Boykin standard (Arizona) · Go Syfert
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Boykin standard in Arizona

17 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2009 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (11)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Miranda-Cabreragreen
arizctapp · 2004 · cited in 2 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
2 sentences

2005But see State v. Aleman, 210 Ariz. 232, ¶ 42 , 109 P.3d 571, 584 (App.2005) (Flórez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding Boykin standard must be satisfied before defendant’s admissions of fact may be used for sentencing purposes); Aleman , ¶ 39 (Es-pinosa, J., specially concurring) (rejecting notion that “routine stipulation or admission by a defendant” used to establish element of offense or factual basis for plea would require independent Boykin waiver before it may be used for sentencing purposes); see also State v. Miranda-Cabrera, 209 Ariz. 220, ¶ 29 , 99 P.3d 35, 41-4

2005But see State v. Aleman, 210 Ariz. 232, ¶ 42 , 109 P.3d 571, 584 (App.2005) (Flórez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding Boykin standard must be satisfied before defendant’s admissions of fact may be used for sentencing purposes); Aleman , ¶ 39 (Es-pinosa, J., specially concurring) (rejecting notion that “routine stipulation or admission by a defendant” used to establish element of offense or factual basis for plea would require independent Boykin waiver before it may be used for sentencing purposes); see also State v. Miranda-Cabrera, 209 Ariz. 220, ¶ 29 , 99 P.3d 35, 41-4

22
State v. Virgogreen
arizctapp · 1997 · cited in 2 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
2 sentences

2005In State v. Virgo, 190 Ariz. 349, 353-54 , 947 P.2d 923, 927-28 (App.1997), however, Division One of this court vacated the defendant’s sentence for possession of over four pounds of marijuana because, even though the parties had stipulated that the marijuana seized from his car had weighed thirty-five pounds and the court had accepted that stipulation, the jury had not been asked to and had not specifically found the weight of the drugs.

2005In State v. Virgo, 190 Ariz. 349, 353-54 , 947 P.2d 923, 927-28 (App.1997), however, Division One of this court vacated the defendant’s sentence for possession of over four pounds of marijuana because, even though the parties had stipulated that the marijuana seized from his car had weighed thirty-five pounds and the court had accepted that stipulation, the jury had not been asked to and had not specifically found the weight of the drugs.

22
State v. Crowleygreen
ariz · 1974 · cited in 2 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1990–1991
2 sentences

1991State v. Crowley, 111 Ariz. 308, 311 , 528 P.2d 834, 837 (1974), rev’d, State v. Avila, 127 Ariz. 21 , 617 P.2d 1137 (1980).

1991State v. Crowley, 111 Ariz. 308, 311 , 528 P.2d 834, 837 (1974), rev’d, State v. Avila, 127 Ariz. 21 , 617 P.2d 1137 (1980).

22
State Ex Rel. Mendez v. AMERICAN SUPPORTgreen
ariz · 2005 · cited in 3 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
2 sentences

2005But see State v. Aleman, 210 Ariz. 232, ¶ 42 , 109 P.3d 571, 584 (App.2005) (Flórez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding Boykin standard must be satisfied before defendant’s admissions of fact may be used for sentencing purposes); Aleman , ¶ 39 (Es-pinosa, J., specially concurring) (rejecting notion that “routine stipulation or admission by a defendant” used to establish element of offense or factual basis for plea would require independent Boykin waiver before it may be used for sentencing purposes); see also State v. Miranda-Cabrera, 209 Ariz. 220, ¶ 29 , 99 P.3d 35, 41-4

2005But see State v. Aleman, 210 Ariz. 232, ¶ 42 , 109 P.3d 571, 584 (App.2005) (Flórez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding Boykin standard must be satisfied before defendant’s admissions of fact may be used for sentencing purposes); Aleman , ¶ 39 (Es-pinosa, J., specially concurring) (rejecting notion that “routine stipulation or admission by a defendant” used to establish element of offense or factual basis for plea would require independent Boykin waiver before it may be used for sentencing purposes); see also State v. Miranda-Cabrera, 209 Ariz. 220, ¶ 29 , 99 P.3d 35, 41-4

13
State v. Johnsongreen
ariz · 1971 · cited in 2 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1972–1973
2 sentences

1973State v. Johnson, . 107 Ariz. 169 , 484 P.2d 1 (1971).

1973State v. Johnson, . 107 Ariz. 169 , 484 P.2d 1 (1971).

12
State v. Gordongreen
ariz · 1980 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
2 sentences

2009See State v. Gordon, 125 Ariz. 425 , 428 n. 2, 610 P.2d 59 , 62 n. 2 (1980) (holding remedy for Boykin violation is not reduction in sentence but either setting aside guilty plea as unintelligent or remand to determine if defendant was properly advised of possible sentences); see also Ariz. R.Crim.

2009See State v. Gordon, 125 Ariz. 425 , 428 n. 2, 610 P.2d 59 , 62 n. 2 (1980) (holding remedy for Boykin violation is not reduction in sentence but either setting aside guilty plea as unintelligent or remand to determine if defendant was properly advised of possible sentences); see also Ariz. R.Crim.

11
Averitte v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2005 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
1 sentence

2005Apr.7, 2005) (same); Averitte v. State, 824 N.E.2d 1283, 1287-88 (Ind.App.2005) (jury trial waiver that failed to advise defendant of jury right under Blakely invalid); See also State v. Hagen, 690 N.W.2d 155, 158 (Minn.App. 2004) (effect of admission tantamount to jury waiver and absent express, knowing waiver, use of aggravating factors not found by jury invalid); State v. Aleman, 210 Ariz. 232, 245, ¶ 42 , 109 P.3d 571, 584 (App.2005) (Florez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding Boykin standard must be satisfied before defendant’s admissions of fact may be used for sente

11
State v. Browngreen
arizctapp · 2005 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
2 sentences

2005State v. Brown, 210 Ariz. 534, 539, ¶ 12 , 115 P.3d 128, 133 (App.2005).

2005State v. Brown, 210 Ariz. 534, 539, ¶ 12 , 115 P.3d 128, 133 (App.2005).

11
State v. Hagengreen
minnctapp · 2004 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
1 sentence

2005Apr.7, 2005) (same); Averitte v. State, 824 N.E.2d 1283, 1287-88 (Ind.App.2005) (jury trial waiver that failed to advise defendant of jury right under Blakely invalid); See also State v. Hagen, 690 N.W.2d 155, 158 (Minn.App. 2004) (effect of admission tantamount to jury waiver and absent express, knowing waiver, use of aggravating factors not found by jury invalid); State v. Aleman, 210 Ariz. 232, 245, ¶ 42 , 109 P.3d 571, 584 (App.2005) (Florez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding Boykin standard must be satisfied before defendant’s admissions of fact may be used for sente

11
State v. Woodsgreen
ariz · 1977 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1985–1985
2 sentences

1985See, e.g., State v. Woods, 114 Ariz. 385 , 561 P.2d 306 (1977); State v. Gaines, 113 Ariz. 206 , 549 P.2d 574 (1976).

1985See, e.g., State v. Woods, 114 Ariz. 385 , 561 P.2d 306 (1977); State v. Gaines, 113 Ariz. 206 , 549 P.2d 574 (1976).

11
Duncan v. Louisianagreen
scotus · 1968 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1972–1972
2 sentences

1972Among these is the right to trial by jury, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 194 , 88 S.Ct. 1444 , 20 L.Ed.2d 491, 522 (1968), and the right to confront one’s accusers, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 , 85 S.Ct. 1065 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), but neither Rule 11 nor the Boykin case requires in express terms that each of the rights mentioned herein, confrontation and jury trial, must be specifically and expressly waived by the accused prior to acceptance of his guilty plea.” 106 Ariz. at 588, 480 P.2d at 344 .

1972Among these is the right to trial by jury, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 194 , 88 S.Ct. 1444 , 20 L.Ed.2d 491, 522 (1968), and the right to confront one’s accusers, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 , 85 S.Ct. 1065 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), but neither Rule 11 nor the Boykin case requires in express terms that each of the rights mentioned herein, confrontation and jury trial, must be specifically and expressly waived by the accused prior to acceptance of his guilty plea.” 106 Ariz. at 588, 480 P.2d at 344 .

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (1)

CaseNegativeCited
State Ex Rel. Mendez v. AMERICAN SUPPORTgreen
ariz · 2005 · cited in 3 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
2 sentences

2005But see State v. Aleman, 210 Ariz. 232, ¶ 42 , 109 P.3d 571, 584 (App.2005) (Flórez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding Boykin standard must be satisfied before defendant’s admissions of fact may be used for sentencing purposes); Aleman , ¶ 39 (Es-pinosa, J., specially concurring) (rejecting notion that “routine stipulation or admission by a defendant” used to establish element of offense or factual basis for plea would require independent Boykin waiver before it may be used for sentencing purposes); see also State v. Miranda-Cabrera, 209 Ariz. 220, ¶ 29 , 99 P.3d 35, 41-4

2005But see State v. Aleman, 210 Ariz. 232, ¶ 42 , 109 P.3d 571, 584 (App.2005) (Flórez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding Boykin standard must be satisfied before defendant’s admissions of fact may be used for sentencing purposes); Aleman , ¶ 39 (Es-pinosa, J., specially concurring) (rejecting notion that “routine stipulation or admission by a defendant” used to establish element of offense or factual basis for plea would require independent Boykin waiver before it may be used for sentencing purposes); see also State v. Miranda-Cabrera, 209 Ariz. 220, ¶ 29 , 99 P.3d 35, 41-4

23

Also cited on this issue (16)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Avila green
ariz · 1980
2 sentences

1991State v. Crowley, 111 Ariz. 308, 311 , 528 P.2d 834, 837 (1974), rev’d, State v. Avila, 127 Ariz. 21 , 617 P.2d 1137 (1980).

1991State v. Crowley, 111 Ariz. 308, 311 , 528 P.2d 834, 837 (1974), rev’d, State v. Avila, 127 Ariz. 21 , 617 P.2d 1137 (1980).

21990–1991
State v. Sullivan green
ariz · 1971
2 sentences

1982Between the date on which the first appeal became final and the decision of the second appeal, we held in a different *42 case, State v. Sullivan, 107 Ariz. 98 , 482 P.2d 861 (1971), that an appellate court could determine the Boykin issue without first requiring defendant to petition the trial court to set aside the plea.

1982Between the date on which the first appeal became final and the decision of the second appeal, we held in a different *42 case, State v. Sullivan, 107 Ariz. 98 , 482 P.2d 861 (1971), that an appellate court could determine the Boykin issue without first requiring defendant to petition the trial court to set aside the plea.

21978–1982
Boykin v. Alabama green
scotus · 1969
2 sentences

1973Since this is a pre-Boykin plea (Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 [1969]) the standard is measured .by basic fairness.

1973Since this is a pre-Boykin plea (Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 [1969]) the standard is measured .by basic fairness.

21971–1973
State v. Gaines green
ariz · 1976
2 sentences

1985See, e.g., State v. Woods, 114 Ariz. 385 , 561 P.2d 306 (1977); State v. Gaines, 113 Ariz. 206 , 549 P.2d 574 (1976).

1985See, e.g., State v. Woods, 114 Ariz. 385 , 561 P.2d 306 (1977); State v. Gaines, 113 Ariz. 206 , 549 P.2d 574 (1976).

11985–1985
State v. Rios green
ariz · 1976
2 sentences

1980In response, the state points out that the Boykin requirement was established for adult cases in State v. Rios, 113 Ariz. 30 , 545 P.2d 954 (1976), and that that case was held to be prospective only in State v. Sten-rud, 113 Ariz. 327 , 553 P.2d 1201 (1976), and State v. Price, 27 Ariz.App. 673 , 558 P.2d 701 (1976).

1980In response, the state points out that the Boykin requirement was established for adult cases in State v. Rios, 113 Ariz. 30 , 545 P.2d 954 (1976), and that that case was held to be prospective only in State v. Sten-rud, 113 Ariz. 327 , 553 P.2d 1201 (1976), and State v. Price, 27 Ariz.App. 673 , 558 P.2d 701 (1976).

11980–1980
State v. Price green
arizctapp · 1976
2 sentences

1980In response, the state points out that the Boykin requirement was established for adult cases in State v. Rios, 113 Ariz. 30 , 545 P.2d 954 (1976), and that that case was held to be prospective only in State v. Sten-rud, 113 Ariz. 327 , 553 P.2d 1201 (1976), and State v. Price, 27 Ariz.App. 673 , 558 P.2d 701 (1976).

1980In response, the state points out that the Boykin requirement was established for adult cases in State v. Rios, 113 Ariz. 30 , 545 P.2d 954 (1976), and that that case was held to be prospective only in State v. Sten-rud, 113 Ariz. 327 , 553 P.2d 1201 (1976), and State v. Price, 27 Ariz.App. 673 , 558 P.2d 701 (1976).

11980–1980
State v. Payne neutral
ariz · 1974
2 sentences

1980In State v. Payne, 110 Ariz. 506 , 520 P.2d 1130 (1974), Arizona recognized for the first time that Boykin warnings may be necessary in a case which is submitted for determination by the court and in State v. Crowley, supra, this principle became the law of the land.

1980In State v. Payne, 110 Ariz. 506 , 520 P.2d 1130 (1974), Arizona recognized for the first time that Boykin warnings may be necessary in a case which is submitted for determination by the court and in State v. Crowley, supra, this principle became the law of the land.

11980–1980
State v. Stenrud green
ariz · 1976
2 sentences

1980In response, the state points out that the Boykin requirement was established for adult cases in State v. Rios, 113 Ariz. 30 , 545 P.2d 954 (1976), and that that case was held to be prospective only in State v. Sten-rud, 113 Ariz. 327 , 553 P.2d 1201 (1976), and State v. Price, 27 Ariz.App. 673 , 558 P.2d 701 (1976).

1980In response, the state points out that the Boykin requirement was established for adult cases in State v. Rios, 113 Ariz. 30 , 545 P.2d 954 (1976), and that that case was held to be prospective only in State v. Sten-rud, 113 Ariz. 327 , 553 P.2d 1201 (1976), and State v. Price, 27 Ariz.App. 673 , 558 P.2d 701 (1976).

11980–1980
State v. Offing green
ariz · 1976
2 sentences

1977Cf. State v. Offing, 113 Ariz. 287 , 551 P.2d 556 (1976), wherein these were again eliminated from an extensive enumeration of the due process and Crowley requirements on a submission which had “the same effect as a plea of guilty,” and where the defendant had contended that the plea was not “knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently” made.

1977Cf. State v. Offing, 113 Ariz. 287 , 551 P.2d 556 (1976), wherein these were again eliminated from an extensive enumeration of the due process and Crowley requirements on a submission which had “the same effect as a plea of guilty,” and where the defendant had contended that the plea was not “knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently” made.

11977–1977
State v. Griswold green
ariz · 1969
2 sentences

1972The case of State v. Griswold, 105 Ariz. 1 , 457 P.2d 331 (1969) holds that the Boy- kin rules were not retroactive and discussed the pre-Boykin rule as follows: “At the time Griswold entered his plea of guilty, that is, in May of 1966, the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure provided only that a plea of quilty (sic) could not be accepted from a defendant who was not represented by counsel until the consequences of such plea were explained to him.

1972The case of State v. Griswold, 105 Ariz. 1 , 457 P.2d 331 (1969) holds that the Boy- kin rules were not retroactive and discussed the pre-Boykin rule as follows: “At the time Griswold entered his plea of guilty, that is, in May of 1966, the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure provided only that a plea of quilty (sic) could not be accepted from a defendant who was not represented by counsel until the consequences of such plea were explained to him.

11972–1972
Pointer v. Texas green
scotus · 1965
2 sentences

1972Among these is the right to trial by jury, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 194 , 88 S.Ct. 1444 , 20 L.Ed.2d 491, 522 (1968), and the right to confront one’s accusers, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 , 85 S.Ct. 1065 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), but neither Rule 11 nor the Boykin case requires in express terms that each of the rights mentioned herein, confrontation and jury trial, must be specifically and expressly waived by the accused prior to acceptance of his guilty plea.” 106 Ariz. at 588, 480 P.2d at 344 .

1972Among these is the right to trial by jury, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 194 , 88 S.Ct. 1444 , 20 L.Ed.2d 491, 522 (1968), and the right to confront one’s accusers, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 , 85 S.Ct. 1065 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), but neither Rule 11 nor the Boykin case requires in express terms that each of the rights mentioned herein, confrontation and jury trial, must be specifically and expressly waived by the accused prior to acceptance of his guilty plea.” 106 Ariz. at 588, 480 P.2d at 344 .

11972–1972
State v. Laurino green
ariz · 1971
2 sentences

1972Passing upon the question of specific waiver, our Supreme Court in the post-Boykin plea case of State v. Laurino, 106 Ariz. 586 , 480 P.2d 342 (1971), said: “It is true that when a plea of guilty is entered in a criminal trial there is a waiver of certain basic federal constitutional rights.

1972Passing upon the question of specific waiver, our Supreme Court in the post-Boykin plea case of State v. Laurino, 106 Ariz. 586 , 480 P.2d 342 (1971), said: “It is true that when a plea of guilty is entered in a criminal trial there is a waiver of certain basic federal constitutional rights.

11972–1972
State v. Martinez green
ariz · 1967
2 sentences

1972The pre-Boykin plea case, State v. Martinez, 102 Ariz. 215 , 427 P.2d 533 (1967), which is very similar to the instant situation, states the following: “The trial of the cause commenced on Friday, December 10, 1965.

1972The pre-Boykin plea case, State v. Martinez, 102 Ariz. 215 , 427 P.2d 533 (1967), which is very similar to the instant situation, states the following: “The trial of the cause commenced on Friday, December 10, 1965.

11972–1972
State v. Reynolds neutral
ariz · 1972
2 sentences

1972State v. Johnson, 107 Ariz. 169 at 170 , 484 P.2d 1 at 3 (1971); State v. Reynolds, 108 Ariz. 314 , 497 P.2d 812 (1972).

1972State v. Johnson, 107 Ariz. 169 at 170 , 484 P.2d 1 at 3 (1971); State v. Reynolds, 108 Ariz. 314 , 497 P.2d 812 (1972).

11972–1972
State v. Leuck green
ariz · 1971
2 sentences

1971State v. Leuck, 107 Ariz. 49 , 481 P.2d 842 (1971); State v. Sullivan, supra; State v. Jackson, 14 Ariz.App. 591 , 485 P.2d 580 (1971).

1971State v. Leuck, 107 Ariz. 49 , 481 P.2d 842 (1971); State v. Sullivan, supra; State v. Jackson, 14 Ariz.App. 591 , 485 P.2d 580 (1971).

11971–1971
State v. Jackson green
arizctapp · 1971
2 sentences

1971State v. Leuck, 107 Ariz. 49 , 481 P.2d 842 (1971); State v. Sullivan, supra; State v. Jackson, 14 Ariz.App. 591 , 485 P.2d 580 (1971).

1971State v. Leuck, 107 Ariz. 49 , 481 P.2d 842 (1971); State v. Sullivan, supra; State v. Jackson, 14 Ariz.App. 591 , 485 P.2d 580 (1971).

11971–1971

Where else courts name it

LA 69 (1972–2023) TX 27 (1996–2025) AZ 17 (1971–2009) NE 11 (1981–2000) IN 10 (1975–2015) KY 10 (1980–2024) SD 8 (1988–2015) NY 8 (1983–2023) TN 7 (1993–2015) CA 6 (1972–1981) CT 5 (1971–2016) GA 5 (1999–2014) IL 3 (1971–1993) MI 3 (1972–1994) VA 3 (1993–2014) FL 3 (1970–2008) MA 3 (1975–1998) MS 3 (1970–1996) ND 3 (1982–2026) OR 3 (1972–2005) AL 3 (1994–1994) NC 3 (1971–1999) MO 3 (1975–1999) OH 2 (2012–2013) PA 2 (1996–1998) NH 2 (1995–1995) VT 2 (2000–2014) WA 2 (1978–1981)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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