5 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2009 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hidalgo v. Stategreen1 sentence2009See Hidalgo v. State, 729 So.2d 984 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (when seeking credit for time served after sentencing the defendant must exhaust administrative remedies with the Department of Corrections before requesting judicial relief). | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Stategreen1 sentence2000See Young v. State, 661 So.2d 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (holding failure to explore the defense of voluntary intoxication is a facially sufficient claim where there is evidence of intoxication and the crime charged is a specific intent crime). | 1 | 1 |
Spaziano v. Stategreen1 sentence1996See Spaziano v. State, 433 So.2d 508, 511 (Fla.1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 447 , 104 S.Ct. 3154 , 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984). [10] In Craig I, we extensively considered and rejected Craig's claim that the Tedder standard had not been met. | 1 | 1 |
Spaziano v. Floridared2 sentences1996See Spaziano v. State, 433 So.2d 508, 511 (Fla.1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 447 , 104 S.Ct. 3154 , 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984). [10] In Craig I, we extensively considered and rejected Craig's claim that the Tedder standard had not been met. 1996See Spaziano v. State, 433 So.2d 508, 511 (Fla.1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 447 , 104 S.Ct. 3154 , 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984). [10] In Craig I, we extensively considered and rejected Craig's claim that the Tedder standard had not been met. | 1 | 1 |
Myles v. Stategreen2 sentences1993See Myles v. State, 602 So.2d 1278 (Fla. 1992). 1993See Myles v. State, 602 So.2d 1278 (Fla. 1992). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Routly v. State
green
1 sentence1996GIGLIO CLAIM First, we address Craig's claim that a new penalty proceeding is necessary because the prosecutor misled the jury concerning the disparate sentence received by his codefendant, Robert Schmidt. [3] Craig contends that the prosecutor in this case withheld material evidence relating to Schmidt's prison status, failed to correct material false evidence presented on this issue, and used Schmidt's misleading testimony as to his status during closing argument to obtain a death sentence for Craig in violation of United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985 | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences1996Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), does not impose upon the prosecution a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence that is equally available to the prosecution and defense. 1996Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), does not impose upon the prosecution a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence that is equally available to the prosecution and defense. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Giglio v. United States
green
2 sentences1996GIGLIO CLAIM First, we address Craig's claim that a new penalty proceeding is necessary because the prosecutor misled the jury concerning the disparate sentence received by his codefendant, Robert Schmidt. [3] Craig contends that the prosecutor in this case withheld material evidence relating to Schmidt's prison status, failed to correct material false evidence presented on this issue, and used Schmidt's misleading testimony as to his status during closing argument to obtain a death sentence for Craig in violation of United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985 1996GIGLIO CLAIM First, we address Craig's claim that a new penalty proceeding is necessary because the prosecutor misled the jury concerning the disparate sentence received by his codefendant, Robert Schmidt. [3] Craig contends that the prosecutor in this case withheld material evidence relating to Schmidt's prison status, failed to correct material false evidence presented on this issue, and used Schmidt's misleading testimony as to his status during closing argument to obtain a death sentence for Craig in violation of United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985 | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Craig v. State
green
1 sentence1996Craig I, 510 So.2d at 870 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
United States v. Bagley
green
2 sentences1996GIGLIO CLAIM First, we address Craig's claim that a new penalty proceeding is necessary because the prosecutor misled the jury concerning the disparate sentence received by his codefendant, Robert Schmidt. [3] Craig contends that the prosecutor in this case withheld material evidence relating to Schmidt's prison status, failed to correct material false evidence presented on this issue, and used Schmidt's misleading testimony as to his status during closing argument to obtain a death sentence for Craig in violation of United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985 1996GIGLIO CLAIM First, we address Craig's claim that a new penalty proceeding is necessary because the prosecutor misled the jury concerning the disparate sentence received by his codefendant, Robert Schmidt. [3] Craig contends that the prosecutor in this case withheld material evidence relating to Schmidt's prison status, failed to correct material false evidence presented on this issue, and used Schmidt's misleading testimony as to his status during closing argument to obtain a death sentence for Craig in violation of United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985 | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Spencer v. State
green
1 sentence1991We resolved this issue concerning the Palm Beach County jury districts in our decision in Spencer v. State, 545 So.2d 1352 (Fla. 1989). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.