Gelish v. Dix Hills Water Dist., 58 A.D.3d 841 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). · Go Syfert
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Gelish v. Dix Hills Water Dist., 58 A.D.3d 841 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
11 citation events (11 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brunson v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · confidence medium
Under the circumstances of this case, in which the defendant received a late notice of claim less than one month after the expiration of the 90-day period, which it accepted and with respect to which it conducted an examination pursuant to *856 General Municipal Law § 50-h, the defendant acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts underlying the claim within a reasonable time after the expiration of the 90-day period (see Matter of Gershanow v Town of Clarkstown, 88 AD3d 879, 880 [2011]; Matter of Ambrico v Lynbrook Union Free School Dist., 71 AD3d 762, 763 [2010]; Matter of Gelish v Dix…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Regan v. City of New York
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · confidence medium
Thus, the DOE and Village Academy acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within a reasonable time after the expiration of the 90-day period (see Matter of Gershanow v Town of Clarkstown, 88 AD3d at 880; Matter of Ambrico v Lynbrook Union Free School Dist., 71 AD3d 762, 763 [2010]; Matter of Gelish v Dix Hills Water Dist., 58 AD3d 841, 842 [2009]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gershanow v. Town of Clarkstown
N.Y. App. Div. · 2011 · confidence medium
Thus, the appellant acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within a reasonable time after the expiration of the 90-day period (see Matter of Ambrico v Lynbrook Union Free School Dist., 71 AD3d 762, 763 [2010]; Matter of Gelish v Dix Hills Water Dist., 58 AD3d 841, 842 [2009] ; Matter of Harrison v New York City Hous.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Silberman v. City of Long Beach
N.Y. App. Div. · 2011 · confidence medium
Under these circumstances, the appellant acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within a reasonable time after the expiration of the 90-day period (see Matter of Ambrico v Lynbrook Union Free School Dist., 71 AD3d 762, 763 [2010]; Matter of Gelish v Dix Hills Water Dist., 58 AD3d 841, 842 [2009]; Matter of Urgiles v New York City School Constr.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ambrico v. Lynbrook Union Free School District
N.Y. App. Div. · 2010 · confidence medium
Here, even if the information provided by the petitioners to the appellant’s personnel regarding the incident and the infant petitioner’s injury within 90 days after the incident was insufficient to provide actual knowledge of the facts constituting the negligent supervision claim, the petitioners served their notice of claim and, thus, provided the appellant with actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting that claim, within a reasonable time after the expiration of the 90-day period (see Erichson v City of Poughkeepsie Police Dept., 66 AD3d 820, 821 [2009]; Matter of Gelish v Di…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Erichson v. City of Poughkeepsie Police Department
N.Y. App. Div. · 2009 · confidence medium
In addition, the original notice of claim, which was served only six days beyond the statutory period, was sufficiently particular to apprise the City of the plaintiffs claim of assault within a reasonable time after the claim accrued (see Matter of Gelish v Dix Hills Water Dist., 58 AD3d 841, 842 [2009]; Bussey v City of New York, 50 AD3d 938, 939 [2008]; Matter of Fritsch v Westchester County Dept. of Transp., 170 AD2d 602 [1991]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of Helen Gelish
v.
Dix Hills Water District
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Jan 27, 2009.
58 A.D.3d 841
Cited by 9 opinions  |  Published

In a proceeding pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) for leave to serve a late notice of claim, the petitioner appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Farneti, J.), dated February 7, 2008, which denied the petition.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, the petition is granted, and the notice of claim is deemed served.

In determining whether to grant an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim, the key factors which the court must consider are whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a rea[*842] sonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Matter of Blair v Pleasantville Union Free School Dist., 52 AD3d 827 [2008]; Matter of Brownstein v Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead, 52 AD3d 507, 508 [2008]; Jordan v City of New York, 41 AD3d 658, 659 [2007]). The presence or absence of any one factor is not necessarily determinative (see Matter of Leeds v Port Washington Union Free School Dist., 55 AD3d 734 [2008]; Jordan v City of New York, 41 AD3d at 659). However, whether the municipality timely acquired actual notice of the essential facts constituting the claim is a factor which is accorded great weight (see Brownstein v Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead, 52 AD3d at 508; Matter of Dell’Italia v Long Is. R.R. Corp., 31 AD3d 758, 759 [2006]).

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim. Even if the letter sent by the petitioner’s counsel to the respondent Dix Hills Water District within 90 days after the accident was insufficient to provide actual notice of the essential facts constituting the claim, the petitioner served her notice of claim less than one month after the expiration of the 90-day period. Thus, the respondents received actual notice of the essential facts constituting the claim within a reasonable time after the expiration of the 90-day period (see Bussey v City of New York, 50 AD3d 938, 939 [2008]; Matter of Urgiles v New York City School Constr. Auth., 283 AD2d 434 [2001]; Matter of Harrison v New York City Hous. Auth., 188 AD2d 367 [1992]). Given the minimal delay in serving the notice of claim and the lack of substantial prejudice to the respondents, the Supreme Court should have granted the petition notwithstanding the lack of reasonable excuse (see Matter of Molloy v City of New York, 30 AD3d 603, 604 [2006]; Matter of Morales v New York City Tr. Auth., 15 AD3d 580 [2005]; Matter of Urgiles v New York City School Constr. Auth., 283 AD2d 434 [2001]; Matter of Irizarry v City of Yonkers, 193 AD2d 746 [1993]). Mastro, J.E, Fisher, Florio, Garni and Eng, JJ., concur. [See 19 Misc 3d 270.]