Boykin presumption in Georgia

2014In the meantime, the United States Supreme Court decided Parke v. Raley, 506 U. S. 20 ( 113 SCt 517 , 121 LE2d 391) (1992), making clear in its decision that Boykin did not, in fact, abrogate the presumption of regularity that attaches to final judgments, and nothing about Boykin requires that the State bear the burden of proving the voluntariness of a plea in the context of a collateral attack upon a final judgment: To import Boykin’s presumption of invalidity into this very different context [of a collateral attack on a conviction] would, in our view, improperly ignore another presumption de

2014In the meantime, the United States Supreme Court decided Parke v. Raley, 506 U. S. 20 ( 113 SCt 517 , 121 LE2d 391) (1992), making clear in its decision that Boykin did not, in fact, abrogate the presumption of regularity that attaches to final judgments, and nothing about Boykin requires that the State bear the burden of proving the voluntariness of a plea in the context of a collateral attack upon a final judgment: To import Boykin’s presumption of invalidity into this very different context [of a collateral attack on a conviction] would, in our view, improperly ignore another presumption de

2014Fourth, the usual rule in habeas cases — that the petitioner bears the burden of proof — is more workable than the rule of Purvis and its progeny, inasmuch as, “in establishing a Boykin violation[,] the [petitioner] is the one best situated to know whether his or her rights were infringed in the earlier proceedings.” Nash v. State, 271 Ga. 281, 285 ( 519 SE2d 893 ) (1999) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2014Fourth, the usual rule in habeas cases — that the petitioner bears the burden of proof — is more workable than the rule of Purvis and its progeny, inasmuch as, “in establishing a Boykin violation[,] the [petitioner] is the one best situated to know whether his or her rights were infringed in the earlier proceedings.” Nash v. State, 271 Ga. 281, 285 ( 519 SE2d 893 ) (1999) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2011See Bazemore, 273 Ga. at 161 (noting that the State may carry its burden of showing that the defendant was advised of and waived his Boykin rights not only with the plea hearing record but with extrinsic evidence properly in the record, including evidence from plea counsel).

2008Consequently, the State met its initial burden, Brown v. State, 244 Ga. App. 544, 544-545 ( 536 SE2d 253 ) (2000), and because Thompson did not raise this issue in any manner during his sentencing, the State had no burden to establish a valid waiver sufficient to satisfy Boykin . 4.

2008Consequently, the State met its initial burden, Brown v. State, 244 Ga. App. 544, 544-545 ( 536 SE2d 253 ) (2000), and because Thompson did not raise this issue in any manner during his sentencing, the State had no burden to establish a valid waiver sufficient to satisfy Boykin . 4.

1999In Bowers v. Moore, 266 Ga. 893, 895 (1) ( 471 SE2d 869 ) (1996), we cited this Court’s decision in Roberts v. Greenway, supra, as authority for placing upon the respondent the burden of showing the validity of a guilty plea, but we failed to consider the effect of the opinion in Parke v. Raley, supra. See also Knight v. Sikes, 269 Ga. 814, 816 (2) ( 504 SE2d 686 ) (1998).

1999In Bowers v. Moore, 266 Ga. 893, 895 (1) ( 471 SE2d 869 ) (1996), we cited this Court’s decision in Roberts v. Greenway, supra, as authority for placing upon the respondent the burden of showing the validity of a guilty plea, but we failed to consider the effect of the opinion in Parke v. Raley, supra. See also Knight v. Sikes, 269 Ga. 814, 816 (2) ( 504 SE2d 686 ) (1998).