negligent supervision claim in New York

2026The negligent supervision claim, however, is unpersuasive given the absence of any showing of notice or specific duty, and that portion of the complaint must be dismissed (Mirand, 84 NY2d at 49 ; Brandy B., 15 NY3d at 302-03 ).

2023Rather, the concept of in loco parentis forms the basis of the duty owed by a school district to students within its charge in the context of a negligent supervision claim ( see Mirand v City of New York , 84 NY2d 44, 49 ; see also Boyle v Brewster Cent.

2024Dist. , 127 AD3d 826, 828 [2d Dept 2015]).

2024Dist. , 127 AD3d 826, 828 [2d Dept 2015]).

2021John's Univ., 69 AD3d 702, 703 [2d Dept 2010]).

2021John's Univ., 69 AD3d 702, 703 [2d Dept 2010]).

2010The Holodook Court also noted “the potential for abuse of a negligent supervision claim when brought in a retaliatory context between estranged parents, one suing the other on the child’s behalf, or by children estranged from their parents who could sue after reaching majority” ( 36 NY2d at 49 ).

2003(See State v Flontek, 82 Ohio St 3d 10, 13, 693 NE2d 767, 770 [1998] [“the duty . . . imposed by the statute is a purely financial one”].) In the somewhat analogous arena of parental liability to a child, the Court of Appeals has held that “a child does not have a legally cognizable claim for damages against his parent for negligent supervision.” (See Holodook v Spencer, 36 NY2d 35, 40 [1974].) In addition to the “prevention of family discord and the correlative concern to preserve the family’s resources for the aid of all its members” (id. at 46), the Court noted other policy considerations t

2007The failure to establish this necessary element of a negligent supervision claim negates the employer’s liability as a matter of law (see Kenneth R. v Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 229 AD2d 159, 161 [1997], cert denied 522 US 967 [1997], lv dismissed 91 NY2d 848 [1997]).

2001This being so, it is settled law that a necessary element of a negligent supervision claim requires a showing that the defendant knew of the employee’s propensity to. commit the tortious act or should have known of such propensity had the defendant conducted an adequate hiring procedure (Ray v County of Delaware, 239 AD2d 755, 757 ; see also, Judith M. v Sisters of Charity Hosp., 93 NY2d 932 , supra; Sato v Correa, 272 AD2d 389 ; Honohan v Martin’s Food, 255 AD2d 627 ; Seegers v Shibley Summer Day Camp, 255 AD2d 499 ; Kenneth R. v Roman Catholic Diocese, 229 AD2d 159 , lv dismissed 91 NY2d 848

2025Defendant's submissions revealed triable issues of fact regarding whether a reasonably prudent parent in the gym teacher's position would have allowed the child to make the determination as to whether it was safe for her to participate in the game and whether her footwear was a proximate cause of the child's fall ( see Genova v Town of Clarkston , 195 AD3d 598 , 600 [2d Dept 2021]; Zalewski v East Rochester Bd. of Educ. , 193 AD3d 1426, 1429 [4th Dept 2021]; see generally Powers v Greenville Cent.

2025He observed the accident, stating that the child "just dropped" while she was running, and that it did not look like she slipped but that her "ankle gave out." In these circumstances, defendant did not satisfy its prima facie burden to submit evidentiary proof in admissible form "demonstrating the absence of any material issues of fact" on the negligent supervision claim ( Reed v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. , 183 AD3d 1207, 1209 [3d Dept 2020] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

2023Here, we conclude that defendant met its initial burden on the motion with respect to the negligent supervision claim by establishing that the incident that caused plaintiff's injuries did not occur inside the bar ( see Place v Cooper , 35 AD3d 1260, 1261 [4th Dept 2006]; Lombart v Chambery , 19 AD3d 1110, 1110-1111 [4th Dept 2005]; Wright , 91 AD2d at 701 ).

2023Here, we conclude that defendant met its initial burden on the motion with respect to the negligent supervision claim by establishing that the incident that caused plaintiff's injuries did not occur inside the bar ( see Place v Cooper , 35 AD3d 1260, 1261 [4th Dept 2006]; Lombart v Chambery , 19 AD3d 1110, 1110-1111 [4th Dept 2005]; Wright , 91 AD2d at 701 ).

2023Thus, to the extent defendants argue that a special relationship or privity between plaintiff and employer is a necessary element of a negligent supervision claim, we expressly reject any such requirement (see NY PJI 2:240, Comment [advising that an employer “is liable for any harm to other persons resulting from its employee’s” act, and that liability is “not necessarily predicated on any special relationship between the employer and plaintiff”] [citing Haddock v New York, 75 NY2d 478 [1990]]).4 4 In support of their argument that a special relationship should be required when a plaintiff see

2023Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition ( see generally Zuckerman v City of New York , 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).

2022Co. v Young , 17 AD3d 1134, 1136 [4th Dept 2005] [negligent supervision claim arose out of the alleged assault and battery, and thus fell within the policy exclusion]).

2021Auth., 78 AD3d 485, 490 [1st Dept 2010]; see Moore v City of New York , 85 AD3d 623, 624 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 713 [2011] ; Keizer v SCO Family of Servs., 120 AD3d 475, 476-477 [2d Dept 2014]).

2021Rather, it was the former employee's sexual abuse of the child that caused the injury and "constituted a superseding cause that so attenuated [Heckeroth's] alleged negligence from the ultimate injury that the imposition of liability would be unreasonable under the circumstances" ( Timoshenko v Airport Auto Group, Inc. , 95 AD3d 1299, 1301 [2012]; see Ingrassia v Lividikos , 54 AD3d 721, 724 [2008]).

2021Auth., 78 AD3d 485, 490 [1st Dept 2010]; see Moore v City of New York , 85 AD3d 623, 624 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 713 [2011] ; Keizer v SCO Family of Servs., 120 AD3d 475, 476-477 [2d Dept 2014]).

2021Auth., 78 AD3d 485, 490 [1st Dept 2010]; see Moore v City of New York , 85 AD3d 623, 624 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 713 [2011] ; Keizer v SCO Family of Servs., 120 AD3d 475, 476-477 [2d Dept 2014]).

2021Rather, it was the former employee's sexual abuse of the child that caused the injury and "constituted a superseding cause that so attenuated [Heckeroth's] alleged negligence from the ultimate injury that the imposition of liability would be unreasonable under the circumstances" ( Timoshenko v Airport Auto Group, Inc. , 95 AD3d 1299, 1301 [2012]; see Ingrassia v Lividikos , 54 AD3d 721, 724 [2008]).

2021Turning now to Heckeroth's motion for summary judgment as to the negligent supervision claim,"[t]o establish a cause of action based on . . . negligent supervision, it must be shown that the employer knew or should have known of the employee's propensity for the conduct which caused the injury" ( Taylor v Point at Saranac Lake, Inc. , 135 AD3d 1147, 1149 [2016] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). [FN2] Although it could be argued that Heckeroth should have known, from the mileage reports, that the former employee utilized the work vehicle for more than its intended work purpose,

2021Auth., 78 AD3d 485, 490 [1st Dept 2010]; see Moore v City of New York , 85 AD3d 623, 624 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 713 [2011] ; Keizer v SCO Family of Servs., 120 AD3d 475, 476-477 [2d Dept 2014]).

2020Accordingly, Supreme Court correctly dismissed the negligent supervision claim insofar as asserted against the Phelpses ( see Rivers v Murray , 29 AD3d 884, 884-885 [2006]; DiCarlo v City of New York , 286 AD2d 363, 365 [2001]; Armour v England , 210 AD2d 561, 561-562 [1994]; Brahm v Hatch , 203 AD2d at 641-642 ).

2020Accordingly, Supreme Court correctly dismissed the negligent supervision claim insofar as asserted against the Phelpses ( see Rivers v Murray , 29 AD3d 884, 884-885 [2006]; DiCarlo v City of New York , 286 AD2d 363, 365 [2001]; Armour v England , 210 AD2d 561, 561-562 [1994]; Brahm v Hatch , 203 AD2d at 641-642 ).