10 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Roe v. Stategreen2 sentences2015The Boykin court concluded that the remainder of Boykin’s plea agreement remained effective because the vaca-tur of the habitual offender enhancement “did not alter any of the other sentences contained in the plea agreement.” Id. 1998In Golden , this court held that when a court vacates a conviction, it is not altering the sentences for the defendant’s other convictions because the sentences for the other convictions remain unaltered. 553 N.E.2d at 1221 ; see also Roe, 598 N.E.2d at 588, n. 3 (“We note that altering the sentence under a plea agreement is different from vacating a conviction under a plea agreement.”). | 1 | 2 |
Parke v. Raleygreen2 sentences2004The Court noted that the case before it involved collateral review, not direct review as in Boykin, and stated, "To import Boykin's presumption of invalidity into this very different context would, in our view, improperly ignore another presumption deeply rooted in our jurisprudence: the 'presumption of regularity' that attaches to final judgments, even when the question is waiver of constitutional rights." Parke, 506 U.S. at 29 , 113 S.Ct. 517 . 2004The Court noted that the case before it involved collateral review, not direct review as in Boykin, and stated, "To import Boykin's presumption of invalidity into this very different context would, in our view, improperly ignore another presumption deeply rooted in our jurisprudence: the 'presumption of regularity' that attaches to final judgments, even when the question is waiver of constitutional rights." Parke, 506 U.S. at 29 , 113 S.Ct. 517 . | 1 | 2 |
Edwards v. Stategreen2 sentences2002Maffett has not satisfied the second criterion because he was represented by counsel and, as our supreme court determined, a Boykin violation "does not undermine the integrity and reliability of the determination of guilt." Id. 2002Maffett has not satisfied the second criterion because he was represented by counsel and, as our supreme court determined, a Boykin violation "does not undermine the integrity and reliability of the determination of guilt." Id. | 1 | 2 |
Brady v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015See Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). 3 [14] Aside from the Boykin exception applicable to guilty pleas, the .U.S. 2015See Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). 3 [14] Aside from the Boykin exception applicable to guilty pleas, the .U.S. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Damrongreen2 sentences2012State v. Damron, 915 N.E.2d 189, 192 (quoting Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 31 (1992)), trans. denied. 2012State v. Damron, 915 N.E.2d 189, 192 (quoting Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 31 (1992)), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Hall v. Stategreen2 sentences2005Id. at 113 (May, J., dissenting) (citing Edwards v. State, 479 N.E.2d 541, 547-48 (Ind.1985)). 2005Id. at 113 (May, J., dissenting) (citing Edwards v. State, 479 N.E.2d 541, 547-48 (Ind.1985)). | 1 | 1 |
Wilburn v. Stategreen2 sentences2004See Wilburn, 499 N.E.2d at 1176 (finding the defendant's post-conviction claim of a Boykin violation to be barred by laches). 2004See Wilburn, 499 N.E.2d at 1176 (finding the defendant's post-conviction claim of a Boykin violation to be barred by laches). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Conley v. Stategreen2 sentences1985Our supreme court, applying the rule stated in Conley, said: "However, for the reasons expressed in Conley v. State, (1972), 259 Ind. 29 , 284 N.E.2d 803 , we decline to follow Boykin as was done in Brimhall and Bonner. 1985Our supreme court, applying the rule stated in Conley, said: "However, for the reasons expressed in Conley v. State, (1972), 259 Ind. 29 , 284 N.E.2d 803 , we decline to follow Boykin as was done in Brimhall and Bonner. | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Goffner v. State
neutral
2 sentences1986Neeley acknowledges his guilty plea was accepted prior to Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 but argues the pre-Boykin standard required the guilty plea court to determine Neeley made his plea "intelligently, advisedly and understandingly, with full knowledge of his rights," Goffner v. State (1979), 270 Ind. 562 , 387 N.E.2d 1321 , quoting Harshman v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 618 , 115 N.E.2d 501, 502 . 1986Neeley acknowledges his guilty plea was accepted prior to Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 but argues the pre-Boykin standard required the guilty plea court to determine Neeley made his plea "intelligently, advisedly and understandingly, with full knowledge of his rights," Goffner v. State (1979), 270 Ind. 562 , 387 N.E.2d 1321 , quoting Harshman v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 618 , 115 N.E.2d 501, 502 . | 2 | 1985–1986 |
Golden v. State
green
1 sentence1998In Golden , this court held that when a court vacates a conviction, it is not altering the sentences for the defendant’s other convictions because the sentences for the other convictions remain unaltered. 553 N.E.2d at 1221 ; see also Roe, 598 N.E.2d at 588, n. 3 (“We note that altering the sentence under a plea agreement is different from vacating a conviction under a plea agreement.”). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Boykin v. Alabama
green
2 sentences1986Neeley acknowledges his guilty plea was accepted prior to Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 but argues the pre-Boykin standard required the guilty plea court to determine Neeley made his plea "intelligently, advisedly and understandingly, with full knowledge of his rights," Goffner v. State (1979), 270 Ind. 562 , 387 N.E.2d 1321 , quoting Harshman v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 618 , 115 N.E.2d 501, 502 . 1986Neeley acknowledges his guilty plea was accepted prior to Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 but argues the pre-Boykin standard required the guilty plea court to determine Neeley made his plea "intelligently, advisedly and understandingly, with full knowledge of his rights," Goffner v. State (1979), 270 Ind. 562 , 387 N.E.2d 1321 , quoting Harshman v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 618 , 115 N.E.2d 501, 502 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Harshman v. State
green
2 sentences1986Neeley acknowledges his guilty plea was accepted prior to Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 but argues the pre-Boykin standard required the guilty plea court to determine Neeley made his plea "intelligently, advisedly and understandingly, with full knowledge of his rights," Goffner v. State (1979), 270 Ind. 562 , 387 N.E.2d 1321 , quoting Harshman v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 618 , 115 N.E.2d 501, 502 . 1986Neeley acknowledges his guilty plea was accepted prior to Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 but argues the pre-Boykin standard required the guilty plea court to determine Neeley made his plea "intelligently, advisedly and understandingly, with full knowledge of his rights," Goffner v. State (1979), 270 Ind. 562 , 387 N.E.2d 1321 , quoting Harshman v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 618 , 115 N.E.2d 501, 502 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.