen evaluated in the context of the jury charge as a whole, the trial court’s failure to expressly instruct” using this language “was not a clear and obvious error beyond reasonable dispute.”).

2023Pindling, 311 Ga. at 236 (2).

2023Pindling, 311 Ga. at 236 (2).

2022See Stanbury, 299 Ga. at 130 (2); see also Doyle v. State, 307 Ga. 609, 613 (2) (b) (837 SE2d 833) (2020) (“On multiple previous occasions, we have held that giving the single-witness instruction, while failing to give the accomplice-corroboration instruction, in a case where the defendant was directly linked to the crime through the testimony of an accomplice, deviates from the plain language of OCGA § 24-14-8 and constitutes a clear and obvious error.”); State v. Johnson, 305 Ga. 237, 238 (824 SE2d 317) (2019) (rejecting the State’s argument that “an [accomplice-corroboration] instruction .

2022See Stanbury, 299 Ga. at 130 (2); see also Doyle v. State, 307 Ga. 609, 613 (2) (b) (837 SE2d 833) (2020) (“On multiple previous occasions, we have held that giving the single-witness instruction, while failing to give the accomplice-corroboration instruction, in a case where the defendant was directly linked to the crime through the testimony of an accomplice, deviates from the plain language of OCGA § 24-14-8 and constitutes a clear and obvious error.”); State v. Johnson, 305 Ga. 237, 238 (824 SE2d 317) (2019) (rejecting the State’s argument that “an [accomplice-corroboration] instruction .

2022See Stanbury, 299 Ga. at 130 (2); see also Doyle v. State, 307 Ga. 609, 613 (2) (b) (837 SE2d 833) (2020) (“On multiple previous occasions, we have held that giving the single-witness instruction, while failing to give the accomplice-corroboration instruction, in a case where the defendant was directly linked to the crime through the testimony of an accomplice, deviates from the plain language of OCGA § 24-14-8 and constitutes a clear and obvious error.”); State v. Johnson, 305 Ga. 237, 238 (824 SE2d 317) (2019) (rejecting the State’s argument that “an [accomplice-corroboration] instruction .

2022See Stanbury, 299 Ga. at 130 (2); see also Doyle v. State, 307 Ga. 609, 613 (2) (b) (837 SE2d 833) (2020) (“On multiple previous occasions, we have held that giving the single-witness instruction, while failing to give the accomplice-corroboration instruction, in a case where the defendant was directly linked to the crime through the testimony of an accomplice, deviates from the plain language of OCGA § 24-14-8 and constitutes a clear and obvious error.”); State v. Johnson, 305 Ga. 237, 238 (824 SE2d 317) (2019) (rejecting the State’s argument that “an [accomplice-corroboration] instruction .

2025But neither decision held that giving this in- struction was error, see id., and this Court has held that giving it was not a clear and obvious error, see Ash v. State, 312 Ga. 771, 792- 795 (5) (a) (865 SE2d 150) (2021).

2025But neither decision held that giving this in- struction was error, see id., and this Court has held that giving it was not a clear and obvious error, see Ash v. State, 312 Ga. 771, 792- 795 (5) (a) (865 SE2d 150) (2021).

2022Palencia argues that under this Court’s decision in Stanbury v. State, 299 Ga. 125 (786 SE2d 672) (2016), the Court of Appeals erred in its determination that the trial court’s failure to give an accomplice-corroboration charge was not a clear and obvious error in light of the evidence presented in this case.

2022Palencia argues that under this Court’s decision in Stanbury v. State, 299 Ga. 125 (786 SE2d 672) (2016), the Court of Appeals erred in its determination that the trial court’s failure to give an accomplice-corroboration charge was not a clear and obvious error in light of the evidence presented in this case.

2025We have explained that a con- fession, for the purposes of the corroboration requirement of OCGA § 24-8-823, is an admission of guilt in which “the entire criminal act is confessed.” English v. State, 300 Ga. 471, 474 (2017) (citation omitted).

2025See Belton, 270 Ga. at 673–74.

2025See, e.g., Baker v. State, 319 Ga. 456, 462 (2024) (jury charge instructing the jury to consider a witness’s “interest or lack of interest in the case” substantially covered the omitted charge on witness bias such that there was no plain error in failing to give the additional charge); see also Thomas v. State, 297 Ga. 750 , 754–55 (2015) (“Failure to give a requested jury charge in the precise language requested does not warrant reversal where the charge given substantially covers the applicable principles of law.” (quotation marks omitted)). 7.

2025Indeed, we have held that it is a clear and obvious error to omit the sort of language at issue here. 9 See State v. Alvarez, 299 Ga. 213, 215 (1) ( 790 SE2d 66 ) (2016).

2025Indeed, we have held that it is a clear and obvious error to omit the sort of language at issue here. 9 See State v. Alvarez, 299 Ga. 213, 215 (1) ( 790 SE2d 66 ) (2016).

2025See Muse v. State, 316 Ga. 639, 661 (2023) (holding that the appellants did not establish, under the plain-error test, that the trial court clearly and obviously erred by failing to exclude certain evidence on the ground that the State committed a discovery violation, because the appellants did not offer any evidence showing that the State acted in bad faith, such that they had not shown that the trial court would have excluded the evidence under OCGA § 17- 16-6); Grier v. State, 313 Ga. 236, 242 (2022) (concluding under plain-error review that the appellant had not shown that the trial court

2025See Baker v. State, 320 Ga. 156, 162 (2024) (“If no one asked for an instruction on accomplice corroboration at trial and there was no evidence presented at trial that obviously called for giving that instruction, then a trial court does not commit a clear and obvious error by omitting it.” (cleaned up)). 3.

2025See Baker v. State, 320 Ga. 156, 162 (2024) (“If no one asked for an instruction on accomplice corroboration at trial and there was no evidence presented at trial that obviously called for giving that instruction, then a trial court does not commit a clear and obvious error by omitting it.” (cleaned up)). 3.

2025Cf. Render v. State, 320 Ga. 890, 901 (4) ( 912 SE2d 679 ) (2025) (assuming without deciding on plain-error review that certain accomplice testimony was a clear and obvious error under the best-evidence rule, and concluding that the appellant did not show prejudice because the challenged testimony was relevant only to show that he had been with an accomplice inside the vehicle used in the crime on the day after the shooting and the testimony was cumulative of the accomplice’s separate testimony from personal experience.). 3.

2025Cf. Render v. State, 320 Ga. 890, 901 (4) ( 912 SE2d 679 ) (2025) (assuming without deciding on plain-error review that certain accomplice testimony was a clear and obvious error under the best-evidence rule, and concluding that the appellant did not show prejudice because the challenged testimony was relevant only to show that he had been with an accomplice inside the vehicle used in the crime on the day after the shooting and the testimony was cumulative of the accomplice’s separate testimony from personal experience.). 3.

2025To show clear and obvious error, the defendant must identify “on-point controlling authority” or “the unequivocally clear words of a statute or rule that plainly establish that the trial court erred.” Hill v. State, 321 Ga. 177, 182 ( 913 SE2d 547 ) (2025) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2025See Huff, 315 Ga. at 565 (2).

2025See Huff, 315 Ga. at 565 (2).

2025See, e.g., Baker v. State, 319 Ga. 456, 462 (2024) (jury charge instructing the jury to consider a witness’s “interest or lack of interest in the case” substantially covered the omitted charge on witness bias such that there was no plain error in failing to give the additional charge); see also Thomas v. State, 297 Ga. 750 , 754–55 (2015) (“Failure to give a requested jury charge in the precise language requested does not warrant reversal where the charge given substantially covers the applicable principles of law.” (quotation marks omitted)). 7.

2025See Muse v. State, 316 Ga. 639, 661 (2023) (holding that the appellants did not establish, under the plain-error test, that the trial court clearly and obviously erred by failing to exclude certain evidence on the ground that the State committed a discovery violation, because the appellants did not offer any evidence showing that the State acted in bad faith, such that they had not shown that the trial court would have excluded the evidence under OCGA § 17- 16-6); Grier v. State, 313 Ga. 236, 242 (2022) (concluding under plain-error review that the appellant had not shown that the trial court

2024See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9 (“[T]he [Confrontation] Clause . . . does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.”).

2024See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9 (“The [Confrontation] Clause . . . does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.”).

2024See generally United States v. Frady, 456 U. S. 152, 163 (III) (A) ( 102 SCt 1584 , 71 LE2d 816) (1982) (plain error includes that which is “so ‘plain’ the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it, even absent the defendant’s timely assistance in detecting it”).

2024See generally United States v. Frady, 456 U. S. 152, 163 (III) (A) ( 102 SCt 1584 , 71 LE2d 816) (1982) (plain error includes that which is “so ‘plain’ the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it, even absent the defendant’s timely assistance in detecting it”).

2024Significantly, this Court is not required to “analyze all elements of the plain-error test [when] an appellant fails to establish one of them.”32 And here, the parties agree the first two prongs of the plain-error test are satisfied—there was a clear and obvious error—some sort of deviation from a legal rule—that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned (i.e., affirmatively waived) by MacMillan.33 But importantly, MacMillan cannot satisfy the third prong of the plain-error test, which is fatal to his claim. 32 Palencia v. State, 366 Ga. App. 316 , 319 ( 881 SE2d 461 ) (2022) (punct

2024Significantly, this Court is not required to “analyze all elements of the plain-error test [when] an appellant fails to establish one of them.”32 And here, the parties agree the first two prongs of the plain-error test are satisfied—there was a clear and obvious error—some sort of deviation from a legal rule—that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned (i.e., affirmatively waived) by MacMillan.33 But importantly, MacMillan cannot satisfy the third prong of the plain-error test, which is fatal to his claim. 32 Palencia v. State, 366 Ga. App. 316 , 319 ( 881 SE2d 461 ) (2022) (punct

2024See also Clark, 315 Ga. at 440-441 (concluding that the trial court’s omission of an instruction on grave suspicion was not a clear and obvious error under plain-error review, because the court instructed on the presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, criminal intent, and parties to a crime, which fully informed the jury that it was not authorized to find the appellant guilty as a party to the crimes unless he shared his co-defendant’s criminal intent to shoot the victim). 5.

2024See also Clark, 315 Ga. at 440-441 (concluding that the trial court’s omission of an instruction on grave suspicion was not a clear and obvious error under plain-error review, because the court instructed on the presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, criminal intent, and parties to a crime, which fully informed the jury that it was not authorized to find the appellant guilty as a party to the crimes unless he shared his co-defendant’s criminal intent to shoot the victim). 5.