crux of a Bruton violation in Florida

2009Looney v. State, 803 So.2d 656, 671 (Fla.2001) (citation omitted). [8] Our conclusion that the evidence at issue was not similar fact evidence subject to section 90.404(2) renders moot Victorino's arguments that the State failed to comply with the ten-day notice requirement pursuant to section 90.404(2)(c)(1) and that the trial court erroneously introduced this evidence pursuant to section 90.404(2)(a). [9] In State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 9 (Fla.1973), we explained the HAC aggravator as follows: It is our interpretation that heinous means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; that atrocious mea

2009Looney v. State, 803 So.2d 656, 671 (Fla.2001) (citation omitted). .

1999Nelson v. State, 490 So.2d 32, 34 (Fla.1986) (quoting Hall v. State, 381 So.2d 683, 687 (Fla.1978)) (emphasis supplied). [10] We reject Ramirez's contention in his third point on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that the murder was cold, calculated and premeditated (CCP), and that the aggravating circumstances of commission to avoid arrest and CCP had to be merged.

1986It is immaterial whether denial of this opportunity occurs because the statements are introduced through the testimony of a third party or because the speaker takes the stand and refuses to answer questions concerning the statements. 381 So.2d at 687 .

2009Looney v. State, 803 So.2d 656, 671 (Fla.2001) (citation omitted). [8] Our conclusion that the evidence at issue was not similar fact evidence subject to section 90.404(2) renders moot Victorino's arguments that the State failed to comply with the ten-day notice requirement pursuant to section 90.404(2)(c)(1) and that the trial court erroneously introduced this evidence pursuant to section 90.404(2)(a). [9] In State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 9 (Fla.1973), we explained the HAC aggravator as follows: It is our interpretation that heinous means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; that atrocious mea

2008(Emphasis added); see also Ramirez v. State, 739 So.2d 568, 579 (Fla.1999)(explaining that it is error to admit the details of a non-testifying co-defendant's confession and that a codefendant's statements "are especially suspect because he has a strong motive to implicate another").

1999The videotape reveals that it was only after Ramirez confessed to the crime that the detectives begin to question Ramirez in earnest about the whereabouts of his parents, who both worked for a nursing agency. [9] Although in Franqui v. State, 699 So.2d 1312, 1318 (Fla.1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1337 , 140 L.Ed.2d 499 (1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1582 , 140 L.Ed.2d 796 (1998), the codefendants were tried jointly, [t]he fact that the defendants here were tried separately rather than jointly does not vitiate the constitutional infirmity [of admitting the stateme

1999Nelson v. State, 490 So.2d 32, 34 (Fla.1986) (quoting Hall v. State, 381 So.2d 683, 687 (Fla.1978)) (emphasis supplied). [10] We reject Ramirez's contention in his third point on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that the murder was cold, calculated and premeditated (CCP), and that the aggravating circumstances of commission to avoid arrest and CCP had to be merged.