plain smell doctrine in Florida

2025See United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738, 747 (10th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the plain smell doctrine "is simply a logical extension" of the longstanding plain view doctrine (collecting cases)).

2023See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993) (“If, however, the police lack probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the object—i.e., if ‘its incriminating character [is not] immediately apparent,’—the plain-view doctrine cannot justify its seizure.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738, 747 (10th Cir. 2006) (‘“The plain smell doctrine,’ in turn, ‘is simply a logical extension of the plain view’ doctrine.’”). 4 https://ccmedia.fdacs.gov/content/download/94417/file/hem p

2025See, e.g., Owens v. State, 317 So. 3d 1218 , 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (concluding that law enforcement had probable cause to search a vehicle "based solely on the odor of marijuana"); Ford v. State, 400 So. 3d 838 , 844 (Fla. 5th DCA 2025) (concluding that because "whether the substance [the police dog] smelled was legal or illegal was not readily apparent," law enforcement lacked "probable cause to justify the warrantless search of" 18 a vehicle); State v. J.J., 143 So. 3d 1050, 1052 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) ("A police officer 'who is trained to recognize the odor of marijuana and who is familiar w

2023See, e.g., State v. Williams, 967 So. 2d 941, 941 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).

2026See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 347 (2009) (holding that established exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement “ensure that officers may search a vehicle when genuine safety or evidentiary concerns encountered during the arrest of a vehicle’s recent occupant justify a search”); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327, 337 (1990) (“A ‘protective sweep’ is a quick and limited search 2 We acknowledge that there is currently a debate among district court judges regarding the vitality of the plain smell doctrine as applied to the smell of marijuana.

2026See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 347 (2009) (holding that established exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement “ensure that officers may search a vehicle when genuine safety or evidentiary concerns encountered during the arrest of a vehicle’s recent occupant justify a search”); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327, 337 (1990) (“A ‘protective sweep’ is a quick and limited search 2 We acknowledge that there is currently a debate among district court judges regarding the vitality of the plain smell doctrine as applied to the smell of marijuana.

2025Adhering to our precedent "is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process." Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 798 (2014) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)).

2025"Stare decisis is the Latin phrase for a foundation stone of the rule of law: that things decided should stay decided unless there is a very good reason for change." Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 363 (2022).

2025See, e.g., Owens v. State, 317 So. 3d 1218 , 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (concluding that law enforcement had probable cause to search a vehicle "based solely on the odor of marijuana"); Ford v. State, 400 So. 3d 838 , 844 (Fla. 5th DCA 2025) (concluding that because "whether the substance [the police dog] smelled was legal or illegal was not readily apparent," law enforcement lacked "probable cause to justify the warrantless search of" 18 a vehicle); State v. J.J., 143 So. 3d 1050, 1052 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) ("A police officer 'who is trained to recognize the odor of marijuana and who is familiar w

2025Adhering to our precedent "is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process." Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 798 (2014) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)).

2025See, e.g., Owens v. State, 317 So. 3d 1218 , 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (concluding that law enforcement had probable cause to search a vehicle "based solely on the odor of marijuana"); Ford v. State, 400 So. 3d 838 , 844 (Fla. 5th DCA 2025) (concluding that because "whether the substance [the police dog] smelled was legal or illegal was not readily apparent," law enforcement lacked "probable cause to justify the warrantless search of" 18 a vehicle); State v. J.J., 143 So. 3d 1050, 1052 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) ("A police officer 'who is trained to recognize the odor of marijuana and who is familiar w

2025That conception of the plain smell doctrine presumes that the odor itself does not justify a warrantless seizure of evidence, as is the case when the plain view doctrine is applicable, but rather that the odor itself may justify a further search for, and seizure of, the object emitting the odor.3 See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 , 738–39 (1983) (" 'Plain view' is perhaps better understood, therefore, not as an independent 'exception' to the warrant clause, but simply as an extension of whatever the prior justification for an officer's 'access to an object' may be.").

2023See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993) (“If, however, the police lack probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the object—i.e., if ‘its incriminating character [is not] immediately apparent,’—the plain-view doctrine cannot justify its seizure.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738, 747 (10th Cir. 2006) (‘“The plain smell doctrine,’ in turn, ‘is simply a logical extension of the plain view’ doctrine.’”). 4 https://ccmedia.fdacs.gov/content/download/94417/file/hem p

2016See Ferrer v. State, 113 So.3d 860, 863 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).

2016See Ferrer, 113 So.3d at 863 .

2012Cf. State v. Pereira, 967 So.2d 312, 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (holding that officers did not violate the defendant’s right to privacy by detecting the odor of marijuana from the front porch where the porch was not enclosed by a fence and was open to public access).