RHC analysis in District of Columbia

2017Mgmt., 877 A.2d at 102-03 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Wahl v. Watkis, 491 A.2d 477, 480 (D.C. 1985) (“The retaliation statute is applicable only where a landlord takes an action not otherwise permitted by law.”). y.

2017Mgmt., 877 A.2d at 102-03 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Wahl v. Watkis, 491 A.2d 477, 480 (D.C. 1985) (“The retaliation statute is applicable only where a landlord takes an action not otherwise permitted by law.”). y.

2014See D.C.Code § 2 — 510(b) (“The Court may invoke the rule of prejudicial error.”); see also LCP, Inc. v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 499 A.2d 897, 903 (D.C.1985) (“[Reversal and remand is required only if substantial doubt exists whether the agency would have made the same ultimate finding with the error removed.” (quoting Arthur v. District of Columbia Nurses’ Examining Bd., 459 A.2d 141, 146 (D.C.1983))).

2014See D.C.Code § 2 — 510(b) (“The Court may invoke the rule of prejudicial error.”); see also LCP, Inc. v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 499 A.2d 897, 903 (D.C.1985) (“[Reversal and remand is required only if substantial doubt exists whether the agency would have made the same ultimate finding with the error removed.” (quoting Arthur v. District of Columbia Nurses’ Examining Bd., 459 A.2d 141, 146 (D.C.1983))).

2004ANALYSIS Mr. Mullin argues that the RHC had no power to dismiss his appeal, and concludes that the RHC’s analysis of its authority to do so “rests on a presumptive foundation of discretionary power” and suggests, in the words of former Supreme Court Justice Douglas, that “ ‘discretion’ [has been used] to mask irresponsible [agency] action .... ” The District of Columbia has maintained, in summary, that “where the tenant refused to comply with [a RHC] order, the [RHC] had authority to dismiss [peti *1141 tioners] appeal.” The court-appointed amicus curiae, Eric Yon Salzen, Esq., concluded that

2004ANALYSIS Mr. Mullin argues that the RHC had no power to dismiss his appeal, and concludes that the RHC’s analysis of its authority to do so “rests on a presumptive foundation of discretionary power” and suggests, in the words of former Supreme Court Justice Douglas, that “ ‘discretion’ [has been used] to mask irresponsible [agency] action .... ” The District of Columbia has maintained, in summary, that “where the tenant refused to comply with [a RHC] order, the [RHC] had authority to dismiss [peti *1141 tioners] appeal.” The court-appointed amicus curiae, Eric Yon Salzen, Esq., concluded that

1998Clark v. Hoes, 677 A.2d 50, 51 (D.C.1996), when there is pending before the [Rent] Administrator or the RHC a challenge to a rent increase that bears upon the amount of rent owed by a tenant defending a pos-sessory action brought for nonpayment of rent, the L & T Judge should stay the action to await the ruling of the Administrator or, if an appeal is taken to the RHC, then of that body.