Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
5 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
JM v. Department of Children and Familiesgreen1 sentence2011See § 39.801(3)(d), Fla. Stat.; J.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 9 So.3d 34, 36 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (finding the trial court should not have entered a consent to the petition when the trial court' failed to expressly warn the mother of her required presence at the previous hearing). | 1 | 1 |
Ellis v. Stategreen1 sentence2000See, e.g., Ellis v. State, 25 Fla. 702 , 6 So. 768 (1889); Irvin v. State, 66 So.2d 288 (Fla.1953); Pacifico v. State, 642 So.2d 1178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Turtle v. State, 600 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); McDonald v. State, 578 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Burgess v. State, 644 So.2d 589 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Preston v. State, 470 So.2d 836 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Monarca v. State, 412 So.2d 443 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) Consent is a statutorily precluded defense under section 800.04, Florida Statutes (1997), in cases of lewd and lascivious assault of a child; consequently, we question application o | 1 | 1 |
Orion Insurance Co. v. Sociasgreen1 sentence1998See 513 So.2d at 234 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Reyes v. State
green
1 sentence2002These are discretionary costs, Reyes v. State, 655 So.2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), that were imposed without specific oral pronouncement or the statutorily required inquiry. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Patterson v. State
green
1 sentence2002As in Patterson v. State, 796 So.2d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), review denied, No. SC01-2256, 817 So.2d 849 (Fla. April 4, 2002), we reverse this portion of the sentence and remand with instructions to strike this cost from *409 the judgment. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
McDonald v. State
green
1 sentence2000See, e.g., Ellis v. State, 25 Fla. 702 , 6 So. 768 (1889); Irvin v. State, 66 So.2d 288 (Fla.1953); Pacifico v. State, 642 So.2d 1178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Turtle v. State, 600 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); McDonald v. State, 578 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Burgess v. State, 644 So.2d 589 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Preston v. State, 470 So.2d 836 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Monarca v. State, 412 So.2d 443 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) Consent is a statutorily precluded defense under section 800.04, Florida Statutes (1997), in cases of lewd and lascivious assault of a child; consequently, we question application o | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Monarca v. State
green
1 sentence2000See, e.g., Ellis v. State, 25 Fla. 702 , 6 So. 768 (1889); Irvin v. State, 66 So.2d 288 (Fla.1953); Pacifico v. State, 642 So.2d 1178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Turtle v. State, 600 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); McDonald v. State, 578 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Burgess v. State, 644 So.2d 589 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Preston v. State, 470 So.2d 836 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Monarca v. State, 412 So.2d 443 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) Consent is a statutorily precluded defense under section 800.04, Florida Statutes (1997), in cases of lewd and lascivious assault of a child; consequently, we question application o | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Turtle v. State
green
1 sentence2000See, e.g., Ellis v. State, 25 Fla. 702 , 6 So. 768 (1889); Irvin v. State, 66 So.2d 288 (Fla.1953); Pacifico v. State, 642 So.2d 1178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Turtle v. State, 600 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); McDonald v. State, 578 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Burgess v. State, 644 So.2d 589 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Preston v. State, 470 So.2d 836 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Monarca v. State, 412 So.2d 443 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) Consent is a statutorily precluded defense under section 800.04, Florida Statutes (1997), in cases of lewd and lascivious assault of a child; consequently, we question application o | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Pacifico v. State
green
1 sentence2000See, e.g., Ellis v. State, 25 Fla. 702 , 6 So. 768 (1889); Irvin v. State, 66 So.2d 288 (Fla.1953); Pacifico v. State, 642 So.2d 1178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Turtle v. State, 600 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); McDonald v. State, 578 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Burgess v. State, 644 So.2d 589 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Preston v. State, 470 So.2d 836 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Monarca v. State, 412 So.2d 443 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) Consent is a statutorily precluded defense under section 800.04, Florida Statutes (1997), in cases of lewd and lascivious assault of a child; consequently, we question application o | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Irvin v. State
green
1 sentence2000See, e.g., Ellis v. State, 25 Fla. 702 , 6 So. 768 (1889); Irvin v. State, 66 So.2d 288 (Fla.1953); Pacifico v. State, 642 So.2d 1178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Turtle v. State, 600 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); McDonald v. State, 578 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Burgess v. State, 644 So.2d 589 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Preston v. State, 470 So.2d 836 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Monarca v. State, 412 So.2d 443 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) Consent is a statutorily precluded defense under section 800.04, Florida Statutes (1997), in cases of lewd and lascivious assault of a child; consequently, we question application o | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Burgess v. State
green
1 sentence2000See, e.g., Ellis v. State, 25 Fla. 702 , 6 So. 768 (1889); Irvin v. State, 66 So.2d 288 (Fla.1953); Pacifico v. State, 642 So.2d 1178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Turtle v. State, 600 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); McDonald v. State, 578 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Burgess v. State, 644 So.2d 589 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Preston v. State, 470 So.2d 836 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Monarca v. State, 412 So.2d 443 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) Consent is a statutorily precluded defense under section 800.04, Florida Statutes (1997), in cases of lewd and lascivious assault of a child; consequently, we question application o | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Preston v. State
green
1 sentence2000See, e.g., Ellis v. State, 25 Fla. 702 , 6 So. 768 (1889); Irvin v. State, 66 So.2d 288 (Fla.1953); Pacifico v. State, 642 So.2d 1178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Turtle v. State, 600 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); McDonald v. State, 578 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Burgess v. State, 644 So.2d 589 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Preston v. State, 470 So.2d 836 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Monarca v. State, 412 So.2d 443 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) Consent is a statutorily precluded defense under section 800.04, Florida Statutes (1997), in cases of lewd and lascivious assault of a child; consequently, we question application o | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Gary McDougald Cross-Appellant v. Vivian L. Jenson, Cross-Appellee, Clarence Ehli, Cross-Appellee
green
1 sentence1987App. Ct. 1986).) Defendants argue that this court is bound by the U.S. Court of Appeals view, expressed in McDougald, supra, that in child snatching cases, an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is tantamount to a statutorily barred claim for alienation of affections. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.